The evolution of larval competition strategies in Callosobruchus maculatus and C. analis. by Colegrave, Nicholas
The Evolution of Larval Competition Strategies in Callosobruchus maculatus and 
C. analis 
Nicholas Colegrave 
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the 
Department of Animal and Plant Sciences 
University of Sheffield 
October 1995 
Y Tl' ;,:' ~'1 ~J ',/:~.; L: 
'of ;.';/, f~[~ i.J 
You know I'm born to lose, 
and gamblin's for fools, 
but thats the way I like it baby, I don't wanna live forever. 
(Lemmy from Motorhead, demonstrating his understanding of the subtleties of 
evolutionary game theory) 
"'1\11:-";. , •• 
. . ' ~.~~ ... ~ ~~~:t: 
,.~~~? {~~} ~.: ' 
Acknowledgements 
The three years of this study have been among the most enjoyable I have known. I will never forget the 
early mornings at Chatsworth. chasing ducks that wouldn't sleep, the hunt for the predacious earwig 
Labidura riparia, the last polka, the great Jack Daniels heist, wedding gowns (for plants!) in Totley 
woods or the swings under the stars in Crookes. However, most important of all are the people that have 
helped me out, picked me up and bought me drinks along the way. It is, of course, impossible to thank 
everyone, but I will now attempt to do just that. If I have forgotten you, let me know and I will buy you 
a drink. 
Darren Rose, Hazel Wilson, Phil Young, Bob Bartlett and Dave Blake have all provided 
technical support. Sue Carter has done everything from typing letters to shOwing me how the fax works. 
Joni provided coffee and good cheer. Dave Hollingworth produced great slides from terrible artwork. 
Gordon and Roy never allowed anyone to steal the beetles, and Norma made mornings less traumatic. 
The postgraduate students past and present have provided a friendly environment in which to 
work. Toby introduced me to the beasts (and Katell), Ben shared thoughts on sexual selection and 
cigarettes under rain coats in Rivelin valley, and Matt not only helped with ideas and computers, but 
also caught me when I fell off things. Rowan, Stew, Ollie and Andy (man) did everything they could. 
Rebecca provided valuable help in the areas of cake eating and tea drinking. Rachel always listened 
(and sometimes didn't tell) and Wee Emma always gave as good as she got. Claire and Allison are two 
people I will never forget! Lucy, Mark, Ellie, Anita (1&2), Dave, Sherry, Bobbie, Steve, Martin, 
Danielle, Brigit and Emily all made coffee times more fun. 
From among those at the other end of the coffee room; Ben Hatchwell, Phil Warren, John 
Spicer and Tim "I've some rather interesting data for you to model" Birkhead all provided valuable 
discussion of ideas, and advice about grown up things. 
Many undergraduates have helped to keep my feet on the ground, including Big Joe, Ted, 
Julian, the triplets Steph, Vicci and Angie (and their Jo), Pat, big Jim, little Jo and Sara, the Moray 
Firth mob, Sue, Vicky, Jenny and Suzi .. 
The Liverpool gang; Big Joe, Penny, Tom, Nina and Jude, have all provided somewhere to 
escape to, when Sheffield got too much. Raqucl, Nannette, Christian, Marcel, Vincent and everyone 
else at the NIoo in Heteren, Holland, made me more than welcome. 
Over the last three years my house mates have all gone out of their way to provide another 
world to go home to in the evenings. Nick, Dawn, Julia, Estelle, Ruth, Cath (and Louisa too), Simon 
and Jim all did much to keep me sane, with Cups of tea, fine food, endless supplies of chocolate and 
Saturday afternoons watching Blind date and Gladiators. Becky, Jen and M put me up (or put up with 
me) when I had nowhere else to go! Becky's calming words, pasta slop and desk, all played a large part 
during the writing of this thesis. 
My mum and dad have always been there for me, from lending me the train fare to get to my 
interview, to listening to me moan on for hours about anything and everything. My brothers Camille 
and Jon, and my sister Mel, have all helped in their own ways. 
Mike Siva-Jothy stepped in to look after the British end of the operation when Kate ran away! 
His constant supply of good ideas, damn fine curries, moral support and sharp sunglasses make him the 
sort of supervisor no one should be without. . 
Lastly, (because I know she wont mind) Kate Lessells has spent more hours than I can possibly 
imagine wrestling with my half baked ideas, appauling spelling and grammar and terrible sense of 
humour. Kate has done much to transform the long haired layabout that first entered her office in 
March 92, into a passable approximation of a real scientist, and she always believed I could do it, even 
when I was less sure. 
Thank you, all of you 
The Evolution of Larval Competition Strategies in Callosobruchus maculatus and 
Canalis - Nicholas Colegrave 
Summary 
Callosobruchus maculatus and C. ana/is present an interesting problem to the 
evolutionary ecologist. The larvae of both species complete their development within the 
seeds of various legumes such as black-eyed beans. However, the two species compete 
over the resources within the bean in very different ways. C. maculatus larvae compete 
in a scramble process; the larvae avoid each other within the bean and several adults can 
emerge from a single bean. In contrast the larva of C. analis compete actively within the 
bean, seeking each other out and fighting until only one larva is left alive. As a 
consequence, only a single C. ana/is adult will emerge from each bean, no matter how 
many larvae were initially present. In this thesis I try to determine the types of selective 
forces that can cause two species to evolve such different competition strategies when 
competing over similar resources. 
In Chapter 3 it is suggested that differences in the cost of exploitation 
competition suffered by the two species could explain why they originally evolved 
different larval competition strategies, but that these differences are not enough to 
maintain the strategies under current conditions. It is suggested that historical 
constraints may have limited C. analis to using an ancestral contest competition strategy 
that is maladaptive on the large hosts which this species currently uses. 
In chapter 4 the effect of host size on the cost of exploitation competition is 
investigated further. As expected, the cost of exploitation competition increases as bean 
size decreases. 
In chapter 5 the cost of fighting is measured for C. ana/is larvae. Although the 
fitness of a larva that fights over a bean and wins is affected by having fought, the 
magnitude of the effect is small, and probably of little evolutionary consequence. 
In chapter 6 a game theory model is presented that investigates the effect of 
asymmetries in fighting and passive competitive ability on the evolution of competition 
strategies. The results suggest that such asymmetries will increase the possibility that 
aggressive competition strategies will evolve and could also explain the conditional 
strategies used by some strains of C. maculatus. 
In chapter 7 a genetic model is presented that investigates the effects of 
population structure on the evolution of competition strategies. The results of the model 
suggest that the patchy population structure, typical of stored product pests such as 
Callosobruchus beetles, can favour the evolution of scramble competition strategies. 
Finally the factors that may affect the competition strategy that a species evolves 
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Chapter 1. General introduction 
1.1. An introduction to competition 
Since the publication of Darwin's "On the Origin of species" (Darwin 1859), 
competition by organisms for scarce resources has been recognised as the major force 
driving the evolution of the complex adaptations seen throughout the animal kingdom. 
Darwin recognised that the resources required by organisms are generally in limited 
supply, and this leads to individuals having to compete to obtain them. If individuals 
differ in their ability to compete, some individuals will obtain more of the resource than 
others and ultimately the successful competitors will leave more offspring in the next 
generation than the unsuccessful competitors. Assuming that the traits that made the 
successful individuals good competitors are heritable, this will ultimately lead to a 
population in which all individuals have the traits making them better competitors. 
Thus, competition results in the evolution of traits that enable organisms to become 
better at competing for the resources that they require. 
Competition has been defined as, "an interaction between individuals brought 
about by a shared requirement for a resource in limited supply, and leading to a 
reduction in the survivorship, growth and/or reproduction of the individuals 
concerned" (Begon et al. 1986). It can occur between individuals of different species 
(interspecific competition), but is probably more intense between individuals of the 
same species (intraspecific competition), simply because their requirements for 
resources are likely to be similar. 
1.2. Asymmetric and symmetric competition 
While competition is, by definition, costly to all individuals this does not mean 
that all individuals will suffer from the effects of competition to the same degree. Even 
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within a single specIes there will be differences in the competitive abilities of 
individuals; this m~ans that some individuals do better than others. Competition in 
which individuals are not equal is termed asymmetric competition and is characterised 
by some individuals suffering very little from competition, whilst others suffer a great 
deal. (Begon 1984, Begon et aI. 1986). When competition is extremely asymmetric, the 
successful competitors may actually obtain as much of the resource as they would have 
without competition, while unsuccessful competitors may get nothing at all. However, 
this does not mean that the successful competitor has not paid a cost of having 
competed; the individual will have invested time and energy in competing, and so may 
have a lower fitness than if it had not had to compete. Whilst many experimental and 
theoretical studies have assumed that competition is symmetrical, with all competitors 
being equal, the reality is probably that most competition is asymmetrical (Begon 1984, 
see also Lawton and Hassell 1981 for interspecific competition). 
1.3. Open and closed systems 
Competition for resources can be viewed as occurring in either an open or a 
closed system. An open system is characterised by the fact that individuals can stay and 
compete over the resource, or leave and go in search of other resources. For example, 
an important resource for female Agelenopsis spiders is the site of a web (Riechert 
1978). If two spiders meet in a web, each has the option of staying and fighting over 
the resource, or leaving in search of another web site. In contrast, in a closed system 
individuals are not able to leave the resource and avoid competition. The larvae of 
many parasitoid wasps are limited for the whole of their development to the host larva 
selected by their parent (Godfray 1987a, b). Similarly many leafminers complete their 
development within a single leaf (Faeth 1990) and young birds will often have to 
compete with siblings within their nest for food from their parent. In fact, closed 
systems are probably most commonly experienced by juvenile organisms, as their 
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limited mobility prevents them from avoiding competition by moving to another area to 
feed. 
Whilst much competition probably occurs in open systems, closed systems 
provide many advantages for the study of competition. In particular, the effect of 
competition on the fitness of individuals can be assessed without many of the 
confounding effects that would arise if individuals were able to leave the resource. 
1.4. Processes of competition 
In general, when faced with competition for a resource an organism can choose 
to compete in one of two ways. It can attempt to monopolise the resource by actively 
excluding other competitors such that successful competitors gain sole access to the 
resource, whilst unsuccessful competitors are excluded or even killed. Alternatively an 
individual can compete by attempting to gain as much of the resource as possible 
without actively interfering with other competitors. In the first case competitors affect 
each other's fitnesses by actively interfering with each other, in the second, competitors 
affect each other indirectly by depleting the available resource. 
Nicholson (1954) termed these two competition strategies contest and 
scramble competition respectively. However, whilst Nicholson's definitions of contest 
and scramble competition related to the actual process by which individuals compete, 
recently several authors have redefined these terms in relation to the outcome of 
competition at the population level. With a contest outcome the number of survivors of 
competition may initially increase as the number of competitors increases but then 
remains constant as the number of competitors increases further, whilst, with a 
scramble outcome, the number of survivors after competition may initially increase 
with increased number of competitors, but then begins to decrease again until at very 
high population densities no individual gains enough of the resource to survive (figure 
1.1). This redefinition of the terms has caused confusion in the literature, not least 
because a contest outcome may arise from either a contest or a scramble process. In 
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this thesis the terms are used exclusively to describe the process of competition rather 
than its outcome. 
Other authors have used the term interference competition, to describe 
situations where individuals compete by actively interfering with other competitors and 
exploitation competition when individuals compete by exploiting the resource without 
interference (Miller 1967). These terms were originally defined in relation to 
interspecific competition and roughly equate to the contest process! scramble process 
dichotomy of Nicholson (I 954). 
Both types of competitive process are found throughout the animal kingdom. 
In many species of animal, males fight over groups of females and winning males gain 
sole access to the females, whilst in other species, males compete for females simply by 
attempting to attract as many females as possible, without directly interfering with 
other males. Even similar species can compete in very different ways. In some birds, 
nestlings compete for food from the parents in a scramble process (e.g. Palmer 1941), 
with individuals attempting to beg louder than each other, whilst in other species, 
particularly raptors, chicks may attempt to kill one another and siblicide within a nest is 
not uncommon (e.g. Meyburg 1974, Mock 1984). Godfray (1987b) has described a 
dichotomy of competition behaviours in the larvae of parasitoid wasps. In gregarious 
species, the larvae do not interfere with each other and compete in a scramble process 
with several adults emerging from a single host, whilst in solitary species, larvae fight 
to the death and, as a consequence, only a single adult emerges from each host. The 
type of competition strategy that a species adopts will have important consequences 
for the population dynamics of that species, therefore it is important for evolutionary 
ecologists to understand the types of selective forces and ecological factors that affect 
the type of competition strategy that a species evolves. 
s 
1.5. Larval competition in Callosobruchus beetles 
Beetles of the genus Callosobruchus are stored product pests of various 
legumes cultivated by man (Southgate 1978. 1979). Females lay their eggs on the 
surface of beans. and once the eggs hatch the larvae burrow through the testa into the 
bean where they feed until pupation. Several eggs can be laid on a single bean and. as 
beans are closed systems with a larva restricted to a single bean for the whole of its pre 
adult development. larval competition can be intense. The consequences of this larval 
competition are particularly important in these beetles as they do not feed as adults and 
so the resources obtained as a larva must sustain the adult for the whole of its life. 
Callosobruchus beetles make an ideal model system for investigating the evolution of 
competition strategies as different species within the genus compete in different ways 
as larvae (Smith & Lessells 1985). The larvae of C. macula/us compete in the way 
typical of most other Callosobruchus species. with larvae avoiding each other within a 
bean and competing in a scramble process. exploiting the resource without directly 
interfering with each other. In contrast. the larvae of C. analis compete using a contest 
process; larvae seek each other out within the bean and fight to the death (Umeya et al 
1975). As a result. whilst more than 15 adult C. macula/us can emerge from a single 
black-eyed bean, generally only a single C. analis adult ever emerges from a single 
host. In this thesis I aim to determine some of the selective forces that may have been 
responsible for the evolution of such different larval competition strategies in two such 
similar species of beetle. 
1.6. The approach 
When investigating the evolution of a trait or behaviour, the evolutionary 
ecologist is faced with an obvious problem; the forces that produced the evolutionary 
outcome observed today were operating in the past, and so cannot be observed 
directly. As a consequence the researcher must use more indirect approaches to make 
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inferences about what may have occurred in the past. One approach that has been 
particularly fruitful is the use of theoretical modelling in conjunction with experiments 
designed to test the assumptions and predictions of the models. This mixture of 
theoretical modelling and experimental investigation was the approach used in this 
study. 
1.6.1. Theoretical models 
The use of theoretical models allows the evolutionary ecologist to construct 
possible scenarios for the way in which evolution may have operated in the past. When 
considering why a species has evolved to compete in a certain way the researcher often 
begins by considering other ways in which the organism could behave, the organism's 
strategy set (parker 1984, Grafen 1991). Factors thought to be important in the 
evolution of the character are then incorporated into the model as parameters, and 
assumptions are made about the effect of each factor on the fitness of individuals using 
different strategies. The strategy expected to evolve under different conditions can 
then be determined by altering the values of the parameters in the model, and seeing 
the effect on the fitness of the different strategies. 
If the fitness of an individual depends only on the way in which it behaves, and 
is independent of the way other individuals behave, optimality models can be used to 
determine the best way to behave under different conditions (Maynard Smith 1978, 
Parker and Maynard Smith 1990). However, when considering the evolution of a 
competition strategy, the fitness of an individual will depend not only on the way in 
which it behaves but also on the strategy used by its competitors. In this situation 
optimality models no longer apply and instead an evolutionary game theory approach 
must be used (Maynard Smith 1982). 
Evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith 1982, Riechert & Hammerstein 
1983, Parker 1984) was developed from economic game theory (Von Neuman & 
Morgenstern 1953) specifically to investigate competitive behaviour in animals. Instead 
of looking for the optimal strategy for a certain set of conditions, game theory looks 
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for the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS: Maynard Smith 1982). This is defined as a 
strategy such that, if all members of a population adopt it, no mutant strategy can 
invade under the influence of natural selection (Maynard Smith 1982). An individual 
using the ESS is effectively maximising its expected fitness given the way in which 
other individuals are behaving, rather than its expected fitness per se. Game theory 
models are typically classified into two types; models in which the fitness of a strategy 
depends on a series of pairwise interactions (pairwise models), and models in which the 
fitness depends on some average property of the whole population (playing the field 
models). The types of competitive interaction studied in this thesis fit into the former 
category because larval competition will occur between two or a few individuals within 
a single bean. 
Game theory models are an example of phenotypic models (Grafen 1991), 
where the evolution of the strategy or phenotype is modelled without considering the 
genetic system underlying the character. More accurately, game theory models assume 
that the phenotype is inherited asexually via a haploid genotype. Phenotypic models are 
particularly common in studies of the evolution of behaviour, simply because the 
genetic system behind the character is often unknown and is likely to be complicated. 
Whilst no evolutionary biologist believes that behaviour is really inherited in this way, 
the fact that models with explicit genetic systems often give identical results to their 
simpler phenotypic equivalents (Maynard Smith 1981, 1982, Thomas 1985a, b, c, d) 
suggests that it is often safe to ignore the genetics of the character. However, there are 
some instances in which a model assuming asexual reprodution will not suffice; for 
example in chapter 7 of this thesis the effect of population structure on the evolution of 
competition strategies, including the effect of the point in the population cycle at which 
a female mates, is investigated theoretically. To investigate such an effect it is 
obviously impossible to assume that inheritance is asexual. In this situation, the 
approach of assuming that the behaviour is controlled by the simplest possible diploid 
genetic system, with behaviours controlled by different alleles can offer a tractable 
alternative. In this case, an allele that, once fixed in the population cannot be replaced 
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by a rare mutant allele, will be evolutionarily stable, and the strategy that this allele 
represents can be viewed as an ESS. 
1.6.2. Experimental investigations. 
Once a model has been constructed which seems consistent with contemporary 
observations, it is not enough to accept that the model is a true representation of the 
way in which evolution actually occurred. Instead, the model must be used to make 
predictions that can be tested. There are three main approaches used in evolutionary 
ecology to test models~ i) selection experiments, ii) comparative studies and iii) 
experimental tests. Selection experiments generally attempt to alter the factors thought 
to be important in the evolution of the character under investigation, in the hope of 
producing a change in the character in line with the predictions of the model. Although 
selection experiments can provide a large amount of information about the validity of 
the model, they are generally extremely time consuming (to select for a change in 
behaviour can take many generations) and are particular likely to be unsuccessful for 
qualititive traits as they rely on the presence of genetic variation which, although 
assumed to have been present at the time when the character evolved, may not be 
present in the contemporary population. Comparative studies use variation in 
characters between species, and look for relationships between characters and the 
factors thought to be important to their evolution (Felsenstein 1985, 1988, Grafen 
1989, Harvey & Pagel 1991). Such studies have been extremely successful in testing 
many ideas in evolution,· but they do require a large amount of information about 
character values for many species that is often not available. Experimental tests use 
experimental manipulations to either test the assumptions of the model, or to measure 
the effect of altering factors on the fitness of individuals. In this study experimental 
techniques were used to test the assumptions and predictions of a model of the 
evolution of larval competition strategies. 
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1.7. Previous models of competition 
There have been many attempts to produce theoretical models to explain how 
various aspects of the way in which organisms compete may have evolved. Many of 
these models have concentrated on the way in which organisms should behave, given 
that they are either competing in a contest process (e.g. Maynard Smith & Price 1973 
, 
Maynard Smith & Parker 1976, Harnmerstein 1981, Enquist & Leimar 1990) or a 
scramble process (Fretwell & Lucas 1970) over the resource. However, several models 
have explored the types of factors that could determine which strategy, contest or 
scramble, a species will evolve. Godfray (1987b) produced a simple genetic model to 
explain why the larvae of some parasitoid insects will fight to the death within a host 
(solitary species), whilst others will coexist, and compete passively (gregarious 
species). Godfray (1987b) found that the stability of the two strategies depended 
Critically on the optimum clutch size of the parent, which will in tum depend on the 
quality of the host. At large clutch sizes the gregarious strategy was stable against 
invasion by the solitary strategy, whilst at small clutch sizes the solitary strategy could 
invade. However, the model also exibited hysteresis; the gregarious strategy was often 
unable to invade a population of solitary strategists, even at high optimum clutch sizes. 
The problem of whether a chick in a nest should share food with its siblings, or attempt 
to monopolise the food by interfering with or killing other chicks has also been 
investigated theoretically (O'Connor 1978, Dickens & Clark 1987, Godfray & Harper 
199 I). While differing in details, these models all showed that sibIicide is likely to 
evolve when the fitness of chicks that share the resources in the nest is low relative to 
the fitness of a chick that has the nest to itself. In this system too, the model of 
Godfray and Harper (1991), predicted hysteresis with it being far harder for a non 
siblicidal gene to invade a siblicidal population, under conditions in which the non 
siblicidal strategy would be stable, than vice versa. More generally, models have been 
used to investigate under what conditions organisms are expected to exclude other 
individuals from resource patches and behave territorially (Davies & Houston 1984). 
These models predict that individuals should contest the resource, and behave 
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territorially if the reduction in fitness caused by sharing the territory is high relative to 
the costs of defending the territory: this is the the concept of economic defendability 
(Brown 1964, Davies & Houston 1984). 
Whilst these models were produced to investigate different systems, their 
general conclusions are similar. The way in which organisms should compete will 
depend on the reduction in fitness suffered by individuals that share the resource, 
compared to individuals with sole access to the resource. 
1.S. The Smith and Lessells model of Larval competition in internally feeding 
granivores 
Smith and Lessells (1985) produced a simple game theory model to try to 
investigate the types of selective forces that may be important in determining the type 
of competition strategy that a species evolves. The model was developed with 
Callosobruchus beetles in mind and provides the basis for much of the work described 
in this thesis. Smith and Lessells began by defining two larval competition strategies: 
Attack strategists attempt to find and kill other larvae within a bean, whilst Avoid 
larvae attempt to avoid one another within a bean, and compete in a scramble process. 
They then constructed a simple game theory model to determine what factors would 
affect which of the two strategies would be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS~ 
Maynard Smith 1982). The simplest version of their model assumed that competition 
occurred between pairs of larvae, with each bean containing exactly two larvae before 
competition, and it is this version of the model that is described here. However, 
versions of the model with more than two larvae per bean produced qualitatively 
similar results. 
The fitness of larvae using the two different competition strategies were 
defined relative to the fitness of an Avoid larva that develops alone within a bean 
(defined as having a fitness of 1). If two Avoid larvae share a bean, there is no 
interference between the larvae and each suffers a reduction in fitness, E, due to 
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exploiting the same resource. If two Attack larvae share a bean they fight, and one kills 
the other and each larva is assumed to have the same probability of winning the fight. 
The surviving larva does not suffer any cost of having fought, and thus has a fitness of 
1. If a bean contains one Attack and one Avoid larva, the larvae are assumed to always 
meet, and fight to the death. The probability that an Attack larva wins an encounter, 
with an Avoid larva was defined as W, and A ttack larvae were always assumed to be at 
least as likely to survive the encounter as Avoid larvae (0.5 ~ W ~ 1). The payoffs to 
the two strategies in competition with each other are shown in Table 1.1. 
Smith and LesseIIs then used these pay-offs to calculate the average fitness of 
Avoid strategists (SAVOid) and Attack strategists (SAnaek) in a population containing a 
proportion p Avoid strategists and (l-p) Attack strategists. The average fitnesses were 
determined as: 
SA void = p.(1-E) + (l-p)(1-W) 
SAnaek = p.W + (l-p)12 ii 
Thus, the average fitness of each strategy depends, not only on E and W but also on 
the frequency of the two strategies in the population. If there is no Attack larval 
superiority, (W = 0.5) the ESS depends simply on the value ofE (figure 1.2a and b.). 
IfE is less than 0.5 (figure 1.2a.), Avoid strategists are fitter than Attack strategists at 
all frequencies, so, no matter what the initial frequencies, the population will evolve to 
consist entirely of Avoid individuals; Avoid is the only ESS. Similarly, ifW = 0.5 but E 
> 0.5 Attack is the sole ESS (figure 1.2b.). If there is some degree of Attack larval 
superiority, Attack is always a possible ESS (figure 1.2c. and d.), but if the cost of 
exploitation competition is also low (E < I-W), Avoid is also a possible ESS (figure 
1.2c.). Under conditions in which Attack and Avoid are both possible ESSls the one 
that the population evolves to will depend on the initial frequencies of the two 
strategies; if Attack is initially at high frequency then the achieved ESS is Attack, 
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Table 1.1. Pay-off matrix for the Smith and Lessells model of larval competition. The 
matrix shows the expected pay-off to a larva adopting a particular strategy against 
both sorts of opponent. E is the cost of exploitation competition and W is the 
. probability that an Attack larva kills an Avoid larva. 
Larva's strategy Opponent's strategy 
Avoid Attack 
Avoid l-E l-W 
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Figure 1.2. The fitness versus frequency curves for the Smith and Lessells model (after 
Smith & Lessells 1985 Fig. 26.6). Fitness of Avoid (broken lines) and Attack (solid 
lines) are plotted against p the frequency of Avoid strategists. The strategy with the 
higher average fitness will increase in frequency. IfW > 0.5 Attack is an ESS (b and d), 
whilst if E < l-W Avoid is an ESS (a and c). If both conditions are true Attack and 
Avoid are alternative ESS's (c), although in this situation individuals at the Attack ESS 
will always have a lower fitness than individuals at the Avoid ESS. 
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otherwise it is Avoid. Also, under some conditions Attack and Avoid are alternative 
ESS's this does not mean that individuals at the alternative ESS's will have the same 
fitness. As can be seen from figure 1.2c., individuals at the Avoid ESS have a higher 
average fitness than those at the Attack ESS, and this is true for all conditions in the 
model in which the two strategies are both possible ESS's. If a population evolves 
under conditions in which the cost of exploitation competition is high, it may become 
stuck at the Attack ESS even if conditions change such that individuals at the Avoid 
ESS would have a higher fitness. 
Thus, the results of the model suggest that the cost of exploitation competition 
is an important factor in determining the type of competition strategy that a species 
evolves, the higher this cost the more likely a species will evolve a contest strategy. 
However, if there is any degree of Attack larval superiority, the evolutionary history of 
the species can play an important role in determining which of the two ESS's the 
population evolves to. Smith (1990) also produced a model of the same situation, but 
with behaviour controlled by a simple diploid genetic system. The genetic model gave 
the same results as the original game theory model, whether the allele producing Avoid 
behaviour was dominant or recessive. Thus adding a simple genetic system to the 
model did not alter the model's outcome. 
1.9. The Aims 
The general aim of this study was to investigate some of the factors that affect 
whether a species evolves a contest or scramble competition strategy using 
Callosobruchus beetles as a model system. The problem was investigated using both 
experimental and theoretical techniques. 
The aim of the experimental work was to evalute the success of the Smith and 
Lessells model in explaining the evolution of larval competition strategies in 
Callosobruchus beetles by testing experimentally some of its predictions and 
assumptions. The cost of exploitation competition was measured for both C. 
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maculatus and C. analis, to see whether inherent differences in this cost could explain 
the different larval competition strategies of the two species (Chapter 3). The cost of 
exploitation competition suffered by C. maculatus larvae was also measured on hosts 
of different species and sizes, to examine the effect of host size on the evolution of 
larval competition strategies (Chapter 4). Finally the assumption that fighting over a 
bean is not costly to the victor was investigated by measuring this cost in C. anaUs 
larvae (Chapter 5). 
The Smith and Lessells model is a simple game theory model and the main aim 
of the theoretical work was to extend this model to provide a better understanding of 
the evolution of larval competition strategies. In particular, models were produced to 
investigate the effects of asymmetries in fighting and passive competitive ability 
(Chapter 6) and of a subdivided population structure (Chapter 7) on the evolution of 
competition strategies. 
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Chapter 2. Materials and methods 
2.1. General biology of Callosohruchus maculatus and Canalis 
Bruchid beetles of the genus Callosohruchus are stored product pests found 
throughout the tropics and subtropics (Southgate 1978, 1979). The genus probably 
had its origins in Asia and Africa, but has since become pan-global with the 
unintentional aid of man (Southgate 1978). C. maculatus is now known to occur in 
Asia, Africa, Europe, Australasia and the Americas, whilst C. analis is most common 
in Asia, but is also occasionally found in Africa (Southgate 1978). 
The adult females of both species lay their eggs on the surface of various 
legumes cultivated by man. The hosts of C. maculatus include black-eyed bean (Vigna 
unguiculata), mung bean (V radiata), adzuki bean (V, angu/aris) soya bean (Glycine 
max) and brown lentil (Lens esculenta), whilst C. ana/is is generally found only on 
black-eyed beans and mung beans. However, both species are able to use other hosts 
when presented with them (Janzen 1977, Umeya et alI975). 
About three days after eggs are laid, the developing larvae of both species are 
clearly visible within the egg, due to the presence of the conspicuous dark cephalic 
shield (Van de Meer 1979), and two to three days after this the larva begins to chew 
through the testa and enter the cotyledon tissue within the bean (Howe & Currie 
1964). As the larvae burrow into the bean, they eject seed matter into the chorion of 
the egg, causing it to change from translucent white to opaque (either white or brown 
depending on the colour of the cotyledon tissue). Once within the bean the larvae of 
the two species show different feeding behaviour, with larvae of C. maculatus feeding 
at the surface of the bean, just below the testa, and C. analis larvae burrowing to the 
centre of the bean to feed. The larvae of both species pass through three or four further 
instars within the bean and then pupate (Howe & Currie 1964, Begum et aI. 1982, 
Wightman 1978). The adult beetles then emerge from the bean through a small 
emergence hole cut into the testa. The developmental times of both species are 
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affected by temperature and humidity (EI-Sawaf 1956, Giga & Smith 1983), but at 
300C, 70% rho C. macula/lis pass from egg to emergence in about 22 days, whilst C. 
analis take about 28 days (pers. obs.). After emerging, the adults can mate at once and 
will live for about 6 days for C. macula/us and 15 days for C. anal is (Giga & Smith 
1983, and pers. obs.). The adults of both species do not nonnally feed after emergence. 
2.2. Stock cultures 
The C. macula/us strain used in this study derives from a stock cultured at 
Imperial college at Silwood park since 1977 and is the same Campinas strain as that 
used by Bellows (1982a, b), and Giga and Smith (1981, 1987). The strain was 
originally collected from Brazil in 1974 (Wilson 1989, Ovenden 1991), and has been 
cultured at Sheffield University since Iuly 1984. The exact geographical origin of the 
C. anal is culture is unknown, but it too came from Imperial college in Iuly 1984 (C.M. 
Lessells pers. com.). Cultures of both C. macula/us and C. analis were maintained, 
and experiments conducted, in a constant environment room at 300 C, 70%rh, using 
black-eyed beans as a host until September 1994, after which point failure of the 
humidifYing equipment meant the conditions were changed to 300 e, 35% ± 5 rho The 
change in conditions occured between experiments, and the only experiment carried 
out under the new conditions was the experiment on three different sized black-eyed 
beans, described in chapter 4. 
The same general culturing regime was used for both species. Every week 
about 200 adult beetles were removed from a stock culture set up four (in the case of 
C. maculatus) or five (in the case of C. anal is) weeks earlier. In general these adults 
would have emerged less than four days previously. The adults were then placed in a 
new culture box with approximately 1000 black-eyed beans, and allowed to oviposit 
for one week. All beetles (most of which had died by this point) were then removed 
from the beans. The beans were then left for a further three (C. macula/us) or four (C. 
17 
anal is) weeks at which point the next generation of adult beetles would have emerged 
and the process could be repeated. 
This procedure means that each culture was made up of four (C. maculatus) or 
five (C. analis) subcultures, each set up a week apart. Whilst this ensures a constant 
supply of newly emerged beetles every week it does have the problem that, because 
subcultures are genetically isolated, there may be some degree of genetic divergence 
between them. To reduce the effect of this on experimental results beetles used within 
an experiment were all obtained from the same subculture whenever possible. 
2.3. General methods 
2.3.1. Sexing adults 
The adults of C. macula/us are sexually dimorphic in their elytral markings 
(Southgate et aI. 1959, Halstead 1963) and so can be easily and reliably sexed. 
However, male and female C. allalis do not differ in appearance (Southgate et at. 
1959), and for this species beetles had to be dissected at the end of an experiment to 
determine their sex, with males identified by the presence of the chitinised aedegus. 
2.3.2. Estimating fitness 
Two main measures of fitness were used in this study; survival of larvae to 
emergence and female emergence size, measured as left elytron length. Both have been 
shown to be affected by competition in previous studies (Mitchell 1975, Credland et at 
1986, Giga & Smith 1991, Messina 1991). Female emergence size is known to be a 
good indicator of lifetime fecundity in many insects, including C. macula/us (Credland 
et aI 1986, Colegrave 1993). To determine the relationship between female lifetime 
fecundity and emergence size in the two species used in this study, virgin females (less 
than 12h since emergence) of both species were mated to virgin males (less than 12h 
since emergence) and each given 100 black-eyed beans on which to oviposit. After the 
females died, their left elytron was removed and measured using a Kontron Videoplan 
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image analysis system (Kontron 8057 Eching, Munchen, Germany) attached to a 
Reichert lung Polyvar compound microscope (Reichert AG, Wien, Austria). The 
number of eggs laid by each female was then counted. In both species there was a 
positive relationship between female lifetime fecundity and female emergence size 
(figures 2.1. & 2.2.). Moreover the intercepts of the two regression lines do not differ 
significantly from zero, suggesting that female lifetime fecundity is directly 
proportional to emergence size. 
In later experiments the development time of larvae was also measured. 
However, as the effect of changes in development time depend on the rate of growth 
of the population, it is difficult to translate effects on development into effects on 
fitness. 
2.3.3. Computing and statistics 
All simulations described in this thesis were written in ANSI C++, and run on 
the University of Sheffield's Silicon Graphics computer. Random numbers were 
generated where required using the ran2 procedure (press et al. 1992). All statistical 
analyses were carried out using SPSS (SPSS Inc, 1989). Statistical methods were 
obtained from Sokal and Rohlf (1981), Snedecor and Cochran (1967), Siegal and 
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Figure 2.1. The relationship between female lifetime fecundity and left elytron length 
for C. maculatus. Fecundity = -127+101.0(elytron length): Fl19 = 4.95, P = 0.038 . 
. The intercept of the line with the y axis does not differ significantly from zero ( t = 
1.22, df = 19, P = 0.24) and so lifetime female fecundity is directly proportional to 
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Figure 2.2. The relationship betwe~~ female lifetime fecundity and left elytron length 
~or C. analis. Fecundity = -Il8+101.4(elytron length): FI,IS = 9.15, P = 0.007. The 
Intercept of the line with the y axis does not differ significantly from zero (t = 1.77,df. 
== 18, P = 0.094 ) and so lifetime fecundity is directly proportional to female elytron 
length. . '. .. . . . . .... . 
.f 
19 
Chapter 3. Experimental measurement of the cost of exploitation 
competition in Callosobrucllus maculatus and C. analis 
(Based on Colegrave 1995) 
3.1 Introduction 
One of the major aims of theoretical modelling in evolutionary ecology is to try to 
determine which factors in an organism's environment could have been important in 
producing the evolutionary outcomes that we see today. Once a model has been 
produced which seems to explain the way in which evolution has proceeded the model 
can then be used to make experimentally testable predictions. 
The Smith and Lessells (1985) model of larval competition in granivorous 
insects attempted to explain why several larvae of Callosobruchus maculatus will 
coexist within a single bean, using the Avoid competition strategy (Smith and Lessells 
1985), whilst the larvae of C. analis use the Attack larval competition strategy (Smith 
and Lessells 1985) and fight to the death within a bean leaving only a single surviving 
adult to emerge. Smith and Lessells modelled larval competition using 2 variables; the 
cost of exploitation competition (E) and Attack larval superiority (W). The cost of 
exploitation competition represents the reduction in fitness of an Avoid larva which 
shares a bean with another A void larva compared to what its fitness would have been 
had it developed without exploitation competition (defined as a fitness of 1). Attack 
larval superiority is simply the probability that an Attack larva beats an Avoid larva in a 
fight, and allows for the fact that by specialising in fighting behaviour, Attack larvae 
may be better fighters than Avoid larvae. The results of the model are summarised in 
figure 3.1. 
In general, as the cost of exploitation competition increases, the Attack larval 
competition strategy becomes more likely to be the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS, 










Figure 3.1. The Smith and Lessells model. E is the cost of exploitation competition and 
W the level of Attack larval superiority. Zones represent the ESS under different 
conditions. Although the original Smith and Lessells model did not include values ofW 
< 0.5, these are included in this figure for completeness. 
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maculatus could thus explain their different larval competition strategies. Previous 
authors have successfully measured the cost of exploitation competition in C. 
maculatus (Credland, et al. 1986, Giga & Smith 1991, Messina 1991) by measuring 
the relative fitness of larvae raised with and without exploitation competition. 
However, this cannot be done for C. analis as the larvae kill each other leaving a single 
larva to develop without exploitation competition. However, it is possible to get two 
C. ana/is larvae to share a bean sequentially, by allowing one larva to develop alone 
within a bean and then, once it has emerged, allowing a second larva to develop in the 
same bean. The reduction in fitness of the second larva compared to the first can be 
used as a measure of the cost if the two larvae had shared the bean simultaneously. If 
the same is done with C. maculatus larvae, then the reduction of fitness of second 
larvae through a bean can be compared for the two species. If the cost of exploitation 
competition in C. analis is higher than in C. maculatus then the reduction in fitness of 
the second C. ana/is larva will be expected to be higher than for the second C. 
maculatus larva. Finally, the sequential development method can be calibrated for 
Avoid competition by comparing the relative fitness of the second C. maculatus larva 
with the fitness of C. maculatus larvae raised in simultaneous competition (i.e. sharing 
the bean with one other larva). 
This chapter describes a series of experiments designed to answer the question: 
can differences in the cost of exploitation competition in C. analis and C. maculatus 
explain their different larval competition strategies? Sequential competition 
experiments were carried out on both species of beetle to provide comparable 
measures of the cost of exploitation competition, and simultaneous competition 
experiments were carried out on C. maculatus to calibrate the sequential experiments. 
All experiments were carried out on a large host, black-eyed bean (Vigna unguiculata: 
mass ± se; 234mg ± 1.19, n = 50) and also on a small host, mung beans (V. radiata: 




3.2.1. Sequential development 
100 adult C. ana/is (within 12h of emergence) were allowed to oviposit on 200 
host beans for 24h. The beetles were then removed and the beans examined. Any beans 
that did not carry eggs were returned to the beetles for a further 6h of oviposition. This 
was repeated until all beans carried at least one egg. All eggs were laid within a period 
of 36h. The beans then had their egg load reduced to one by removal of excess eggs 
with a scalpel and. were placed in individual cells of a partitioned petri dish in 
conditions suitable for larval development (300 C, 70%rh). This procedure removes 
any systematic difference in bean quality caused by females laying fewer eggs on 
poorer quality hosts. After seven days the beans were re-examined and any carrying 
unhatched eggs were removed from the experiment. After a further 21 days the beans 
were monitored daily and any emergent adults removed. The length of the left elytron 
of each adult was measured. Once adults had ceased emerging, all beans from which 
beetles had emerged were collected for the next stage of the experiment. Any beans 
from which no beetle had emerged were kept for a further seven days to ensure no 
further emergence, and then discarded. 100 C. ana/is adults (less than 12h old) were 
then allowed to oviposit on the remaining beans for 24h, after which the beetles were 
removed and the beans examined. Any beans not carrying eggs were returned to the 
beetles for a further 6h of oviposition, and this was repeated until all beans carried at 
least one egg. As C. ana/is adults showed reduced oviposition on used mung beans, 
not all beans carried eggs within 36h. Beans that did carry eggs after 36h were 
therefore used as a subgroup. The remaining beans were given to a new set of adults 
(less than 12h old) for a further bout of oviposition until they also all carried at least 
one egg. Thus two subgroups were set up, the beans within each subgroup carrying 
eggs laid within 36h of each other. All beans in both subgroups were then modified to 
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have an egg load of one and the larvae were allowed to develop exactly as in the 
previous part of the experiment. Once again all emergent adults were measured. 
The C. maculatus sequential experiment was carried out using exactly the same 
method, but due to the shorter development time of C. maculatus larvae the beans 
were monitored for emergence daily 21 (rather than 28) days after the eggs were laid. 
As C. maculatus adults showed less aversion to laying on used beans, all second eggs 
were laid within 36h and it was not necessary to set up subgroups. 
3.2.2. Simultaneous development 
100 adult C. maculatus (less than 12h old) were allowed to oviposit on 200 
host beans for 24h. The beetles were removed and the beans examined. Any beans that 
did not carry eggs were returned to the beetles for a further 6h of oviposition. This was 
repeated until all beans carried at least two eggs. All eggs were laid within 36h. Each 
bean then had its egg load reduced to two by removal of excess eggs with a scalpel. 
The beans were then placed in individual cells of a partitioned petri dish and placed in 
conditions suitable for larval development. After seven days the beans were re-
examined and any carrying unhatched eggs were discarded. After a further 14 days the 
beans were monitored daily and any emergent adults removed on the day of their 
emergence. All adults were measured. 
3.2.3. Analysis 
Both the survival of larvae and the size of emergent adults were used as 
measures of fitness in the statistical analysis. Size was used as a measure of fitness as 
lifetime fecundity is strongly correlated with size in both species (Credland et aI. 1991, 
Colegrave 1993 and chapter 2 for C. maculatus and C. analis). As males and females 
of C. anal is are impossible to distinguish reliably without dissection, and there is no 
sex difference in size, with or without competition (two-way anova: sex F1•40 = 0.79, P 
= 0.38), size data for the two sexes were pooled for C. analis in the statistical analysis. 
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However, as C. maculatus shows sexual dimorphism with males smaller than females, 
and the effect of size on a male's fitness is unknown, only the data on C maculatus 
female size were used. 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Large host: black-eyed bean 
In both C. analis and C maculatus the second larvae to pass through the beans 
showed a reduction in the size of emergent adults compared to first larvae (Table 3.1 a: 
two-way anova: larval sequence FI,372 = 23.0, P < 0.0001) suggesting that they are 
suffering a reduction in fitness due to reduced resources. However second C. analis 
larvae did not show a greater reduction in size than second C. maculatus larvae (Table 
3.1 a: two-way anova: species by larval sequence interaction F 1,372 = 0.18, P = 0.68). 
There was no difference between the species in the survival to emergence when 
comparing first larvae to second larvae, as shown by the non-significant 3-way 
interaction in a 3-way loglinear model (table 3.2a: G = 1.17, df= 1, P = 0.28: Sokal & 
Rohlf 1981). Thus it appears that in black-eyed beans the cost of exploitation 
competition is similar in C. anal is and C. maculatus. Furthermore, second C. 
maculatus larvae did not differ in either survival to emergence ( chi2 = 2.83, df= 1, P 
> 0.05) , or emergent female size (t = 0.96, df= 161, P= 0.34) when compared to C. 
maculatus larvae raised in simultaneo,:!s competition with another larva (Tables 3.1b & 
3 .2b), suggesting that the estimate of the cost of exploitation competition obtained by 
the sequential development method is a good estimate of the true cost of simultaneous 
larval competition in C. maculatlls on black-eyed beans. 
3.3.2. Small host: mung beans 
Adult C. analis from the two subgroups did not differ in either survival to 
emergence (chi2 = 1.07, df= 1, P> 0.05) or adult size (t = 0.16, df= 41, P = 0.87), 
so the two subgroups were pooled for the following analysis. Once again second larvae 
24 
Table 3.1. Mean elytron lengths (mm) for adult C. maculatus and C. analis from a) the 
sequential experiment where larvae . share a bean one after the other and b) the 
simultaneous experiment where larvae share the bean at the same time. 
a) sequential experiment 
1 st adults mean elytron 2nd adults mean elytron 
length (+ se) length (+ se) 
black-eyed beans 
C. analis 2.07 (0.01) 2.02 (0.01) 
C. maculatus 2.44 (0.01) 2.38 (0.02) . 
mung beans 
C. analis 2.04 (0.01) 1.87 (0.02) 
C. maculatus 2.39 (0.02) 1.91 (0.03) 
b) simultaneous experiment 
Mean elytron length (se) of adults raised 
in simultaneous competition 
C. maculatus 
black-eyed beans 2.39 (0.01) 
mung beans 2.29 (0.02) 
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Table 3.2. Percentage survival of C. macula/us and C. analis larvae from a) the 
sequential experiment where larvae share a bean one after another and b) the 
simultaneous experiment where larvae share beans at the same time. 
a) sequential experiment 
percentage survival (se) 
first larva second larva 
black-eyed beans 
C. analis 86.5 (3.2) 82.4 (3.2) 
C. macula/us 91.7 (2.2) 93.7 (2.21 
Mung beans 
C. analis 74.7 (3.2) 41.7(4.5) 
C. macula/us 72.1 (3.4) 65.3 (2.2J 
b) simultaneous experiment 
percentage survivat( se) 
C. macula/us 
black-eyed beans 88.1 (2.1) 
mung beans 56.2 (2.8) 
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through a bean produced smaller adults than first larvae (Table 3.la: two-way anova: 
larval sequence FI.282 = 319.4, P < 0.0001), suggesting that they are suffering due to 
reduced resource. However, in this case the reduction in size of second larvae in C. 
maculatus was significantly greater than the reduction in size of second larvae in C. 
analis (Table 3.1 a: two-way anova: species by larval sequence interaction: F 1,282 = 
80.4, P < 0.0001) suggesting that the cost of exploitation competition, in terms of its 
effect on adult size, may actually be greater in C. maculatus. C. analis showed a 
greater reduction in survival to emer~ence of second larvae than C. maculatus (Table 
3.2a: G = 9.29, df= I, P = 0.002) suggesting that in terms of survival C. maculatus 
suffers a lower cost of exploitation competition in mung beans. Second C. maculatus 
larvae survived as well as those raised in simultaneous competition (Table 3.2b: chi2 = 
3.06, df= 1, P >0.05). However, the adults that emerged from the second larvae were 
smaller than those from larvae raised in simultaneous competition (Table 3.lb: t = 
11.68, df= 123, P <0.0001); they appear to suffer a greater reduction in fitness when 
in sequential competition. 
3.4. Discussion 
The results of the sequential development experiments described in this paper 
suggest that when using black-eyed . beans as a host the cost of exploitation 
competition for the two species is very similar. The fact that both the sequential and 
simultaneous experiments give comparable estimates of the relative cost of exploitation 
competition in C maculatlls on black-eyed beans suggests that the values obtained in 
the sequential experiment for C. ana/is are probably a reliable indicator of the values 
that would be obtained if larvae did share beans simultaneously, without competing 
aggressively. However, if mung beans are used as a host the situation becomes more 
complex. In terms of survival to emergence C. maculatus seems to suffer less due to 
exploitation competition than C. analis, but in terms of the size of surviving adults the 
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situation is reversed, with C. maculatus showing a greater reduction in size of adults 
than C. analis. Also, whilst the estimates of the cost of exploitation competition in 
terms of survival to adulthood agree for the C. maculatus sequential and simultaneous 
development experiments, the greater reduction in size of second adults from the 
sequential experiment suggest that on mung beans the sequential method may actually 
give an overestimate of the cost of exploitation competition. 
The results of these experiments also provide estimates of the value of the cost 
of exploitation competition parameter used by Smith and Lessells (1985) in their 
model. The cost of exploitation competition parameter (E) used in the model 
represented the reduction in fitness of a larva due to exploitation competition 
compared to a fitness of 1 if the larva had been alone in the bean. As lifetime fecundity 
is directly proportional to female size. in both species (see chapter 2) the measures of 
fitness used in this experiment can be combined by multiplying the mean size of 
emergent adults by their percentage survival. If the fitness value of larvae raised in 
competition (either sequentially or simultaneously) is then divided by the fitness value 
of larvae raised without exploitation competition, then a value of the relative fitness of 
the competing larvae is obtained. This value can then be subtracted from 1 to give an 
estimate of the cost of exploitation competition parameter (E). 
Estimates of this parameter (E) obtained from the sequential experiments are 
shown in Table 3.3, along with the estimates obtained for C. maculatus competing 
simultaneously. The model predicts that if there is no Attack larval superiority (W=O.5) 
and E is greater than 0.5 then Attack will be the only stable strategy, while if E is less 
than 0.5 Avoid becomes a possible ESS. The values for both species competing on 
black-eyed beans are not only very similar (C. maculatus E=O.OI, C. ana/is E= 0.06), 
but are also well within the range where Avoid is expected as a possible evolutionary 
outcome. When using mung bean as a host the cost of exploitation competition in C. 
analis (E = 0.49) does appear to be higher than in C. maculatus (E=O.28), and is also 
very close to the 0.5 value above which Attack is the only stable evolutionary outcome. 
In a situation where Attack larvae are actually better fighters than Avoid larvae 
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Table 3.3. Estimates of the cost of exploitation competition parameter (E) from both 
the sequential and simultaneous experiments. 
host species 
black-eyed beans mun~beans 
C. maculatus 
Simultaneous 0.06 0.24 
Sequential 0.01 0.28 
C. analis 
Sequential 0.08 0.49 
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(W>O.5) the Smith and Lessells model requires that the cost of exploitation 
competition is reduced further if Avoid is to be an ES S (as E < 1-W). In this case a small 
Attack larval superiority could put C. ana/is within the conditions in which Attack is 
the only ESS on mung beans. It would require a very large increase in Attack larval 
superiority to stop Avoid being an ESS for C. ana/is on black-eyed beans and C. 
macu/atus on both hosts. 
Thus it appears that on black-eyed beans differing costs of exploitation 
competition cannot be invoked to explain the disparate larval competition strategies of 
the two species. It seems that C. ana/is larvae would actually show an increase in 
individual fitness if they showed the Avoid behaviour used by C. macu/atus. However 
on the smaller host, mung beans, the two species may indeed be using the appropriate 
behaviour that maximises individual fitness given their differing cost of exploitation 
competition on this host. It may be that C. ana/is originally evolved in a host similar to 
mung bean and has only recently moved to using black-eyed beans as an alternative 
host. If Attack larvae are superior fighters to Avoid larvae then once C. ana/is had 
evolved the Attack strategy it would be very difficult for mutant Avoid larvae to invade 
the population even if the cost of exploitation competition reduced, because they 
would almost always be sharing beans with Attack larvae that would often kill them. 
The population would be stuck at the Attack ESS. This is similar to the situation that is 
thought to occur in parasitoid insects, where the larvae of some species fight over a 
host even though there is enough resource in a single host to support the development 
of several larvae (Godfray 1987a, b). 
The notion that the costs of exploitation competition are higher in smaller 
beans, and promotes the evolution of Attack type strategies on these hosts is in 
agreement with the observation that wild bruchid species in Japan (Kiritani 1957 cited 
in Toquenaga and Fujii 1990), which feed on small wild beans rather than on larger 
stored products, usually show an Attack larval competition strategy. Thanthianga and 
Mitchell (1987) have also shown that a strain ofC. macu/atus, that was isolated from 
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mung beans in south India shows an Attack type of larval competition, even when 
allowed to develop in larger host beans in the laboratory. 
It might be expected that larvae of an Avoid species, which may have to share a 
bean with one or several other larvae, will encounter far more variation in resource 
availability than larvae of an Attack species, which essentially obtain all or none of the 
resource. Thus Avoid species might evolve a greater degree of plasticity in adult 
emergence size compared to Attack species, with each individual modifying its 
emergence size to suit the resources available. The variance of the first and second 
larvae through the beans can be pooled to give an idea of the degree of variation in 
adult size when larvae share different hosts. On the black-eyed beans there was no 
difference between the variances of C. ana/is and C. macu/atus ( variance C. ana/is = 
0.101, variance C. macu/atus = 0.109: F124,248=1.08 P>0.05). However on mung bean, 
\ 
the smaller host, C. macu/atus showed a greater variance than C. ana/is (variance C. 
ana/is = 0.081, variance C. macu/atus = 0.181: FI05,177 = 2.235, P < 0.01) suggesting 
that C. macu/atus larvae may indeed be able to tailor their size at emergence to suit the 
level of resource to a greater degree than C. ana/is larvae. The fact that second C. 
macu/atus larvae show a greater reduction in size than second C. ana/is larvae whilst 
second C. alla/is show a much higher reduction in survival when developing on mung 
beans is also consistent with this idea. It may be that when resources are limited C. 
macu/atus larvae can respond plastically and produce smaller adults while C. ana/is 
larvae are unable to respond and so, if resources are significantly reduced, die. 
The fact that selection pressures may change between the evolutionary origin of 
a character and the present day creates problems with making inferences about the 
evolutionary origins of a behavioural strategy from contemporary experiments. There 
may have been alterations in the physiology of the species since the larval competition 
strategy evolved. For example, a species that evolves an Avoid type strategy may then 
also evolve a greater degree of plasticity in its response to resource availability. This 
could make the currently measured cost of exploitation competition a poor indicator of 
what it was at the time when the strategy evolved. Nevertheless, the use of theoretical 
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models, along with the experimental testing of the model's predictions is an extremely 
powerful tool in demonstrating which, evolutionary scenarios are consistent with what 
is observed today. 
Thus, it seems that differing cost of exploitation competition for the two 
species is not the reason for the different larval competition strategies when developing 
in black-eyed beans (the host on which the cultures used in this experiment has been 
cultured for at least the last 18 years; C. M. Lessells pers. comm.). However, the 
higher cost of exploitation competition shown by C. ana/is on mung beans, does 
suggest that if they originally evolved on a host similar to mung this could explain the 
origin of their Attack strategy. What forces maintain this strategy now is still open to 
question. 
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Chapter 4. The effect of host size on the cost of exploitation competition in 
Callosobruchus maculatus 
4.1. Introduction 
When two organisms compete to exploit the same patch of resource each will, in the 
absence of an Allee effect (Allee 1931), have a lower fitness than if they had sole 
access to the resource. Even if the organisms do not actively interfere with each other 
and compete simply by exploiting the resource in a scramble process (sensu Nicholson 
1954), each will suffer a cost because the resource must be split between the two of 
them (Begon et al. 1986). Previous authors have shown that the larvae of 
Callosobruchus beetles suffer a reduction in fitness if they have to compete with other 
larvae whilst developing within a bean, compared to the fitness of larvae which do not 
have to compete. Larvae which have to share beans show a lower survival to 
emergence, and also emerge as smaller adults and hence have lower fecundity (Mitchell 
1975, Smith & Lessells 1985, Credland et al. 1986, Giga & Smith 1991, Messina 
1991), than larVae which develop alone within beans. 
Smith and Lessells (1985, see also Smith 1990) suggested that the size of this 
reduction in fitness, suffered by larvae due to exploitation competition, could have 
important consequences for the type of larval competition strategy that a species 
evolves. In their game theory model of larval competition, Smith and Lessells defined 
the cost of exploitation competition as the reduction in fitness of a larva which suffers 
exploitation competition during development, compared to its expected fitness if it had 
developed without competition (defined as a maximum fitness of 1). The results of the 
model suggested that the greater the cost of exploitation competition, the more likely a 
species is to evolve an Attack type of competition strategy, such as the strategy used 
by C. analis (Umeya et al. 1975), with larvae fighting to the death within the bean. 
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However, as the cost of exploitation competition decreases, species are more likely to 
evolve an Avoid type of strategy, such as the strategy used by C. maculatus (Mitchell 
1975), with larvae competing by exploiting the resource without directly interfering 
with each other. Smith and LesseIJs (1985) suggested that disparate larval competition 
strategies used by C. maculatus and C. anal is could be explained if the two species 
evolved under conditions in which the cost of exploitation competition experienced by 
the larvae differed. 
One factor that will be expected to affect the cost of exploitation competition is 
the size of the host on which larvae develop (Smith & LesseIls 1985, Smith 1990). 
Smaller hosts contain less resource and so the costs of sharing these hosts are likely to 
be higher. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the effect of host size on the cost of 
exploitation competition in C. maculatus. Experiments are described in which the 
fitness of larvae raised in competition with other larvae are compared to the fitness of 
larvae raised without competition, on hosts of different sizes. Two approaches were 
used to produce hosts of different sizes. In the first experiment the seeds of four 
different species of legume, black-eyed bean (Vigna unguiculata), adzuki bean (V, 
angularis), mung bean (V, radiata) and brown lentil (Lens culinaris) were used as 
hosts. These four species of bean differ in size and are aU known to be suitable hosts 
for the development of C. maculatlls larvae (Southgate 1979 and pers. obs.). 
However, whilst different species of bean differ in weight, they will also differ in other 
ways. In particular, legume beans are known to contain toxins, and the amount and 
type of toxin varies between beans of different species (Janzen 1977). Thus a second 
experiment was carried out using hosts of a single species (black-eyed beans). In this 
experiment bean weight was manipulated in two ways; first naturally small «200mg) 
black-eyed beans were selected, and second the weight of standard black-eyed beans 
Was reduced by allowing a single larva to develop within and emerge from beans 
before they were used in the experiment. In both experiments the fitness of larvae 
raised alone within beans was compared to the fitness of larvae that shared beans. Two 
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components of fitness were measured in each experiment; female emergence size, 
measured as left elytron length, was used, since this is a good indicator of a females 
lifetime fecundity (Credland et al. 1991, Colegrave 1993, see also chapter 2 of this 
thesis), and survival of larvae to emergence. The amount of host consumed by larvae 
was also determined to allow the expected cost of exploitation competition on hosts of 
different sizes to be estimated, based on the amount of available resource. The effect of 
competition on emergence size of males was ignored as the relationship between 
emergence size and fitness in males of this species is unknown. 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Different host species 
The following procedure was used to set up beans of all four species (black-
eyed beans, adzuki beans, mung beans and brown lentils) carrying either one or two 
eggs. 100 adult C. maculatus (less than 12h since emergence) were allowed to oviposit 
on 200 host beans for 12h. The beetles were then removed and the beans examined. 
Any beans that did not carry at least one egg were returned to the beetles for a further 
6h oviposition. This was repeated until all beans carried at least one egg. The beans 
then had their egg loads modified to exactly one by removal of excess eggs with a 
scalpel. The same procedure was used to produce host beans with egg loads of two 
eggs per bean, except that oviposition continued until all beans carried at least two 
eggs. Female C. maculatus are expected to modify the number of eggs that they lay on 
a bean in response to differences in bean quality (Mitchell 1975), this procedure of 
forcing females to lay at least the treatment number of eggs on all beans and then 
manipulating eggs loads, removes any systematic differences in bean quality between 
the one egg and two egg treatments that could be caused by females laying fewer eggs 
on poorer quality hosts. The beans were then placed in conditions suitable for larval 
35 
development (300 C, 70% rh). After one week the beans were examined and any 
carrying unhatched eggs were removed from the experiment. After a further two 
weeks the beans were monitored daily and adult beetles were removed on their day of 
emergence and sexed. The left elytron of each female beetle was then removed and 
measured. 50 of each host species were weighed before oviposition to provide an 
estimate of the amount of resource available in each host species. These weighed beans 
were then used in the one egg per bean treatments, and re-weighed at the end of the 
experiment to provide an estimate of the amount of resource used by a single larva 
developing in each of the host species. 
4.2.2. Single host species. 
Host beans of different species, differ not only in weight but also in other ways 
(e.g. toxin content; Janzen 1977). To examine the effect of host size, whilst minimising 
chemical differences between hosts of different sizes, the following experiment was 
carried out using hosts of a single species (black-eyed bean). Groups of 100 adult C. 
maculatus (less than 12h since emergence) were allowed to oviposit on 200 host beans 
of each treatment type (standard black-eyed beans weighing approximately 240mg, 
selected black-eyed beans less than 200mg, and standard black-eyed beans which had 
been used previously for the development of a single larva) for 24h. The beetles were 
then removed and the beans examined. Any beans not carrying at least two eggs were 
returned to the beetles for a further 2h of oviposition. This was repeated until all beans 
carried at least two eggs. The beans were then randomly allocated to two groups. One 
group then had their egg loads modified to one egg per bean, the other to two eggs per 
bean, by removal of any excess eggs with a scalpel. The beans were then placed in 
conditions suitable for larval development (300C, 35 ± 5%rh). After one week the 
beans were examined and any carrying unhatched eggs were removed from the 
experiment. After a further two weeks the remaining beans were examined daily and 
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any emergent beetles removed and sexed. The left elytron of each female beetle was 
then measured. The beans in each treatment were also weighed before the experiment. 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Different host species. 
The different host species used in the experiment differed in weight (mean weight ± se 
for black-eyed bean: 232mg ± 0.7; adzuki bean: 89mg ± 0.2; mung bean: 63mg ± 0.4 
and lentil 33mg ± 0.1, n = 50 for all hosts: anova F3,l96 = 957.5, P < 0.0001), and so 
do represent different amount of resource available to beetle larvae. However, there 
was no difference in the amount of a bean consumed by a single larva during 
development on the four hosts (mean weight loss ± se for black-eyed beans (n = 41): 
24.lmg ± 0.8, adzuki beans (n = 34): 23.3mg ± 0.9; mung beans (n = 32): 24.7mg ± 
1.0 and lentil (n = 19): 22.8mg ± 1.3: anova: F3,m = 0.69, P = 0.56). Beetles which 
had to compete over a bean as larvae, emerged smaller than those that had sole access 
to a bean (Table 4.1a: 2 way-anova: eggs per bean FI"SI = 12.74, P < 0.0001) 
suggesting that beetles suffer a reduction in fitness due to exploitation competition. 
The emergence size of beetles also differed for different host species (Table 4.1a: two-
wayanova: species F3,SS! = 108.25, P < 0.0001. ), and so beans of different species 
seem to provide different amount or different quality of resources. However, the 
reduction in size of beetles raised with competition compared to those raised alone, did 
not differ on the different host bean species (two-way anova: egg per bean by species 
interaction F3,sSl = 1.68, P = 0.169). However, this only shows that there is no 
difference in the absolute reduction in elytron length, whereas the cost of exploitation 
competition depends on the proportional red~ction in fecundity. Therefore a second 
I 
two-way anova was carried out on log fecundity of females, with fecundity being 
estimated using the relationship fecundity = -127+I01.0(elytron length) (see chapter 
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Table 4.1. a) Mean elytron length (nun) and b) estimated lifetime fecundity (eggs) of 
female C. maculatus raised with and without competition on the four different host 
speCIes. 
a) 
mean left elytron length + se (n) 
Host species 1 egg per bean 2 eggs per bean 
black-eyed bean 2.44 ± 0.01 (68) 2.39 ± 0.01 (105) 
adzuki bean 2.23 ± 0.02 (63) 2.18 ± 0.02 (94) 
mung bean 2.39 ± 0.02 (73) 2.29 ± 0.02 (91) 
lentil 2.05 ± 0.02 (26) 2.04 ± 0.02 (39) 
b) 
mean estimated fecundity + se (n) 
Host species 1 egg per bean 2 eggs per bean 
black-eyed bean 119.4 ± 1.16 (68) 114.4 ± 0.93 (105) 
adzuki bean 98.2 ± 2.38 (63) 93.2 ± 2.19 (94) 
mung bean 114.4 ± 2.18 (73) 104.3 ± 1.68 (91) 
lentil 80.1 ± 2.25 (26) 79.0 ± 2.04 (39) 
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2). Whilst the egg per bean by species interaction was not significant (Table 4.1 b: two-
way anova: egg per bean by species interaction F3",l = 2.07, P = 0.10), the associated 
probability was low enough to at least be suggestive that such an effect may be 
occurring. The effect of host species and competition on survival to emergence were 
analysed using a Logit model (Sokal & Rohlf 1981). Although survival to emergence 
was lower in beetles raised in competition (Table 4.2: Logit model: eggs per bean: G = 
10.4, df= I, P = 0.001) and survival differed on the different hosts (Table 4.2: Logit 
model: species: G = 325.1, df= 3, P < 0.0001), there was no difference in survival to 
emergence when comparing larvae raised with or without competition on different 
hosts (Table 4.2: Logit model: egg per bean by species interaction G = 3.59, df= 3, P 
= 0.302). Thus, the reduction in fitness due to competition appears to be of a similar 
size on all four host species, whether it is measured in terms of absolute reduction in 
female emergence size, relative reduction in estimated fecundity or relative reduction in 
survival to emergence. 
4.3.2. Single host species 
The beans in the three treatments used in this experiment differed in initial 
weight (mean weight ± se for standard black-eyed beans: 219.3mg ± 3.99; beans less 
than 200 mg: 147.Smg ± 2.17 and beans previously used by a single larva: 195.3mg ± 
4.55. n = 100 for all hosts. one-wayanova: F2,297 = 97.1, P < 0.0001). Beetles that had 
to compete over a bean as larvae emerged smaller than those that had sole access to 
the bean, (Table 4.3a: two-way anova: egg per bean Fl,232 = 4.42 , P = 0.037), so 
again larvae appear to suffer a reduction in fitness due to exploitation competition. The 
emergence size of beetles also differed for the different host types (Table 4.3a: two-
way anova: treatment F2,232 = 14.8, P <0.0001) due to the smaller size of beetles 
emerging from the used beans. However, the absolute reduction in size of beetles 
raised with competition compared to those raised alone did not differ for the different 
host types (Table 4.3a: two-way anova: eggs per bean by treatment interaction F = 
2,232 
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Table 4.2. Percentage survival to emergence of C. maculatus larvae raised with and 
without competition on the four different host species. 
Percentage survival + se (I)} 
Host species 1 egg per bean 2 eggs Rer bean 
black-eyed bean 92% ± 2.2 (156) 88% ± 2.1 (244) 
adzuki bean 69% ± 3.4 (179) 65% ± 2.7 (310) 
mung bean 72% ± 3.3 (179) 56% ± 2.8 (308) 
lentil 35% ± 3.7 (165) 28% ± 2.5 (316) 
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Table 4.3. a) Mean elytron length (mm) and b) estimated lifetime fecundity (eggs) of 
female C. maculatus raised with and without competition on the three different types 
of black-eyed bean. Numbers in brackets are standered errors of the mean. 
a) 
mean left elytron length + se (n) 
Host type 1 egg per bean 2 eggs per bean 
standard 2.42 ± 0.01 (29) 2.40 ± 0.02 (33) 
used 2.35 ± 0.02 (40) 2.33 ± 0.02 (43) 
<200mg 2.46 ± 0.02 (39) 2.41 ± 0.02 (54) 
b) 
estimated fecundity + se (n) 
Host ty~e 1 egg per bean 2 eggs per bean 
standard 117.4 ± (29) 115.4 ± (33) 
used 110.4 ± (40) 108.3 ± (43) 
<200mg 121.4 ± (39) 116.4 ± (54) 
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0.52, P = 0.593), and neither did the relative reduction in estimated fecundities (Table 
4.3b. two-way anova egg per bean by treatment interaction F2,232 = 0.02, P = 0.568) 
obtained from an analysis of log fecundities. There was also no difference in survival to 
emergence for larvae raised with or without competition (Table 4.4: Logit model: eggs 
per bean G = 3.02, df = 1, P = 0.082) or larvae raised on different host types (Table 
4.4: Logit model: treatment G = 5.15, df= 2, P = 0.076). It appears that the reduction 
in fitness, measured in terms of survival to emergence, female emergence size and 
female fecundity is of similar magnitude on black-eyed beans containing different 
amounts of resource. 
4.4. Discussion 
The results of these experiments suggest that there is no difference in the reduction in 
fitness experienced by C. maculatus larvae, whether they compete on hosts of different 
species, or on hosts of the same species but of different sizes. This is true whether 
fitness is assessed as survival to emergence, female emergence size, or estimated 
female fecundity. Although larvae suffered a reduction in all three measures of fitness 
due to competition on all host, and the fitness components of larvae differed between 
hosts, the size of this reduction in fitness was the same on hosts of different sizes. 
This result is slightly surprising. The hosts used in these experiments 
represented a large range of host sizes and so presumably a large range of available 
resource. To estimate the cost that would be expected for larvae competing on the 
hosts used in these experiments a simple model was constructed. Using the reduction 
in weight caused by the development of a single larva (about 24 mg) as an estimate of 
the amount of resource required for the full development of a larva, the amount of 
resource that a bean must contain if two larvae are to both develop without suffering 





Table 4.4. Percentage survival to emergence of C. macula/us larvae raised with and 
without competition on the three different types of black-eyed bean. 
percentage survival + se (n) 
Host type 1 egg per bean 2 eggs per bean 
standard 85% ± 4.0 (81) 82% ± 4.6 (107) 
used 87% ± 3.6 (85) 85% ± 3.1 (131) 
<200mg 87% ± 3.8 (77) 86% ± 3.0 (129) 
43 
amount of resource obtained by a larva is assumed to directly affect its fitness, the 
relative fitness of larvae that share beans can be calculated as the amount of resource 
available to each of the larvae (i.e. the total amount of resource available within the 
bean divided by two) divided by the 24mg required to attain full fitness. This relative 
fitness can then be subtracted from 1 to give the expected cost of exploitation 
competition for larvae sharing hosts of different sizes. However, the weight of a bean 
is probably an overestimate of the amount of resource it contains; some of the bean 
will be unavailable for consumption by larvae. By continually allowing C. maculatus 
larvae to develop on a sample of mung beans, for several generations, until no more 
adults emerged, Mitchell (1975) estimated that at least 9 mg of a mung bean is 
unavailable for consumption by larvae. This represents about 16% of the weight of the 
mung beans used in his experiments. If this percentage is assumed to be constant for 
hosts of different sizes then the true amount of resource present in beans of different 
sizes can be estimated by reducing their weight by 16%. This assumption is unlikely to 
be valid for black-eyed beans that have already had one larva develop within them as 
larval feeding will reduce the amount of resource, whilst not altering the amount of 
bean that is unavailable for consumption. Thus, these beans were assumed to contain 
18% unavailable material (this value was obtained by calculating 16% of the mean 
mass of standard black-eyed beans, and determining what percentage of the mean mass 
of a used black-eyed bean this represented). To take into account variation in bean size 
within a species, 20 random beans of each species were weighed, and the expected 
cost of exploitation competition for each bean calculated as described above. The 
individual values were then combined to give a mean value for the expected cost of 
exploitation competition for the bean species used in these experiments (Table 4.5.). 
These estimates of the cost of exploitation competition, based solely on the 
amount of resource present in a bean, suggest that there should be no cost of 
exploitation competition on both black-eyed beans (from both of the experiments) and 
adzuki beans, as both these species seem to contain enough resource for the 
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Table 4.5. Estimates of the cost of exploitation competition on a) host beans of 
different species and b) black -eyed beans of different weights. The theoretical estimates 
are based on the amount of resource in the bean, the experimental estimates are based 
on the survival to emergence and estimated female fecundity of larvae from the 
experiments. Numbers in brackets are the standard errors of the means. 
a) different host species 
cost of exploitation competition 
Host species theoretical e:q>erimental + se (n) 
black-eyed bean 0 0.08 ± 0.03 (120) 
adzuki bean 0 0.13 ± 0.06 (161) 
mung bean 0.03 0.29 ± 0.06 (146) 
lentil 0.39 0.31 ± 0.10 (153) 
b) single host species 
cost of exploitation competition 
Host type theoretical experimental 
standard 0 0.10 (0.08) 
n=43 
used 0 0.06 (0.06) 
n=63 
" 
<200mg 0 0.05 (0.05) 
n=62 
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development of two larvae. On mung beans a small cost is predicted as some of the 
beans do not contain enough resource for the development of two larvae, whilst on 
lentil, the smallest host, a large cost of exploitation competition is predicted as none of 
the beans contained enough resource for the full development of two larvae. Thus it 
does appear that the range of host sizes used in these experiments should be large 
enough to produce a measurable difference in the cost of exploitation competition. 
One possible reason that no differences were found could be due to the way in 
which fitness was measured in the experiments. The total fitness of larvae was 
measured as two separate components, survival to emergence and female fecundity 
(estimated from elytron length), and the effect of competition on these two 
components was analysed separately. The fact that no difference in the size of the 
reduction in fitness was detected on either of the two components of fitness, does not 
necessarily mean that there was no effect on total fitness. To investigate this possibility 
that the relative reduction in total fitness (survival and fecundity combined) may differ 
on beans of different sizes the following analysis was carried out on the data from the 
two experiments. 
First the two separate measures of fitness were combined for female larvae 
raised without competition by multiplying the mean estimated fecundity by the 
proportion of larvae that survived to emergence. This gives an estimate of total fitness 
of female larvae raised without competition on each host. The relative fitnesses of 
female larvae that survived to emergence raised in competition on each host were then 
determined by dividing the fecundity estimate for each female from the two egg 
treatments, by the mean total fitness of female larvae raised without competition on the 
same host. Half of the larvae that failed to emerge were assumed to be female and 
included in the analysis as female larva with a relative fitness of zero. Finally these 
relative fitness values were all subtracted from one to give the cost of exploitation 
competition suffered by each larva. 
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The mean cost of exploitation competition (Table 4.5), measured in this way, 
differs on the different host species (Kruskall Wallis; H = 26.7, df = 3, P < 0.0001). 
Thus, even though the relative reduction of both larval survival and female fecundity 
do not differ on different hosts when analysed separately, the cost of exploitation 
competition does appear to differ on different host species when the two components 
are combined into a single measure of total fitness. Furthennore, the size of the relative 
reduction in fitness varies in the way that would be predicted on the basis of host size 
, 
being highest in the smallest host (lentil) and decreasing as host size increases. 
However, a similar analysis shows that the cost of exploitation does not differ 
Significantly on the three types of black-eyed beans from the second experiment 
(Kruskall Wallis H = 5.22, df= 2, P = 0.074). 
Whilst these experimental estimates of the cost of exploitation competition 
show qualitative agreement with the theoretical estimates, based on the amount of 
resource within a bean, there are some interesting quantitative differences between 
experimental and theoretical values. On the basis of bean weight, there should be no 
, 
Cost of exploitation competition on either black-eyed beans or adzuki beans. However, 
the experimental results suggest that larvae suffer a cost of exploitation competition on 
all hosts. This suggests that the cost of exploitation competition measured on these 
two host species may not be due to a reduction in available resources. Parker (1982) 
has shown that when organisms compete over a resource in a scramble process they 
are expected to alter their behaviour due to the presence of competitors. An organism 
that has sole access to a resource will invest the minimum amount of effort required to 
gain the resource that it needs. However, in the presence of competitors the organism 
will increase the amount of effort invested in obtaining the resource, even though this 
may reduce the efficiency with which it exploits the resource. The net result is that 
individuals that have to compete will have a lower fitness than an individual with sole 
access to the resource, even if they obtain the same amount of resource, because the 
competing individuals invest more to obtain the resource required. C. maculatus larvae 
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appear to be able to detect the presence of other larvae within a bean due to the 
vibrations produced by larval feeding (Thanthianga & Mitchell 1987). If larvae that 
detect the presence of another larvae alter their feeding behaviour, for example by 
increasing feeding rate at the expense of feeding efficiency, to ensure that they obtain 
as much of the bean as possible before it is eaten by the other lava, this could produce 
a cost of competition even though each larva obtains the same amount of resource as if 
it had developed alone within a bean. Whether C. maculatus larvae do alter their 
behaviour in this way is at present unknown. A cost of exploitation competition is 
predicted for larvae competing on mung beans, however the predicted value is much 
lower than the value obtained experimentally. Again this may be due to some effect of 
competition other than a simple effect of reduced resources. 
The prediction that the cost of exploitation competition suffered by larvae 
competing on lentils should suffer a large cost is supported, but the measured cost 
appears to be smaller than the cost that would be predicted on the basis of the size of 
lentils. The survival of larvae on lentil was very low, even without the presence of a 
competitor, probably due to high concentrations of toxin within lentils (Smith 1990). 
This high level of competition independent mortality may mean that although all of the 
beans in the competition treatment began with two larvae, many of these larvae may 
have died before using much of the resource, and so many of the emerging adults from 
the competition treatment may have completed most of their development alone in the 
bean without competition. This may mean that the cost of exploitation competition 
measured on lentils is an underestimate of the true cost of competition on this host. 
Thus, even though the amount of resource within a bean does appear to have 
some effect on the cost of exploitation competition suffered by larvae, the poor 
qualitative fit between the experimental estimates and theoretical estimates based on 
the amount of resource within beans of different species, suggests that the cost of 
exploitation competition actually suffered by larvae is also affected by other factors. 
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There was no difference in the cost of exploitation competition suffered by 
larvae on the three types of black-eyed bean used in the second experiment, although 
the probability from the analysis of survival and fecundity combined was low enough to 
be suggestive that with a larger sample size an effect might be found. If this is the case 
it suggests the paradoxical result that the cost of exploitation competition is highest on 
the largest host (standard black-eyed beans). The three types of bean used in this 
experiment all appear to contain ample resources for the fuJI development of two 
larvae and so any differences in costs are unlikely to be caused by the amount of 
resource available to larvae. An interesting possibility is that the presence of two larvae 
feeding within a bean improves the quality of the host in some way making it easier for 
larvae to feed on it. Such an effect would be likely to be greater on small hosts and so 
larvae sharing the smaller black-eyed beans may could suffer less from competition 
than those in larger beans. Giga and Smith (1981) suggested that such an effect might 
Occur in C. maculatus, although their data set was not large enough to demonstrate 
this unequivocally. However, even if such an effect does occur it is likely to be limited 
I" 
to a small range of host sizes, as once hosts become very small, the reduction in 
resource quantity will outweigh any improvement in quality. 
Previous authors (Smith & Lessel1s 1985, Smith 1990, Toquenaga & Fujii 
1990) have suggested that the interspecific differences in larval competition strategies 
Observed in bruchid beetles may be due to the species evolving on host beans of 
different sizes, the assumption being that the cost of exploitation competition will be 
higher on smaller hosts making the evolution of Attack type larval competition 
strategies more likely on smaller hosts. This has been used to explain why most 
Callosohruchus species, which live on large cultivated legumes, use the Avoid type of 
strategy as larvae whilst most wild bruchid species, living on the much smaller wild 
legumes, generally use an Attack type of larval competition strategy (Kiritani 1987 
cited in Toquenaga & Fujii 1990). The results discussed here lend support to the idea 
that the cost of exploitation competition does increase as host size decreases. 
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However, as differences were only found between hosts of different species of bean, 
which will differ in ways other than size, it cannot be argued with certainty that the size 
of the host is the factor affecting the cost of exploitation competition. Further 
experiments, manipulating the amount of resources within beans, or even using 
artificial beans, which differ only in size, are required to show unequivocally that host 
size is the important factor affecting the cost of exploitation competition. 
so 
Chapter S. The cost of having fought in Callosobruchus analis 
5.1. Introduction 
It is generally agreed by ecologists that when organisms compete over 
resources all competitors pay a cost due to the competition (Begon et al. 1986). The 
type of cost paid will depend on the mechanism by which competition occurs. If 
organisms compete without directly interfering with competitors in a scramble process 
(sensu Nicholson 1954), each competitor will have a reduced fitness, either because 
they obtain less of the resource due to depletion by other individuals (Begon et at. 
1986) or because they have to invest more time and energy into obtaining the same 
amount of resource as they would if there were no competitors present (parker 1982). 
If organisms compete actively by attempting to exclude other individuals from the 
resource, in a contest process (sensu Nicholson 1954), the costs to the loser are 
obvious. As well as the time and energy invested in competition, losers will be 
excluded from the resource and may be injured or even killed in the process. However, 
the winners will pay costs too. Succes.sful competitors will also have invested time and 
energy in excluding individuals and may also occasionally be injured if competition 
involves active aggression. This means that even though the successful competitors 
have sole access to the resource, their fitness will be lower than if they had not had to 
compete in the first place . 
. In their model of larval competition, Smith and Lessells (1985) highlighted the 
importance that the cost of competing over a resource will have on whether a species 
evolves an Attack competition strategy, with larvae fighting to the death over the 
resource, or an Avoid strategy, with larvae competing passively, exploiting the 
resource without directly intefering with each other. They assumed that when two 
Avoid larvae compete in a scramble type of process, each suffers a reduction in fitness 
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due to exploitation competition, relative to the fitness of a larva that develops without 
competition. This cost of exploitation competition parameter has major consequences 
for the outcome of the model; the higher the cost of exploitation competition, the more 
likely that the Attack strategy, with larvae fighting to the death within the bean, will be 
the predicted evolutionary outcome. However, when considering the fitness of larvae 
that fight over a bean, Smith and Lessells assumed that only the larva that loses the 
contest pays a cost. The larva that wins was assumed to have the same fitness as a 
larva that develops without competition, effectively suffering no reduction in fitness 
due to having fought. If winning larvae actually do suffer a cost of having fought, this 
would be expected to reduce the ra~ge of conditions in which Attack behaviour is 
expected to evolve; the greater the cost of having fought, the more likely that a species 
will evolve an Avoid type of larval competition strategy and compete passively over the 
resource without interfering with each other. 
Smith and LesseUs' assumption that larvae that fight over beans suffer no cost 
of having fought may be largely due to the lack of available data for this cost in bruchid 
beetles. Whilst there have been several studies measuring the effect of larval 
competition on fitness in species such as C. maculatus and C. rhodensianus (Credland 
et al .. 1986, Giga & Smith 1991, Messina 1991), where larvae compete using the 
Avoid strategy, there has been relatively little work investigating the effects of 
competition on species such as C. analis, whose larvae compete using an Attack 
strategy (Umeya et al. 1975). Umeyaand co-workers (1975) found no evidence for a 
cost of having fought for C. allalis larvae raised at a range of host densities, but their 
results were limited to the effect on larval survival to emergence, and did not include 
any measure of adult fecundity. Toquenaga and Fujii (1990) did measure the effect of 
different initial larval densities on survival to emergence, beetle emergence size and 
development time, but the small number of beans per treatment in their experiments 
coupled with the fact that the beans used in the different treatments carried naturally 
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generated egg loads rather than experimentally manipulated egg loads, make it difficult 
to draw firm conclusions from their results. 
In this chapter experiments are described that were designed to measure the 
cost of having fought over a bean to the larva that survives the competition, by 
comparing the fitness of larvae raised alo~e within beans to the fitness of larvae that 
develop in beans initially containing one to three other larvae. 
5.2. Methods 
To obtain host beans with differing egg loads (either one, two, three or four 
eggs per bean) adult C. analis were allowed to oviposit on four groups of 120 host 
beans for 12h. The number of adult beetles was varied for each group depending on 
the required number of eggs per bean, with SO, 60, 75 and 100 adults used in the one, 
two, three and four egg per bean treatments. After 12h the beetles were removed and 
the beans examined. Any beans not carrying at least the number of eggs required for 
their treatment were returned to the beetles for a further 6h of oviposition. This was 
repeated until all beans in a treatment carried at least the required number of eggs. All 
eggs were laid within 24h. The beans had their egg loads manipulated to the treatment 
number by removal of excess eggs with a scalpel and were then placed in conditions 
suitable for larval development (300C, 70%rh). Female beetles are expected to vary 
the number of eggs they lay on a bean in response to differences in bean quality. If 
beans were selected for treatments on the basis of the number of eggs that they carried 
there could be differences in the quality of the beans in the one and two egg treatments 
due to females only laying two eggs on better quality beans. This procedure of forcing 
females to lay at least the treatment number of eggs on all beans, and then manipulating 
egg loads reduces the possibility of systematic differences in bean quality between 
treatments which might occur ifbeans with naturally generated egg loads were used. 
After seven days the beans were examined and any carrying unhatched eggs 
were discarded. After a further 14 days the beans were monitored daily and any adults 
removed on their day of emergence. The left elytron of each adult was removed and 
measured as an indicator of body size, which is known to be a good indicator of a 
female's lifetime fecundity in this species (see chapter 2), and the beetles were then 
dissected to determine sex. 
Because any cost of having fought may depend on the size of the host bean, the 
experiment was carried out twice using two hosts of different sizes. Black-eyed beans 
(Vigna unguiculata: mean weight = 232mg ± 0.8se, n = 20) were used as the large 
host and mung beans (Vigna radiata: mean weight = 65mg ± O.4se, n = 20) as the 
smaller host. 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Large host: black-eyed beans 
The emergence size of both male and female beetles was affected by the initial 
number of larvae in a bean (Table S.la: two-way anova: treatment F3,266 = 3.36, P = 
0.019), with beetles from treatments with higher initial numbers of larvae within beans 
emerging smaller than beetles from the one egg per bean treatment. Males and females 
did not differ in emergence size (Table 5.1a: two-wayanova: sex F1,266 == 0.86, P == 
0.354), and the effect of the number of eggs per bean on emergence size did not differ 
for males and females (Table S.la: two-way anova: treatment by sex interaction F3,266 
= 1.21, P = 0.307). Thus, having to fight for a bean appears to reduce the emergence 
size of the surviving larvae, and the size of the reduction is the same for both male and 
female beetles. 
Development time was highly·skewed, therefore violating the assumptions for 
parametric statistics. Since there is no suitable non parametric equivalent to a 2-way 
Table 5.1. Mean elytron lengths for male and female C. ana/is that developed at 
different larval densities on a) black-eyed beans and b) mung beans. 
a) black-eyed beans 
mean elytron len ~h (mm) + se (n) 
eggs per bean males females 
1 1.92 ± 0.01 (43) 1.92 ± 0.01 (51) 
2 1.92 ± 0.01 (43) 1.90 ± 0.01 (35) 
3 1.90 ± 0.02 (23) 1.86 ± 0.02 (26) 
4 1.89 + 0.02 (24) 1.90 ± 0.02 (29) 
b) mung beans 
mean elytron len ~h (mm) + se (n) 
eggs per bean males females 
1 1.82 ± 0.01 (39) 1.83 ± 0.01 (47) 
2 1.87 ± 0.01 (40) 1.89 ± 0.01 (39) 
3 1.88 ± 0.01 (37) 1.89 ± 0.01 (43) 
4 1.92 ± 0.01 (50) 1.90 ± 0.02 (35) 
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anova for unbalanced designs, development time was analysed separately for males and 
females. The time taken for larvae to develop from eggs to emergence also differed 
between the treatments (Table 5.2a: males: Kruskal Wallis chi2 = 16.52, df = 3, P < 
0.001; females: Kruskal Wallis chi2 = 2l.11, df= 3, P < 0.001), with adults that had to 
compete as larvae emerging later than adults that did not have to compete. Thus, 
fighting over a bean appears to increase the development time of a larva. 
The number of adult beetles emerging per bean did not differ between the four 
treatments (Table 5.3a: chi2 = 6.526, df= 3, P > 0.05) because generally only a single 
adult emerged from each bean. This also suggests that the survival to emergence of the 
larva that wins the contest within a bean is not reduced by having fought. 
5.3.2. Small host: mung beans 
The emergence size of both male and female beetles was again affected by the 
initial number of larvae in the bean (Table 5.1b: two-way anova: treatment F3•322 = 
23.34, P < 0.001) but this time beetles that developed in competition with other larvae 
emerged larger than those that developed alone within a bean: the largest beetles 
emerged from the beans with the highest initial number of larvae. Males and females 
did not differ in size (Table 5.lb: two-wayanova: sex F1,322 = 0.96, P = 0.329) and the 
increase in size due to the number of eggs per bean was the same for both males and 
females (Table 5.1 b: two-way anova: treatment by sex interaction F3,322 = 0.82, P = 
0.484). Thus having to fight for a bean appears to increase the emergence size of the 
surviving larvae, and the size of the increase is the same for both males and females. 
The time taken for adults to develop from egg to emergence also differed 
between treatments for both males and females (Table 5.2b: males: Kruskal Wallis chi2 
= 15.30, df= 3, P < 0.001; females: Kruskall Wallis chi2 = 19.79, df= 3, P < 0.001). 
However in this case the effect was the same as on black-eyed beans, with larvae that 
had to fight over a bean taking longer to develop. Again, competition appears to slow 
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Table 5.2. Development time (days) for male and female C. ana/is that developed at 
different larval densities on a) black-eyed beans and b) mung beans. Numbers in 
brackets are standard errors of the means. 
a) black-eyed beans 
~ean development time + se (n) 
eggs per bean male female 
1 29.5 ± 0.24 (43) 29.5 ± 0.20 (52) 
2 29.9 ± 0.27 (43) 29.7 ± 0.21 (35) 
3 31.1 ± 0.55 (23) 31.0 ± 0.47 (26) 
4 31.0 ± 0.45 (24) 30.9 ± 0.46 (29) 
b) mung beans 
mean development time + se (n) 
eggs per bean male female 
1 31.3 ± 0.19 (39) 31.2 + 0.16 (47) 
2 31.7 ± 0.25 (40) 31.3 + 0.23 (39) 
3 32.1 ± 0.28 (37) 32.2 ± 0.28 (43) 
.'4 33.0 ± 0.31 (SO) 33.0 ± 0.39 (35) 
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Table 5.3. Number of adult C. ana/is emerging per bean on a) black-eyed beans and b) 
mung beans. 
a) black-eyed beans 
eggs per bean emergence per bean + se (n) 
1 0.86 ± 0.03 (101) 
2 0.76 ± 0.04 (103) 
3 0.71 ± 0.05 (65) 
4 0.77 ± 0.05 (69) 
b) mung beans 
eggs per bean emergence per bean + se (n) 
1 0.84 ± 0.03 (102) 
2 0.88 ± 0.03 (90) 
3 0.85 + 0.03 (94) 
4 0.83 ± 0.03 (102) . 
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the development of the larvae. The number of emerging adults per bean did not differ 
between treatments (Table S.3b: chil = 0.807, df = 3, P> 0.05), so on this host too, 
fighting for the resource does not appear to reduce the survival of the larva that wins. 
5.4. Discussion 
The results on the large host (black-eyed beans) suggest that larvae that fight 
for access to a bean and win do suffer a cost of having fought. Larvae that have 
survived contest competition emerge smaller than larvae that do not have to compete 
and, as emergence size is an indicator of lifetime fecundity for females, this will 
translate into a reduction in lifetime fecundity for beetles that had to compete as larvae. 
This reduction in size may be due to the larvae having to divert energy into fighting 
that could be used for growth, or due to having to spend time fighting which could 
have been spent feeding. Larvae that have to compete for a bean also emerge later than 
larvae that do not and again this may be due either to the larvae having to feed for 
longer after fighting to build up their energy reserves before emergence, or may simply 
reflect the time spent fighting. The fitness consequences of an increase in development 
time is not as obvious as the reduction in lifetime fecundity. As a stored product pest, 
C. analis probably experiences periods of rapid population growth, for example when 
a new bean store or field is first colonised, followed by population crashes when the 
resource is exhausted. During these periods of rapid increase a fast development time 
will be an advantage enabling beetles to produce more generations before the hosts 
become seriously depleted. 
However, there does not appear to be any cost in terms of survival to 
emergence for larvae that have fought over a bean, because the number of beetles 
emerging per bean does not differ between treatments. Godfray (1987b) has suggested 
that when the larvae of parasitoid insects, which develop within the body of other 
insect larvae, fight over a host there is a risk of even the larva that wins the contest 
suffering injuries that cause it to die before adulthood. The fact that a C. ana/is larva 
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that survives the contest within the bean is no less likely to successfully emerge than a 
larva that develops without competition suggests that serious injury to the victor is not 
a major cost in this species. 
The results from the small host, mung beans, are slightly more surprising. As 
on black-eyed beans, fighting over a bean appears to increase the development time of 
the victor, but not reduce its survival to emergence. However, in contrast to the results 
on black-eyed beans there appears to be no cost of fighting in terms of reduced lifetime 
fecundity on this host. Indeed, beetles that had to compete as larvae appear to have 
increased lifetime fecundity, as they emerge larger than beetles that developed alone. 
This implies that there may actually be some benefit to larvae of having fought for the 
bean. This result agrees with that of Toquenaga and Fujii (1990) who also found an 
increase in emergence size of beetles· with increasing number of eggs per bean when 
developing on mung beans. 
This increase in emergence size with increased number of eggs may not be due 
to any effect of competition on fitness. If there are inherent differences in the size of 
larvae before competition occurs, caused either by genetic differences or maternal 
affects, and larger larvae tend to beat smaller larvae when they fight, the beetles that 
emerge from beans after winning a fight will be a biased sample of the larvae that 
entered beans. If inherently larger larvae produce larger adults then the beetles that 
emerge after fighting will tend to be larger on average than beetles that did not 
compete as larvae. There is evidence that in C. maculatus there is variation in egg size 
between females, and also that the size of eggs varies during the lifetime of the female 
(Fox 1993). Furthermore, this variation in egg size has been shown to affect the fitness 
of larvae, with larger eggs producing fitter beetles (Fox 1993). If the same occurs in 
C. analis, this could give rise to the increase in emergence size observed in the 
experiment. 
To investigate the importance of this effect, the following analysis of the mung 
bean data was carried out. Pseudo pairs, trios and quads of larvae were generated by 
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drawing two, three or four elytron length values at random from the one egg per bean 
treatment. The largest elytron length from each pair, trio or quad was taken as the 
elytron length of the surviving larva from each bean. The mean elytron length for these 
surviving beetles provides an estimate of the sizes of beetles that would be expected 
from the two, three and four egg per bean treatments if the differences are due simply 
to the largest larva winning in larval competition. The means generated in this way do 
increase in size as the number of eggs per bean increases (Table 5.4) as in the 
experiment. However, the experimental results are still larger than the predictions 
(Table 5.4: 2-way anova: experimental vs. theoretical F1,332 = 7.93, P = 0.005: 
comparisons based on the two, three and four egg per bean results) and so the increase 
in size observed in the experiment is probably not due to a sampling effect. 
Furthermore, if the increase is simply due to the largest larva winning in competition it 
is surprising that the same effect was not found on black-eyed beans as well. 
Another possibility is that, even though larvae that have fought for a bean 
emerge larger than those that have not, this increase in size may not translate into an 
increase in lifetime fecundity. Although there is known to be a relationship between 
female lifetime fecundity and female size at emergence in C. ana/is, it is not known 
whether this relationship is the same for larvae raised with and without competition. It 
is plausible that if the size of a larva affects its success in contest competition, a larva 
that detects the presence of a competitor within the bean might divert energy into 
growth which would otherwise have been used for reproduction after emergence. This 
would result in larvae raised in competition having a lower fecundity for their size than 
larvae raised alone. If such an effect of competition on lifetime fecundity does exist, 
then larva raised in competition might still show a reduction in lifetime fecundity even 
though they emerge larger. However there are two reasons to doubt that this explains 
the observed size increase in the experiments; first, it is known that in C. maculatus 
there is no effect of larval competition on female fecundity independent of its effect on 
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Table 5.4. The mean elytron lengths (mm) for C. ana/is emerging from mung beans 
carrying different number of eggs, along with the predicted elytron lengths if there is 
no cost of competition and the increase in size is due to larger larvae winning contests. 
As males and females did not differ in size within treatments, the experimental values, 
and the predicted values calculated from them using both the male and female data 
combined. 
, . 
mean elytron len ~h (mm) + se (n) 
eggs per bean experimental predicted 
1 1.83 + 0.01 (86) 1.83 + 0.01 (86) 
2 1.87 + 0.01 (79) 1.86 + 0.04 (43) 
3 1.89 + 0.02 (80) 1.87 + 0.04 (28) 
4 1.91 + 0.02 (85) 1.88 + 0.05 (21) 
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female emergence weight (Colegrave 1993), and second, if larvae did react plastically 
in this way they should be expected to do the same on black-eyed beans. 
Thus it seems that larvae which have fought successfully for access to mung 
beans may indeed show an increase in emergence size, which will translate into an 
increase in lifetime fecundity. Why might this be? It is possible that the presence of 
larvae feeding within a bean affects the quality of the resource in some way so· that its 
quality as a food source improves. For example, developing larvae produce moisture 
which may soften the bean tissue making it easier to ingest and assimilate: such an 
effect would be likely to increase as the number of larvae within the bean increases. If 
this is the case then the larva that wiris the contest for the bean may have access to a 
better quality resource, due to the effect of several larvae within the bean before 
competition occurred, and the benefit of this improved quality resource may outweigh 
the cost of having fought for it. Such an affect has been reported in the larvae of 
solitary parasitoid insects, where the presence of several larvae within a host before 
contest competition occurs reduces the effect of the hosts immune system on the 
larvae. As a consequence, the larva that wins the contest has a higher fitness than a 
larva that has sole access to the host for the whole of its development (Waage and 
Godfray 1985, Askew 1968, Puttler 1974). A similar effect has also been reported in 
another species ofbruchid beetle, Zabrotes subfasciatus (Utida 1967). In this species 
larvae compete using a scramble process of competition, and the survival of an 
individual larva that shares a bean with one other larva, is higher than for larvae that 
develop alone within a bean (Utida .1967). If such an effect is responsible for the 
increase in size observed on mung beans then the reason that it does not occur on 
black-eyed beans may simply be a consequence of the difference in host size: a few 
larvae feeding on a small host like mung bean could have a large effect on its quality, 
but little effect on a large host such as black-eyed bean. However, without detailed 
information of the way in which larval feeding alters the physical and chemical nature 
of the bean it is impossible to comment further on the likelihood of this. 
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The results of these experiments suggest that there is a cost to C. analis 
developing on black-eyed beans in terms of development time and emergence size 
whilst on mung beans larvae seem to pay a cost in terms of increased development 
time, but seem to benefit in terms of increased emergence size. Whether the 
combination of these two effects translates into a net benefit to larvae that have fought 
over mung beans or simply a smaller cost than they suffer on black-eyed beans depends 
on their combined effect on overall fitness. While the effect of an increase in 
emergence size on fitness, due to its effect on lifetime fecundity of females, can be 
estimated, the effect of increased development time depends on details of the 
population dynamics of this species that are unknown. However, even if these results 
do show a cost of having fought on black-eyed beans, and a net benefit on mung beans, 
the effect of having fought on the fitness of the surviving larva is very small. The 
reduction in size of females that have fought one other larva for access to a black-eyed 
bean, compared to the size of females that develop without competition (Table S.la) 
represents only about a 2% reduction in fecundity, whilst the increase in size on mung 
beans represents a 2% increase. Thus, even though having fought over a bean does 
appear to affect the fitness of the surviving larvae, the effect is so small in C. analis at 
the densities used in these experiments that it has probably had little effect on the 
evolution of the larval competition strategy in this species. 
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Chapter 6. Extending the Smith and Lessells model: asymmetries in 
fighting and competitive ability 
(Based on Colegrave 1994) 
6.1. Introduction 
The Smith and LesselIs (1985) model provided an insight into the types of factors 
which could be important in determining the way in which organisms compete in 
closed systems (figure 6.1). If the cost of sharing the resource is high then organisms 
will evolve a contest stra~egy and fight over the resource, whilst if the cost of sharing 
is low a scramble strategy may evolve. These two strategies were called Attack and 
Avoid respectively. If Attack strategists are also inherently better fighters than Avoid 
strategists this also increases the chance that Attack behaviour evolves. 
However, this model assumed that competition was symmetric; that if two 
larvae shared a bean each would gain the same amount of the resource. In nature 
competition is rarely totally symmetric (Begon 1984, see also Lawton & Hassell 1981 
for interspecific competition), with one competitor often doing much better than 
another. Wilbur and CoJlins (1973) have described how competition can generate a 
skewed size distribution in amphibian larvae, due to some larvae competing more 
strongly than others and so getting more of the resource, and the same phenomenon 
has been shown to occur in young pygmy sunfish (Rubenstein 1981). Both of these 
studies also suggest that the degree of asymmetry increases with the intensity of 
competition. Although previous authors have modelled effects of asymmetries on the 
evolution of competition (Maynard Smith & Parker 1976, Hammerstein 1981), these 
models have generally been for open systems. This chapter takes the Smith and 
Lessells model as a starting point and describes a game theory model addressing the 
question: What effect does asymmetric competition have on the evolution of 
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Figure 6.1. The Smith and Lessells model: The x-axis represents W, the probability 
that an Attack larva beats an Avoid larva in a fight. The y-axis represents E, the relative 
cost to an Avoid larva of sharing a bean with another Avoid larva. The zones represent 
different ESSs. N.B Although the original Smith and Lessells model only considered 
Values ofW of 0.5 or greater, for completeness this figure includes all possible values 
of W from 0 to 1. However, values of W less than 0.5 mean that Attack larvae are 
Worse fighters than Avoid larvae; a situation which is unlikely to occur in nature. 
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6.2. The asymmetric game 
. The model I describe is for a two larval game, that is each bean contains two larvae. I 
use the same basic strategies, Attack (attempt to find and kill other larvae within a 
bean) and Avoid (avoid other larvae within the bean and compete passively over the 
resource), as used in the Smith and Lessells model, but the use of asymmetries in the 
model also allows for the incorporation of conditional strategies based on detected 
asymmetries. 
I assume two possible asymmetries. The first is an asymmetry of fighting 
ability, with one larva (the "Superior larva") being a better fighter and thus more likely 
. to win an aggressive encounter (with the "Inferior larva"). The second is an asymmetry 
in passive competitivness, that is if two A void larvae share a bean, one is likely to be a 
better passive competitor than the other and so suffer less from the competition than 
the other. There could be many reasons for these asymmetries. In the case of 
Callosobruchus beetles the most plausible cause is different arrival time of larvae 
within the bean. A larva which arrives first in a bean may have a growth head start and 
so be larger when the two larvae meet, thus which is the superior larva depends on 
which arrived first in the bean. 
The two asymmetries (fighting ability and passive competitive ability) are 
independent in the model. The labels superior and inferior refer only to the asymmetry 
in fighting ability. Thus the superior larva (fighting ability) may be a better or worse 
passive competitor than the inferior larva. 
Finally, I assume that both asymmetries are produced by chance effects (such as 
order of arrival in the bean) not by any inherent difference in the competitive ability of 
the strategies. In contrast to the Smith and Lessells model, where Attack larvae are 
always equal or better fighters to Avoid larvae, in this model Attack larvae are not 
inherently better fighters than Avoid larvae. This means that all larvae, independent of 
the strategy that they use, have a 50% chance of being a superior larva. If the 
asymmetries are caused by order of arrival in the bean, then the strategy that a larva 
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will use does not affect its probability of being the first larva in the bean. Whilst this 
may not represent the most biologically realistic situation, it does allow for the effect 
of asymmetries caused by chance effects to be looked at without the confounding 
effect of determined asymmetries between strategies. 
I consider four strategies, two of which are simple strategies, and two of which 
are conditional strategies. The two simple strategies are Attack and Avoid. The 
conditional strategies are "Attack if you are the superior larva and Avoid if inferior", 
which I call Tyrant, and "Avoid if you are the superior larva and Attack if inferior", 
which I call Martyr. The strategies are assumed to be determined genetically, but the 
conditional strategies allow for flexible behaviour dependent on the conditions in which 
the individual finds itself. Thus two larvae could have the same genetic strategy (eg 
they may both be Martyr), but show different behaviour (Attack or Avoid), dependent 
on conditions (eg depending on whether they are the first or second larva to arrive in 
the bean). 
Payoffs are defined relative to the payoff to a larva developing alone within a 
bean (=1). If two larvae meet and fight for possession of the bean I assign a probability 
(F) that the superior larva wins. This will occur whenever both larvae show Attack 
behaviour, and also whenever one larva adopts Attack behaviour the other Avoid 
behaviour and the Avoid larva does not successfully avoid the Attack larva. The 
variable F can take values from 0.5 to 1 depending on the advantage of the superior 
larva in a fight. If two larvae coexist within a bean then each will pay a cost incurred by 
sharing the resource. I have used EI to represent the cost to the superior larva and E2 
the cost to the inferior larva. These values are calculated as reductions to a maximum 
fitness of 1, and can thus take values of 0-1. Finally I have used q to represent the 
probability that an Avoid larva successfully avoids an Attack larva within a bean. The 
payoff matrix for this game is shown in Table 6.1, payoffs being calculated assuming 
that a larva has a probability of 0.5 of being the superior larva. For example if an Avoid 
larva finds itself in a bean with another Avoid larva, then with probability of 0.5 it will 
be the superior larva and so suffer the EI cost of passive competition (and so gain a 
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Table 6.1. Pay-off matrix for the asymmetric game. F is the probability of a superior 
larva beating an inferior larva in a fight , Eland E2 are the relative costs due to 
passive competition of the superior and inferior larva respectively. q is the probability 
of an Avoid larva successfully evading an Attack larva. Payoffs represent the payoff to 
larva A in competition with larva B. 
larva B 
larva A Attack Avoid Tyrant Martyr 
Attack o.s 1+g::QEl::gE2 l+g::gEI-EQ 1+Fg::gE2 
2 2 2 
Avoid 1+g::QEl::gE2 2-EI-E2 2-E+Fg-I;]::gE2 1 +1: -Fg+g::gEI-E2 
2 2 2 2 
Tyrant 1+Fg::QE2 1+1:-Fg+g::gEI-E2 1 +g::gE 1 ::gE2 1+E-E2 
2 2 2 2 
Martyr 1 +g-Fg::9E 1 2-F+Fg-El::gE2 2.:f.:ID. I +g::gE 1 ::gE2 
2 2 2 2 
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payoff of (I-El)/2) otherwise it will be the inferior larva (and so gain a payoff of (1-
E2)/2). So the mean payoff to the larva will be (2-E1-E2)/2. 
6.3. Results 
Figure 6.2 shows diagrammatically the results of the game under various 
conditions. The axes of each graph represent the relative cost of passive competition 
to either the superior (y-axis) or the inferior (x-axis) larvae. Zones can then be 
delimited onto these figures indicating the evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS; 
Maynard Smith 1982) under different conditions. Figure 6.2a represents a situation 
where the asymmetries are undetected, whilst 6.2b and 6.2c represent situations where 
asymmetry is detected by the larvae. 
6.3.1 Asymmetries not detected 
Iflarvae are unable to detect asymmetries (i.e they cannot tell whether they are 
the superior or inferior larva) then the predicted ESS's are the same as those produced 
by the Smith and Lessells model, depending only on the average costs to the two 
larvae of sharing the bean. In the Smith and Lessells model, if two larvae sharing a 
bean have individual fitnesses of greater than 0.5 of the fitness of a larva alone in a 
bean (E < 0.5), and Attack larvae are not better fighters than Avoid larvae (y/= 0.5) 
then Avoid is the stable strategy. In the undetected asymmetry model presented here 
Avoid is the stable strategy if the mean fitness of two larvae sharing a bean is greater 
than 0.5 of the fitness of a larva alone within a bean. It does not matter whether the 
passive competition is symmetric, with larvae having equal E values, or whether 
competition is highly asymmetric, for instance with one larva with an E value of 0.1, 
the other with an E value of 0.9. The degree of asymmetry in fighting ability also has 
no effect on which strategy is stable when the asymmetry is undetected. Thus in this 
situation asymmetry in competitive ability does not affect the evolutionary outcome if 

















Figure 6.2. The asymmetric' game: The x-a.xis represents E 1. The relative cost due to 
passive competition to the superior larva, whilst the y-a.xis represents E2, the cost to 
the inferior larva. a) represents the situation where asymmetries are undetected by the 
larvae whilst b) and c) represent two situations where the larvae are able to detect the 
asymmetries. F is the probability that a superior larva beats an in~erior larva in a fight. 
The zones represent different ESSs. 
'.'t 
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6.3.2. Asymmetry in passive competitive ability 
If the asymmetry is detectable by the larvae then conditional strategies become 
a possibility and the ESS's are no longer the same as those predicted by the Smith and 
Lessells model. If there is no asymmetry in fighting ability (F=0.5) then the ESS 
depends simply on the relative fitnesses (EI and E2) of the two larvae when sharing a 
bean. For consistency I still use the labels superior and inferior to describe the larvae 
even though in this situation there is no difference in fighting ability, the superior larva 
is then defined as the larva which suffers the E 1 cost of passive competition in the 
model. If both suffer little from competition (EI and E2 < 0.5) then Avoid is stable. If 
both suffer badly from competition (EI and E2 >0.5) then Attack is the ESS. However 
if there is a high degree of asymmetry in passive competitive ability (El<0.5 and 
E2>0.5 or EI>0.5 and ~<0.5) then the conditional strategies become stable. Which of 
the strategies, Tyrant or Martyr, is stable depends on the direction of the asymmetry; if 
the superior larva is the better passive competitor (EI < E2) then Martyr is stable, while 
if the inferior larva is the better passive competitor then Tyrant is stable. However, 
because in this situation there is no asymmetry in fighting ability the labels of superior 
and inferior are just arbritrary labels (they do not imply anything about passive 
competitive ability), the two conditional strategies are better viewed as a single 
strategy of "Attack if you suffer the higher cost of passive competition Avoid if you 
suffer the lower cost of passive competition". This makes sense because a larva that is 
going to suffer a great reduction in fitness due to passive competition does better by 
fighting for access to the whole bean and risking dying in the process. 
6.3.3. Asymmetry in fighting ability 
At the other extreme, if there is no asymmetry in passive competitive ability of 
superior and inferior larvae (El=E2) but there is asymmetry in fighting ability, then 
Martyr is no longer a possible ESS. If the cost to the larvae of sharing a bean is low 
(EI & E2are low) then Avoid is stable and if it is high (EI & E2 are high) then Attack is 
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the ESS. At intermediate values of EI and E2 Tyrant is the stable strategy. The exact 
range of conditions over which Tyrant is the ESS depends on the asymmetry in 
fighting ability. For example, if a superior larva beats an inferior larva in a fight with a 
probability of 0.6 (F=0.6) then Tyrant will be stable when the individual fitnesses of 
two larvae competing passively within a bean are between 0.4 and 0.6 of the fitness of 
a larva alone in a bean (0.4< E1, E2 <0.6). If the degree of asymmetry in fighting ability 
is higher so that a superior larva beats an inferior larvae with a probability of 0.8, 
Tyrant is stable for values of El and E2 of between 0.2 and 0.8. Thus, increasing the 
degree of asymmetry in fighting ability increases the range of condition over which 
Tyrant is the ESS. 
6.3.4. Asymmetries in both fighting and passive competitive ability 
If there are asymmetries in both fighting and competitive ability then which 
strategy is the ESS depends on the exact values of the asymmetries. In general as 
asymmetries in passive competitive ability increase the conditional strategies become 
. more likely as the ESS, and as the asymmetry in fighting ability increases the range of 
conditions over which Tyrant is stable increases at the expense of the other three 
strategies. The formal ESS conditions for each of the strategies are shown in Table 
6.2. 
The probability of an Avoid strategist avoiding an Attack strategist (q) has no 
effect on which strategy is the ESS as long as this probability is not 0 or 1. However 
computer simulation suggests that the value of q does affect the speed at which a 
mutant strategy can invade a population (Figure 6.3.). 
6.4. Discussion 
If asymmetries are present in fighting ability or competitive ability, but cannot 
be detected by the larvae then they have no effect on the evolutionary outcome of this 
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Table 6.2. ESS conditions for the asymmetric game. F is the probability of a superior 
larva beating an inferior larva in a fight, EI and E2 are the relative costs due to passive 
competition of the superior and inferior larva respectively. 
asymmetries undetected 
Strategy ESS Conditions 
Attack El < l-E2 
Avoid El> l-E2 
asymmetries detected 
Strategy ESS Conditions 
Attack El > I-F & E2 > F 
Avoid El<I-F & E2<F 
Martyr El < I-F & E2 > F 
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Figure 6.3. The effect of altering the probability, q, that a larva using Avoid behaviour 
Successfully . avoids a larva using Attack behaviour within a bean. The lines show the 
frequency of Attack strategists every five generations, for a population initially 
containing all four strategies at equal frequencies (0.25). The conditions are such that 
Attack is the ESS (El = 0.9, E2 = 0.9~ F = 0.6). The three lines are for three different 
value of q (large dashed line; q = 0.8, small dashed line; q = 0.5, solid line q = 0.1). 
the value of q does not effect the ESS but alters the speed at which it is reached. 
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game. However, if the asymmetries are detectable by the larvae then conditional 
strategies become possible and the stable strategy depends on the level of the 
asymmetry. However, it is unlikely that there would be an asymmetry in passive 
competitive ability without there being some asymmetry in fighting ability and if both 
factors are included then the situation becomes more complex. Furthermore it is likely 
that there would be a relationship between the degree of asymmetry in competitive 
ability and fighting ability. If this is the case then the possible strategies depend on the 
relationship between these two asymmetries. If the asymmetry in fighting ability is 
greater than the asymmetry in competitive ability then Tyrant becomes more likely as 
the ESS. If the asymmetry in competitive ability is greater than the asymmetry in 
fighting ability then the Martyr becomes more likely as the stable strategy. 
If the chance of an Avoid larva evading an Attack larva is small (q is small) then 
both of the conditional strategies will produce what look like Attack outcomes, and so 
detectable asymmetries may increase the observed frequency of Attack like strategies 
in nature. This differs from the predictions of previous models of asymmetric 
competition (Maynard Smith & Parker 1976). In general these models predict that 
detectable asymmetries will reduce the severity of contests. This discrepancy arises as 
these models represent open systems where one contestant can leave the resource 
rather than fight: if one contestant leaves the fight cannot escalate. My model assumes 
that as long as one larva attempts to fight then the two larvae will meet with a non zero 
probability and an escalated contest occur; in effect neither larva can leave the resource 
patch. The results agree with the prediction of Maynard Smith and Parker (1976) that 
escalated contests are expected when the pay-off for winning is large compared to the 
loss due to injury; the model predicts fighting when the benefit to one of the larvae of 
winning a fight is greater than the risk of dying in a fight. This also agrees with the 
predictions of Enquist and Leimar (1990) that fatal fights are expected when the value 
of the future to an individual if it does not fight is small compared to the value of the 
resource over which it is fighting; a larva which will suffer a great reduction in fitness 
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due to sharing a resource (a low future fitness without fighting) will be expected to 
fight over the resource. 
The model assumes that larvae have only two options, to attempt to kill the 
other competitor or to accept a share of the resource determined by their passive 
competitive ability. However, it can easily be extended to include the possibility of 
dominance, with the superior larva forcing the inferior larva to accept a reduced share 
of the resource. IfE1 is viewed as the cost to the superior larva of being dominant, and 
E2 as the cost to the inferior larva of being denied access to the resource, then figure 
6.2 can be used to predict the ESS under different conditions. In this situation the 
avoid strategy can be viewed as the dominantlsubdominant strategy, and any 
conditions under which avoid is stable can be viewed as conditions under which a 
system of dominance would be stable, indeed from outside the bean these two 
strategies would be impossible to distinguish. In general the ESS depends on the way 
the resource is partitioned between the two larvae; it does not matter if this 1S 
determined by passive competitive ability or some system of dominance. 
Whilst the conclusions of this model do not disagree with those of the Smith 
and Lessells model (Attack strategies are still more likely when the costs of sharing a 
seed are high) it does allow for the existence of conditional strategies. There is some 
evidence that the south Indian strain of C. maculatus shows a conditional strategy very 
similar to the Tyrant strategy described here (Thanthianga & Mitchell 1987), with one 
larva developing normally while the other holds back its development. Thanthianga and 
Mitchell (1987) suggest that the larvae may be using the vibrations, caused by larval 
feeding, to asses the presence and size of another larva in the bean. If the two larvae 
meet then a contest occurs and the smaller larva dies, although active killing by the 
larger larva has not been demonstrated. Experiments are required to determine whether 
the Attack strategies of other species such as C. analis are true Attack strategies or in 
fact conditional strategies. 
The model presented here was framed with Callosobruchus beetles in mind 
where the asymmetry is likely to be caused by arrival time at the bean. A larva which 
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arrives first will have a growth head start and so be bigger than the second larva, 
probably making it a superior fighter. This growth headstart may also make it a 
stronger passive competitor (Bellows 1982a). However the model will equally apply to 
larval competition in other species, and even to other types of competition where the 
competitors are unable to move to another area. In other species the asymmetry in 
fighting ability could be caused by any number of factors and an individual with a 
higher fighting ability may not always have a higher passive competitive ability. In fact 
a trade-off between investment in fighting equipment and feeding equipment could 
mean that the superior fighter is an inferior passive competitor. 
However, although the results of the model will apply to many other 
competitive situations, the model does not take into account inclusive fitness because 
in Callosobruchus beetles the larvae within a bean are rarely related. The model would 
need to be extended to apply to situations where competitors are related (ie siblicide in 
birds). 
Whilst previous models of asymmetric competition (Maynard Smith & Parker 
1976, Hammerstein 1981) suggested that detected asymmetries should reduce the 
amount of fighting over resources, the results of the model presented here suggest that 
in closed systems detected asymmetries may actually increase the likelihood of fighting 
as a competition strategy. This adds asymmetry in competition to a list of factors 
(including those of population genetics such as hysteresis) that make Attack type 
behaviour· a more likely observed outcome than the simplest models of larval 
competition suggest. 
Chapter 7. Extending the Smith and Lessells model: the effect of population 
structure on the evolution of competition strategies 
(submitted) 
7.1. Introduction 
Early models of evolution tended to assume that organisms live in large panmictic 
populations in homogeneous environments. More recently biologists have realised that 
this idealised view of organisms in structured environments does not apply to many 
species (Wilson 1977). Moreover, population structure may have profound 
consequences for the evolution of organisms (Wright 1945, Maynard Smith 1964, 
Matessi & Jayakar 1976, Cohen & Eshel 1976, Wilson 1977). One population 
structure that has been shown to have important consequences on evolution is one in 
which the global population periodically splits into a number of isolated subpopulations 
for one or more generations. This type of population structure corresponds to the 
structured deme model of population genetics (Uyenoyama & Feldman 1980). 
Structured deme models can produce different evolutionary outcomes from 
equivalent models with no population structure. For example, in a single panmictic 
population organisms are generally expected to invest equally in male and female 
offspring (Fisher 1958). However, if organisms produce offspring in isolated patches 
of resource, and offspring mate within their natal patch before dispersal, organisms 
may evolve to invest more heavily in females than in males (Hamilton 1967, Wilson & 
Colwell 1981, Colwell 1981, Harvey 1985). This difference in outcome arises because 
in the structured deme there are two selective forces affecting allele frequencies. 
Within all mixed patches (i.e. patches containing both alleles) female biasing alleles are 
less fit than equal investment alleles and so decrease in frequency every generation just 
as they would in a single population; each patch moves towards the Fisherian equal 
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investment outcome. However, patches with relatively high frequencies of female 
biasing alleles produce a greater numper of dispersers. Thus, even though the female 
biasing allele decreases in frequency in all mixed patches, the greater productivity of 
patches with a female biased sex ratio may allow the female biasing allele to spread in 
the global population. Wilson and Colwell (1981) refer to the change in allele 
frequency within each patch as "individual selection" and the productivity effect as 
"group selection". However, the use of the term individual selection in this context can 
be misleading (Grafen 1984) so in this chapter the change in allele frequencies within 
patches is termed "within patch selection" and the productivity differences between 
patches as "between patch selection". Structured deme models have also been shown 
more generally to make the evolution of altruistic traits possible in patchy populations 
when they could not evolve in a single population (Wright 1945, Maynard Smith 1964, 
Matessi & Jayakar 1976, Cohen & Eshel 1976). Again, this is because even though 
altruistic individuals have a lower relative fitness than selfish individuals within all 
mixed patches, patches with a high relative frequency of altruistic individuals will have 
a higher productivity and the within patch selection against the altruistic individuals 
may be outweighed by the between patch selection favouring patches of altruistic 
individuals. 
For a patchy population structure to produce a different evolutionary outcome 
to a single undivided population there are two general requirements. Firstly, the 
productivity of patches must vary depending on the frequency of alleles within patches 
producing between patches selection. Secondly, within patch selection and between 
patch selection must work in different directions, with one of the selective forces 
favouring one of the alleles whilst the other selective force favours the alternative 
allele. 
One situation in which a patchy environment might have important 
evolutionary consequences is o~ the evolution of competition behaviour. Organisms 
typically compete in one of two ways; they may compete actively over the resource, 
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attempting to exclude or even kill other competitors in a contest type process (sensu 
Nicholson 1954), or they may compete in a scramble of process (sensu Nicholson 
1954) with each individual attempting to gain as much of the resource as possible 
without directly interfering with other competitors. However, a set amount of resource 
may support a different number of ~ontest and scramble individuals. For example 
larvae of different species of parasitoid wasps show either a contest or scramble 
strategy when competing over their host (Godfray 1987a, b). In solitary species the 
larvae fight and typically only one adult emerges from each host, but if diflubezuron, 
which stops larvae developing their fighting mouthparts, is added to the host, several 
adults can emerge from each host (Khoo et al 1985). Thus, each host can support a 
single contest strategist or several scramble strategists. If larval hosts were patchily 
distributed this would lead to differential productivity between patches depending on 
the frequency of the two strategists within a patch. 
A similar situation is found in insects such as bruchid beetles whose larvae 
complete development within seeds or beans. In many of these species larvae are 
confined to a single host for the whole of their development and, as several eggs can be 
laid on a single host, larval competition can be intense. The larvae of these beetles 
show a similar dichotomy of competition behaviour (Smith & Lessells 1985); in some 
species larvae fight within the host and only a single adult emerges, whilst in others 
several larvae develop to adulthood within a single bean and apparently compete in a 
scnimble type process. Even closely related species can show disparate competition 
strategies; whilst most species within the genus Callosobruchlls use scramble 
competition behaviour as larvae, the larvae of C.allalis use contest competition 
behaviour (Umeya et al 1975). What types of selective forces can cause different 
species to evolve different competition strategies? Previous authors (e.g. Godfray 
1987b for parasitoids, Smith & Lessells 1985 for internally feeding granivorous 
insects) have used mathematical models to attempt to answer this question, but all of 
these models have assumed that organisms live in a single undivided population. This 
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chapter describes a series of models of the evolution of competition strategies in a 
patchy environment. The models were developed with Callosobruchus beetles in mind, 
and are based on a genetic version of the original Smith and Lessells (Smith 1990) 
model. Initially the results of a model with a patchy population structure are compared 
to the same model in a single undivided population (the Smith and Lessells model) to 
determine the general effects of a patchy population structure. Then the results of 
several patchy models with differing population structures are compared to determine 
the effects of different aspects of· the population structure on the evolutionary 
outcome. 
7.2. The Model 
In the model, individuals can adopt one of two alternative competitive 
strategies. "Attack" strategists compete over the resource by fighting to the death, 
whilst "Avoid' strategists compete passively without directly interfering with each 
other. The behaviour of each individual is controlled by a single diploid locus with two 
alternative alleles, with the Avoid allele dominant. The population goes through two 
phases (figure 7.1). In the patchy phase individuals reproduce for a set number of 
generations within isolated patches and competition occurs between the offspring 
every generation, affecting their survival to adulthood and so causing changes in allele 
frequencies in the next generation of adults. During the dispersal phase adults leave the 
patches and form a single population. No reproduction occurs during dispersal and at 
the end of this phase a new generation of patches is founded by a set number of 
random females from this dispersal population. The model is then used to follow 
changes in allele frequency from one dispersal population to the next. 
In a structured population such as this the change in allele frequency in the 








, Dispersal phase. . . 
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Figure 7.1. The population structure. Individuals begin in a single dispersal population 
(the dispersal phase). Isolated patches are then founded by random individuals from the 
dispersal population. Individuals spend a set number of generations within patches and 
competition occurs every generation. Adult individuals then disperse from the patches 
and form a single population again. Females that found patches can mate during 
dispersal (point a), or within patches either after (point b) or before (point c) dispersal. 
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each patch, ii) the number of adults dispersing from each patch and iii) the number of 
patches with different initial allele frequencies. 
Competition within a patch is modelled by assuming that the resource is divided 
up into a large number of discrete units. Adult females deposit their offspring within 
these resource units, and the offspring are restricted to a single resource unit where 
they develop into adults. Each unit contains exactly two individuals and they compete 
over the resource during development. This competition during development affects 
the survival of the individuals to adults. The expected fitness of an adult after 
competition depends on two variables, the cost of competition and Attack larval 
superiority. If two Avoid strategists share a bean they each have a lower probability of 
survival than if they had developed alone within a bean without competition. If an 
individual that develops alone without competition is defined as having an expected 
fitness of 1, then the cost of competition parameter (E) is simply the reduction in 
fitness of individuals which compete over resources relative to this. If an Attack 
strategist competes with an Avoid strategist over a resource unit, they fight and the 
surviving individual has sole access to the resource and gains a fitness of 1. The Attack 
superiority parameter (W) is the probability that an Attack strategist beats an Avoid 
strategist in a fight and allows for the fact that Attack strategists may be better fighters 
than Avoid strategists, because they specialise in Attack behaviour. W can take any 
value from O.S, when Attack and Avoid strategists are equally good fighters, to 1 
where Attack strategists always kill Avoid strategists. If two Attack strategists compete 
over a resource unit, each has an equal chance of killing the other and gaining sole 
access to the resource and a fitness of 1. 
The Avoid allele is represented by v and the Attack allele by t, so the genotypes 
of individuals can be represented as [vv], [ttl, and [vt] denoting Avoid homozygotes, 
Attack homozygote and heterozygotes respectively. If Pvv, Ptt and Pvt are the 
frequencies of these three genotypes in young individuals before competition occurs, 
and individuals are assumed to compete with one other random individual, the 
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frequencies of the three genotypes in the adults after competition (denoted P'vv, P'vt 
and pitt) can be determined using the following relationships. For Avoidhomozygotes 
P'vv = «(1-E)(2Pvv2+2Pvv.Pvt)+2(1-W)Pvv.Pvt) 
(2(1-E)(Pvv2+2Pvv.Pvt+Pvt2)+2Pvv.Ptt+2Pvt.Ptt+Ptt2) 
for Attack homozygotes 
pitt = W(2Pvv.Ptt+2Pvt.Ptt)+Ptt2 ii 
(2(1-E)(pvv2+2Pvv.Pvt+Pvt2)+2Pvv.Ptt+2Pvt.Ptt+Ptt2) 
-. 
The frequency of heterozygotes is then simply 
P'vt = 1 - (Pvv+Ptt) . iii 
Similarly, the number of adult beetles produced in each generation (N') can be 
calculated in terms of the number of females in the previous generation (Nr), their 
fecundity (R) and the frequencies and fitnesses of the three genotypes in their larvae 
using 
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N' = Nf.R(2( l-E)(Pw2+2Pw.Pvt+Pvt2)+2Pvv.Ptt+2Pvt.Ptt+Ptt2) . IV 
The absolute population size within a patch will depend on the fecundity of 
females, but the change in allele frequency in the global population depends only on the 
relative number of dispersers produced in each patch rather than the absolute number, 
and this is independant of the fecundity of females. Thus the value of R used will not 
alter the outcome of simulations. 
In general, the population within a patch was assumed to be large enough to be 
in Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium; genotype frequencies before competition occurred 
were the same as in the previous generation of adults. However, because each patch is 
founded by a small number of individuals, this assumption will not hold for the first 
generation of offspring within a patch. Instead genotype frequencies were calculated 
separately for each mated female within a patch and then combined to give the overall 
genotype frequencies in the first generation of offspring. 
The deterministic nature of these equations means that patches of the same type 
(i.e. patches with the same initial genotype frequencies) will produce the same number 
and frequency of dispersing adults. Thus, to determine the genotype frequencies in the 
next dispersal population it is necessary to know the number of each patch type. In 
models in which females mate before or during dispersal, each mated female can be 
viewed as having a tetraploid genotype, made up of the females diploid genotype as 
well as the genotype of her mate. This mated female genotype can be represented as 
[wItt], with the females genotype before the slash and the males after. If Fw/tt is the 
frequency of [wItt] females in the dispersal population, Fvtlvt the frequency of [vtlvt) 
females, Patch[w/tt,w/tt] the frequency of patches founded by two [wItt] females, 
Patch[w/tt,vtlvt] the frequency of patches founded by one [wItt] female and one 
[vt/vt] female, and it is assumed that an infinite number of patches are founded, then 
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Patch[ vv/tt, vv/tt] = Fvv/tt2 v 
and 
Patch[ vv/tt, vtlvt] = 2Fvv/tt.Fvtlvt. vi 
The frequency of other patch types with all possible combinations of mated female 
genotypes can be calculated in the same way. 
If females mate within patches after dispersal, patch frequencies cannot be 
calculated in terms of mated female genotypes in the dispersal population. Instead, a 
slightly different procedure is used. The frequency of patches with different 
combinations of unmated males and females are determined in terms of the frequency 
of the three genotypes in the dispersal population. For example, if Fvv, Fvt and Ftt are 
the frequencies of the three genotypes in the dispersal population, and genotype 
frequencies are the same for both males and females and Patch[vv,tt][vt,tt] represents 
the frequency of patches founded by one [vv] female, one [ttl female, one [vt] male 
and one [ttl male, the frequency of patches with this mix of unmated individuals can 
then be calculated as 
Patch[vv,tt][vt,tt] = 4Fvv.Ftt.F~.Ftt. vii 
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However, within a patch ~f this type there are four possible mating 
combinations which can give rise to different mated female patch types. If mating is 
random within the patches and both females can mate with the same male the four 
possible combinations are; both females mating with the [vt] male, both with the [ttl 
male, the [w] female mating with the [vt] male and the [ttl female with the [ttl male or 
the [w] female mating with the tt male and the [ttl female with the [vt] male. In terms 
of mated females this will give rise to the four mated female patch types [w/vt,ttlvt], 
[w/tt,ttltt], [w/vt,ttltt] and [w/tt,ttlvt] with each with a frequency of Fw.Ftt.Fvt.Ftt. 
This same procedure can be carried out for all possible combinations of unmated male 
and female genotypes to give the frequencies of patch types with all possible 
combinations of mated female genotypes. 
Once the frequency of each patch type, the number of dispersers from each 
patch type and the frequency of genotypes within these dispersers are known, the 
frequency of each genotype in the next dispersal population can be determined. This is 
simply the sum of that genotype's frequency within dispersers from each patch type, 
weighted by both the relative number of dispersers produced by that patch type, and 
the frequency of that patch type in the population. 
: For a behavioural strategy to be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS, 
Maynard Smith 1982), a population fixed for the appropriate allele must be stable 
against invasion by rare mutant alleles for the alternative behaviour. To see if this is the 
case for Attack or Avoid the model was begun with the allele for the other behaviour at 
low frequency (0.00001) in the initial dispersal population. The change in allele 
frequencies were then followed for 30. cycles of patchy and dispersal phases. If the rare 
allele decreased in frequency the behaviour determined by the common allele was 
deemed to be an ESS. The genotypes in the dispersal population will generally not be 
in Hardy-Weinberg proportions, and so the way in which an allele is distributed 
amongst the three genotype in the initial dispersal population might have important 
consequences for the outcome of the model. To assess the importance of this, separate 
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runs of the model were carried out under a range of conditions, with the rare allele 
either present only in homozygotes, in Hardy-Weinberg proportions or only in 
heterozygotes. Whilst the initial conditions occasionally affected the results for the first 
one or two cycles, these differences were negligible after 10 cycles, and so all runs of 
the model were begun with the alleles in Hardy-Weinberg proportions. 
Initially. the model was set up with each patch being founded by 2 females 
which mated during dispersal, and patches existed for two generations of competition. 
The ESS's were determined for a range of values ofE (0-1) and W (0.5-1: Values of 
W less than 0.5 are biologically unlikely and have not been considered here.) and 
compared to the results of the model with an undivided population structure. There are 
several components of the population structure which may affect the outcome of the 
model; the spread of an allele may depend on i) the number of females that found each 
patch, ii) the number of generations that individuals spend within a patch and iii) the 
point at which founding females mate (before, during or after dispersal; see figure 7.1). 
Consequently further runs of the model were carried out with each of these parameters 
altered in tum to asses their effect on the predictions of the model. 
7.3. Results 
The effect of the patchy population structure can be seen by comparing the 
outcome of the basic patchy model, in which patches are founded by two females that 
mate during dispersal and spend two generations within patches before dispersing, to 
the model with an undivided population structure, which is exactly equivalent to the 
genetic version of the Smith and Lessells model with the Avoid allele dominant (Smith 
1990). If the cost of competition is .high (E >0.5) Attack is the only ESS in both 
models. Similarly, if the cost of competition is low (E < 0.5) and there is no Attack 
superiority, Avoid is the only ESS in both models. Thus under these two sets of 
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conditions, the structured population has no effect on the model's outcome. However, 
ifthere is some level of Attack superiority 0N >0.5) and the cost of competition is also 
low (E<0.5) the outcomes of the two models differ. 
The ESSls for this range of conditions are shown in figure 7.2. If there is any 
level of Attack superiority (i.e.W>0.5) then Attack is always a possible ESS in the 
undivided model, but this is not the case in the patchy population model. If the cost of 
competition is low enough then Avoid alleles are able to invade a population fixed for 
the Attack allele, even if there is some level of Attack superiority. Avoid becomes the 
only ESS for a range of conditions in which both Attack and Avoid were possible 
ESSls in the undivided population model. As both Attack superiority and the cost of 
competition increase a boundary is reached (E<l-W) above which Attack becomes the 
only ESS in the undivided population model. In the patchy model this boundary is 
shifted to higher values ofE and W, and Avoid continues to be a possible ESS for a 
range of values where E >l-W. Avoid continues to be a possible ESS in the patchy 
model under conditions in which Attack is the only ESS in the undivided population. 
Thus, the patchy population structure increases the range of conditions in which Avoid 
is a possible ESS, and reduces the range in which Attack is a possible ESS. 
The reason for this change in outcome is that, as with other structured 
population models, there are two selective forces which affect allele frequencies in a 
patchy population; within patch selection acting on the relative fitness of the two 
alleles within patches, and· between patch selection acting on the differential 
productivity of patches with different initial genotype frequencies. Within patch 
selection operates within each patch in exactly the same way as it would do in an single 
undivided population. If conditions are such that Attack is the only ESS in an 
undivided population then Attack alleles will be replacing Avoid alleles within all mixed 
patches, whatever the initial frequencies of the two alleles (figure 7.3a), whilst if Avoid 
is the only ESS in an undivided population, Avoid alleles will be replacing Attack 



























Figure 7.2. Predicted ESS's for a) the undivided population model (the Smith and 
Lessells model) and b) the basic patchy model with patches founded by two females 
which mated during dispersal and two generations of competition within patches. E is 
the cost of competition and W the level of Attack superiority. Lines represent 
boundaries between conditions with different ESS's. Values of W below 0.5 are 
biologically unlikely and so not shown on figures, values of E above 0.5 are also not 
shown as Attack is the only ESS under these conditions, and does not change in any of 
the models. There is a zone (unlabelled on figure} corresponding to the y axis in the 
undivided population figure, for which Avoid is the only ESS. 
Figure 7.3. Within patch change in Avoid allele frequency under conditions in which a) 
Attack is the only ESS (E=0.6, W=0.5), b) Avoid is the only ESS (E=0.2,W=0.5) and 
c) Attack and Avoid are both possible ESS's (E=O.l, W=0.75) in the undivided 
population model. Each graph shows the frequency of the Avoid allele after one to six 
generations of competition within patches. The three lines represent patches with 
different initial frequencies of the Avoid allele (0.25,0.5,0.75). 
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ESSIs the allele which spreads to fixation in an undivided population depends on the 
initial frequencies of the two alleles. There is a threshold frequency above which the 
Avoid allele will spread to fixation and below which it will decrease in frequency. 
Under these conditions the allele which spreads within each patch depends on the 
initial frequency of the alleles when the patch is founded; patches initially above the 
threshold frequency for the spread of the Avoid allele in an undivided population 
moving towards fixation of the Avoid allele and patches below this threshold moving 
towards fixation of the Attack allele (figure 7.3c). On the other hand, between patch 
selection, due to patches with different initial allele frequencies producing different 
numbers of dispersing adults, can only operate in a patchy population. The differential 
productivity arises because when pairs of individuals compete over a resource unit, the 
number which survive to adulthood depends on the strategy of the two competitors. If 
at least one of the competitors uses the Attack strategy, only a single individual will 
survive, whilst if both competitors use the Avoid strategy, the resource unit will 
produce 2(I-E) adults. Hence between patch selection can favour either the Attack 
allele or the Avoid allele depending on the cost of competition; ifE > O.S patches with 
a high frequency of Avoid alleles produce fewer dispersers (figure 7.4a), whilst if E 
<O.S they produce more dispersers (figure 7.4b). 
If within patch and between patch selection both favour the same allele, the 
population structure does not affect the outcome of the model. If the cost of 
competition is high then both forces favour the spread of the Attack allele and the ESS 
in both models is Attack. Similarly, if there is no Attack larval superiority and the cost 
of competition is low, both forces favour the Avoid allele and the ESS is Avoid in both 
models. However, if the two selective forces favour different alleles the predictions of 
the two models may differ. If Attack is the only ESS in the single population model, 
within patch selection favours the spread of the Attack allele, but if the cost of 
competition is also low between patch selection favours the spread of the Avoid allele. 
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Figure 7.4. Relative productivity of patches with different initial frequencies of Avoid 
alleles. The graphs show the productivity of patches with different initial frequencies of 
Avoid alleles, relative to the productivity of a patch fixed for the Attack allele. Value 
are shown for one to six generations of competition, under conditions in which a) the 
cost of competition is high (E = 0.6, W=0.5) and b) low (E = 0.4, \V=0.5). The three 
lines represent patches with initial Avoid allele frequencies of 0.25 (solid line). 0.5 
(large dashed line) and 0.75 (small dashed line). 
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global population even though it declines in frequency within every mixed patch. Thus, 
under conditions in which Attack is the only ESS in the undivided population model, 
Avoid may become an alternative ESS to Attack in a patchy population model. If 
Attack and Avoid are both possible ESS's in the undivided population model, the allele 
favoured by within patch selection varies between patches depending on their initial 
allele frequencies. In patches with relatively high frequencies of Avoid alleles, within 
patch selection favours the Avoid allele, whilst in patches with lower frequencies it 
favours the Attack allele. Again, between patch selection favours the Avoid allele, and 
the Avoid allele is able to, spread to fixation in the global popUlation from a lower initial 
frequency than in an undivided population. Indeed, the threshold frequency above 
which the Avoid allele can spread to fixation in the global population may be reduced 
so much that the Avoid allele is able to invade a population fixed for the Attack allele 
and Avoid becomes the only ESS in the patchy population model under conditions in 
which Attack is also a possible ESS in the undivided population model. 
Thus, when the cost of competition is low, the increased productivity of 
patches with relatively high frequencies of"Avoid alleles may allow the Avoid allele to 
spread in conditions in which it could not do so in a single population, and so Avoid 
behaviour is more likely to evolve in a patchy population than in a population that is 
undivided. 
7.3.1. Number of founding females 
Increasing the number of females that found each patch from two to three 
reduces the effect of the population s~ructure on the spread of the Avoid allele (figure 
7.5). The zone in which Avoid is the only ESS is reduced and the zone in which Attack 
is the only ESS is increased. This occurs because the strength of between patch 
selection depends on the initial variation in allele frequencies between patches which is 
caused by sampling effects when the patches are founded. The smaller the number of 
, 
founding females, the greater the variation between patches. As the number of females 
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Figure 7.5. Effect of the number of founding females. E is the cost of competition and 
W is the level of Attack superiority. Lines represent boundaries between conditions 
with different ESS's. Boundaries are shown for models in which patches are founded 
by two females (solid lines) or three females (broken lines). 
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is increased, the frequency of the alleles within patches become closer to their 
frequencies in the dispersal population, and the strength of the productivity effect is 
reduced. 
7.3.2. Number of generations within patches 
Increasing the number of generations that organisms spend within patches from 
two to 10 favours the spread of the Avoid allele (figure 7.6). The size of the zone in 
which Avoid is the only ESS increases, and the zone in which Attack is the only ESS 
decreases. Increasing the number of generations to 20 increases this effect even further 
(figure 7.6). 
As the number of generations spent within patches before dispersal increases, the 
strength of both within patch and between patch selection increases. However, whilst 
between patch selection can increase in strength indefinitely, within patch selection can 
only operate while there are patches containing both Attack an'd Avoid alleles. As 
initially mixed patches become fixed for one of the alleles, the strength of within patch . 
selection begins to decline. Thus, an increase in generations within patches has a 
greater effect on between patch selection than within patch selection and increases the 
range of conditions in which the Avoid allele is able to spread. 
7.3.3. Point at which founding females mate 
In the basic model founding females mate in the single population during 
dispersal. If instead, mating occurs within patches either before or after dispersal, 
Avoid becomes more likely as an ESS (figure 7.7). The zone in which A void is the only 
ESS increases in size and the zone in which Attack is the only ESS decreases in size. 
The effect of moving the point at which founding females mate to either before or after 
dispersal is to increase the variation in allele frequencies between patches. This will 
increase the differences in productivity between patches and thus favour the spread of 











Figure 7.6. Effect of number of generations of competition within patches. E is the 
cost of competition and W the level of Attack superiority. Lines represent boundaries 
between conditions with different ESS's. Boundaries are shown for models in which 
individuals compete for two generations (solid lines) 10 generation (smaIl dashed lines) 













Figure 7.7. Effect of altering the point of mating. E is the cost of competition and W 
the level of Attack superiority. Lines represent boundaries between conditions with 
different ESS's. Boundaries are shown for models in which females mate before (small 
dashed lines), during (solid lines) or after (large dashed lines) dispersal. 
1 
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in the entire population, but if mating occurs within patches, females can only mate 
with a small subset of the males in the global population. 
7.4. Discussion 
The model shows that subdividing a population into isolated patches can favour 
the evolution of Avoid behaviour and that the number of generations within patches, 
the number of founding females and the point of mating affect how strong this effect is. 
The population structure most conducive to the evolution of Avoid behaviour is one in 
which patches are founded by a small number of individuals, that mate within patches 
either before or after dispersal and in which patches persist for many generations (but 
see below for possible effect of infinite patches) .. These results are consistent with the 
effects of a patchy population structure on the evolution of other traits such as sex 
ratio and altruistic behaviour (Colwell 1981, Wilson & Colwell 1981, Harvey 1985 for 
sex ratio, Wilson 1977, Maynard Smith 1964, 1983, Matessi & Jayakar 1976. Cohen & 
Eshel 1976 for altruistic behaviour) where a small number of founders and mating 
within patches also increased the effect of the population structure on the evolutionary 
outcome. 
The model makes assumptions that may not necessarily be true of natural 
populations. In the model each patch is founded by the same number of females. 
However patches certainly vary in the number of founders. If the variance in allele 
frequency is determined for patches founded by exactly two mated females, and also 
for patches founded by a mean of two mated females but with the exact number 
varying from one to six in Poisson frequencies, the variance is higher for the latter 
case. Thus variation in the number of founders per patch may further increase the 
spread of the Avoid allele. The mean number of females founding patches is also 
expected to vary in relation to the size of the dispersal population. This introduces an 
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interesting dynamic, because as the frequency of the A void allele increases the dispersal 
population size will also increase. This will then increase the mean number of founders 
which will work against the spread of the Avoid allele. Thus, an increase in the 
frequency of the Avoid allele may actually alter conditions so that it is no longer able to 
spread. The exact effect will depend on the conditions but could include long term 
cycling of allele frequencies or even a stable polymorphism. 
In the model the number of competitors per resource unit is assumed constant 
throughout the lifetime of the patch, whereas it would probably increase as the 
population within the patch becomes larger. This increase in the number of competitors 
per resource unit with time will differ between patches depending on their relative 
growth rates. It is hard to predict the effect of this, but Smith and Lessells showed that 
the results of their game theory model were qualitatively, but not quantitatively the 
same with different number of larvae per bean. It seems likely that the same will be true 
of the patchy model; the effect will still be to favour the spread of the A void allele 
although the strength of this effect may differ. 
In the model an infinite number of patches are founded at the beginning of each 
patchy phase allowing the frequency of· different patch types to be calculated 
deterministically in terms of the frequency of alleles in the previous dispersal 
population. In the real world the number of patches will be finite which will add an 
element of stochasticity to the frequencies of patch types. This may have important 
consequences for the spread of the Avoid allele when rare. particularly when beetles 
spend a large number of generations within patches. In the deterministic model some 
patches will always begin fixed for the A void allele, no matter how rare the allele is in 
the population as a whole. Even if conditions are such that the Atlack allele is able to 
spread in all other patches, these patches will remain fixed for the A void allele. In a 
population with a finite number of patches, chance events may lead to no patches 
beginning fixed for the Avoid allele, and if the number of generations within patches is 
high enough, all patches could become fixed for the Attack allele, and the Avoid allele 
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be lost from the population. So although in theory a large number of generations 
within patches increases the range of conditions in which the A void allele can spread 
when rare, in practice, if the number of generations is too high, it may be very difficult 
for the Avoid allele to spread, as chance events will frequently result in it disappearing 
from the population. To examine this effect the model was set up with a finite number 
of patches, each founded by two mated females whose genotype was selected at 
random from the dispersal population. Individuals spent 10 generations competing 
within patches and conditions were such that Avoid ane1es could spread when rare in 
the infinite patch version of the model (E=0.67, W=I). If 10 000 patches were 
founded, only 16 out of 100 replicate runs went to fixation for the Avoid allele, whilst 
if 100 000 patches were founded, 93 out of 100 went to fixation. 
Whilst the model should be generally applicable to the evolution of competition 
strategies in patchy population structures, it was developed with Callosobruchus 
beetles in mind.· Callosobnlchus beetles are stored product pests of various legumes 
cultivated by man, and as such their 'environment is made up of many isolated bean 
stores. Initial infection occurs in the field, and the beetles are then transported as larvae 
within the beans into large bean stores (Southgate 1979, Hagstrum 1985, Germaine et 
al 1987). Infestation levels in the field are low and so only a small number of beetles 
emerge within the store. Hagstrum (1985) has reported C maculatus infestation in the 
field at a level of about one larva in every 100 000 beans. The founding beetles then 
emerge and mate within the store, before reproducing rapidly on the abundant 
resource. After several generations within the store the resource becomes depleted and 
the beetles enter a dispersal phase leaving the store in search of new beans to infect. 
Lefevre (1950 cited in Taylor 1981) reports 48-70% damage of beans within 8 months 
of bruchid infestation. In the laboratory the generation time of Cal/osobruchus beetles 
is about one month but is likely to be slower in the field. This suggests that 
C.maculatus may destroy most of the beans within a store within 10 generations. This 
... 
population structure, with a low number of founders mating after dispersal within the 
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store, and several generations of reproduction before dispersal is the type of structure 
which should favour the evolution of Avoid type competition strategies. Most 
Callosobruchus species use an Avoid type competition strategy as larvae, whilst other 
bruchid beetles, which exploit wild legumes, tend to show Attack behaviour (Kiritani 
1957 cited in Toquenaga & Fujii 1990). The results of this model support the idea that 
moving from a wild host to a stored product. and the associated change in population 
structure, may have been an important step in the evolution of the Avoid competition 
strategy in this genus (Smith and Lessells 1985, Smith 1990). However wild legumes 
are smaller than cultivated ones, and this could also favour Attack behaviour in the 
wild and Avoid behaviour in stored products. A detailed comparative study examining 
the relationship between the two competition strategies and factors such as host size, 
and population structure across different species of bruchids would be required to 
determine whether either or both of these factors have been important. Also while 
most Callosobruchus species use Avoid behaviour, C. ana/is uses Attack behaviour 
(Umeya et al 1975); a comparison of the exact population structure of this species to 
other Callosobruchlls species might provide clues to the reason for its larval 
competition strategy. 
The similarities between the effects of a patchy population structure on the 
evolution of competition strategies shown by this model, and the effect shown by other 
authors on the evolution of female biased sex ratios and altruistic traits are not 
surprising as the systems have many common features. In all three cases the population 
structure has an effect because the allele which has the greater relative fitness within a 
patch is not the allele which maximises the absolute fitness of individuals within the 
patch. Indeed, Wilson and Colwell (1981) regarded females producing a female biased 
sex ratio as behaving altruistically because the trait lowered their relative fitness within 
a patch whilst increasing the absolute fitness of all members of the patch. Using this 
same definition, the Avoid behaviour in this model could also potentially be described 
as an altruistic trait. This redefining of the term altruism, to refer to a trait which 
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reduces individuals relative fitness within its group rather than its absolute fitness 
compared to the global population, has been criticised by Grafen (1984), but whatever 
term is used, there is no doubt that the same processes that make the evolution of 
female biased sex ratios and altruistic traits more likely in a subdivided population also 
make the evolution of scramble competition strategies more likely too. This model 
adds the way in which organisms compete over resources to the list of traits whose 
evolution can be affected by the population structure in which they evolve, so any 
attempt to understand why different species compete in different ways cannot ignore 
the population structure of the organisms concerned. 
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Chapter 8. General discussion 
8.1. Introduction 
The two species ofbruchid beetle, Callosobruchus analis and C. macula/us present an 
interesting problem to evolutionary biologists. The larvae of both species develop 
within legume seeds, such as black-eyed beans and mung beans, but the larvae of the 
two species compete in very different ways. The larvae of C. analis adopt an extreme 
contest type behaviour (the Attack strategy) and fight to the death within the bean, so 
that normally only a single adult emerges from each bean, no matter how many initially 
entered the bean. In contrast, the larvae of C. macula/us adopt a scramble competition 
strategy (the Avoid strategy), and compete passively by exploiting the resource, as a 
result several C. maculatus adults may emerge from a single bean. The aim of this 
study was to investigate the types of selective forces that can cause two closely related 
species to evolve such different larval competition strategies when competing over 
identical hosts. 
The main factors likely to affect the competition strategy that a species evolves 
in a closed system are summarised in Table 8.1. In this chapter I will discuss each of 
these factors in relation to the results of this study, and also discuss some of the 
implications of these factors to competition in general. 
8.2. Factors affecting competition in closed systems 
8.2.1. The cost of sharing resources 
One factor that the Smith and Lessells model suggests may have important 
consequences for the type of competition strategy that a species evolves is the cost of 
exploitation competition. This represents the relative reduction in fitness of a larva that 
shares a bean compared to the fitness of a larva that develops alone within a bean. The 
higher the cost of exploitation competition, the more likely that the Altack larval 
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Table 8.1. Factors that affect the competition strategy that a species evolves in a closed 
system 
Factor Effect References 
Cost of sharing the The higher this cost the Smith & Lessells(1985) 
resource (the cost of more likely that contest Godfray (1987b) 
exploitation competition). strategies will evolve. Smith (1990) 
Chapters 3 and 4 
Cost of fighting Any cost of fighting over Godfray (1987b) 
the resource will reduce Chapter 5 
the likelihood that contest 
competition strategies will 
evolve 
Asymmetries in fighting Detected asymmetries Chapter 6 
and passive competitive make the evolution of 
abilities conditional strategies 
possible. Increased 
asymmetries make the 
evolution of contest 
strategies, either pure or 
conditional. more likely. 
Historical constraints on Models of competition Smith & Lessells (1985) 
evolution suggest that species may Godfray (1987b) 
often be constrained to Godfray & Harper (1990) , 
using a contest 
competition strategy, once 
they have evolved it, even 
if conditions change so 
that a scramble strategy 
would have higher fitness 
Population structure. A subdivided popUlation Smith & Lessells (1985) 
structure makes the Smith (1990) 




competition strategy (the contest strategy) will be the evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS: Maynard Smith 1982). The results described in chapters 3 and 4 suggest that 
one factor determining the cost of exploitation competition in bruchid beetles is the 
size of the host bean, or more precisely the amount and quality of the resource within 
the host bean, in which the larvae develop. This idea is also supported by the work of 
Toquenaga and Fujii (1990, 1991a, b) on interspecific competition between C. ana/is 
and C. phaseoli (another Avoid species). They found that the Attack species, C. analis, 
was favoured in competition over small hosts, but that the Avoid species, C. phaseo/i. 
was favoured on large hosts. This is likely to be generally true for the evolution of 
competition strategies in many other closed systems. Godfray's model (Godfray 1987b) 
of the evolution of larval competition strategies in parasitic wasps predicted that 
contest competition strategies would be likely to evolve when the optimum clutch size 
per host is small. The optimum clutch size per host is likely to depend in a large part on 
the amount of resource within the host (Klomp & Teerink 1967, Waage & Godfray 
1985). Thus, it seems that in these types of closed systems the size of the host probably 
does play an important role in the type of competition strategy that a species evolves. 
However, current differences in the cost of exploitation competition caused by 
differences in host size cannot be the sole reason for the different larval competition 
strategies used by these two species of beetle, because both species are known to 
occur on beans of the same species (Southgate 1978) both in nature and in the 
laboratory. One possible explanation is that there are inherent differences in the cost of 
exploitation competition suffered by the two species so that although they both use the 
same hosts, C. analis larvae suffer a greater cost of exploitation competition than C. 
maculatus larvae. There do indeed appear to be differences in the cost suffered by the 
two species when they compete on small hosts, such as mung beans, but on larger 
hosts such as black-eyed bean this does not appear to be the case; both species suffer a 
similar cost of exploitation. Moreover, the cost is low, so that the larvae of both 
species would appear to have higher individual fitness if they shared beans rather than 
fighting over them. Thus, in terms of individual fitness, C. ana/is larvae appear to be 
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using a maladaptive strategy on black-eyed beans. A similar problem has been 
observed with the larvae of parasitoid insects, with the larvae of some solitary species 
fighting over hosts that are large enough to support the development of several larvae 
of gregarious species of a similar size (Godfray 1987a,b). Why should some species 
contest over resources when they would appear to show greater individual fitness if 
they scrambled for the resources? One possible explanation is that a species may be 
constrained to using a strategy that was evolved under different conditions. The 
importance of such historical constraints in limiting the evolution of a species are 
discussed below. 
8.2.2. The cost of fighting 
In chapter 5 it was suggested that if larvae that fight over a bean and win suffer 
some cost of having fought this will reduce the conditions in which Attack behaviour 
will evolve. Similar conclusions apply to both the parasitoid model (God fray 1987b) 
and also the siblicide models (Dickens & Clark 1987, Godfray & Harper 1990). The 
experiments in chapter 5 show that in C. alla/is there seems to be very little effect of 
fighting over a bean on the fitness of the winner, so in this system costs of fighting 
would appear to have been of little importance in the evolution of competition 
strategies. How general this conclusion is to other systems is difficult to assess. Salt 
(1961) reported cases in which the larvae of solitary parasitoids would kill each other 
within a host, but it is not clear how often this occurs. Dickens and Clark (1987) 
suggest that the ease with which a siblicidal kittiwake chick can dispose of a sibling, 
simply by pushing it from the nest over the cliff, may make it more likely that siblicide 
will evolve in cliff nesting species. However, it seems unlikely that fighting will always 
have very little cost for the victor, thus in some cases the cost of fighting probably 
does increase the chance that a species will evolve a scramble competition strategy. 
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8.2.3. Asymmetries in fighting and passive competitive abilities 
The major effect of adding asymmetries in fighting and competitive ability to 
the Smith and Lessells model of larval competition, is that they allow the evolution of 
more complex conditional strategies, in which the behaviour of the individual depends 
on whether it is the inferior or superior competitor. It is difficult to assess the 
importance of this to the evolution of competition strategies because it is often difficult 
in a closed system to tell whether the competitive outcome observed arose from 
individuals using conditional or pure strategies. In the case of siblicide in birds it is 
common for asymmetries to mean that the larger chick kills the smaller chick, but it is 
impossible to tell whether this is a result of the chicks using a pure, "attempt to kill 
your nest mate" strategy or a conditional "if you are the big chick attempt to kill your 
nest mate, otherwise keep out of your nest mates way", because unless small chicks are 
very good at keeping out of the way, the outcome will look the same; the big chick 
kills the smaller chick. 
The model in chapter 6 shows that as the degree of asymmetries increases, the 
conditional strategies become more likely to evolve, thus in closed systems 
asymmetries appear to increase the chance that individuals will compete aggressively, 
whether this is as part of a conditional strategy, or is a pure contest strategy. 
8.2.4. Historical constraints on evolution 
The results of the Smith and Lessells model show that a species may not always 
be free to evolve the competition strategy that maximises individual fitness, but instead 
may be constrained by its history. Under conditions in which Allack and Avoid are 
alternative ESS's in the Smith and Lessells model, the ESS that the population evolves 
to will depend on the relative frequencies of the two strategies in the initial population. 
If a species originally evolved an Allack larval competition strategy on a small host, it 
may be unable to escape from this ESS, even if host size increases so that A void 
becomes an alternative ESS. The species may be limited to using a strategy which, 
although evolutionarily stable, is of lower individual fitness than the alternative A void 
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behaviour. It is generally accepted that the ancestral strategy of bruchid beetles is the 
Attack strategy, evolved on small wild legumes, and that selective breeding by man for 
larger seed size, may have resulted in conditions altering so that Avoid became a 
possible ESS. C. analis may be constrained to using the Attack strategy on black-eyed 
beans, even though individuals would be fitter if they used the Avoid strategy. 
However although historical constraints may explain why C. ana/is still uses the Allack 
strategy on hosts where the Avoid strategy would apparently have higher fitness, the 
fact that most other Ca/Josobnlchlls species do use the Avoid strategy on large hosts 
suggests that there must be ways to escape this constraint. One possible mechanism, 
the effect of a patchy population structure is discussed below. 
The results of other models suggest that historical constraints may be quite a 
common factor in limiting a species to using a contest competition strategy under 
conditions in which a scramble strategy would give individuals a higher fitness. The 
models of larval competition in parasitoid insects (God fray 1987b) and siblicide in 
birds (Godfray & Harper 1990) both suggest that it is often hard for a species that has 
evolved a contest competition strategy to subsequently evolve a scramble competition 
strategy, even if conditions change so that individuals using the scramble competition 
strategy would have higher fitness. This may explain why some species of parasitoid 
larvae fight over hosts that are large enough to support several similarly sized larvae of 
gregarious species (Godfray 1987b) and also the fact that some species of eagle 
practice siblicide, even when resources are plentiful (Godfray & Harper 1990 
discussing the results ofMeyburg 1974). 
Historical constraints mean that it may often not be possible to understand the 
competition strategy used by a species in terms of current selective pressures, without 
some knowledge of how selection pressures operated in the past. 
8.2.5. Population structure 
In chapter 7 it was argued that scramble competition strategies are more likely 
to evolve in a population that periodically divides into isolated patches, each founded 
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by a small number of random individuals, than in a single undivided population. This 
effect can be thought of as an example of kin selection; the Avoid allele is able to 
spread because even though it has a lower relative fitness within each patch, it 
increases the absolute fitness of all individuals within the patch. As patches are founded 
by a small number of individuals, larvae within a patch will be more closely related to 
each other than to a random individual drawn from the global population. Thus an 
allele that increases the absolute fitness of all individuals within the patch will be 
increasing the fitness of relatives, and this allows it to spread in the population as a 
whole even if it is reduced in frequency within every patch. 
Models of this type have been criticised because the conditions required for the 
population structure to significantly alter the evolutionary outcome are stringent (e.g. 
" 
Maynard Smith 1964). In particular the number of individuals that found each patch 
must be small. However, this may be the case for stored product pests such as 
Callosobruchus beetles. The natural environment of Callosobruchlls beetles is made 
up of many temporary grain stores, and each of these is originally colonised by a small 
number of individuals. This is exactly the type of population structure that should be 
expected to favour the evolution of scramble competition strategies. Thus population 
structure may well have had an important effect on the evolution of competition 
strategies in this genus. 
A patchy population structure provides one way for a species to escape the 
constraints of its evolutionary history. When discussing historical constraints above it 
was suggested that the ancestral strategy of Callosobruchlls beetles was probably the 
Attack strategy. The Smith and Lessells model shows that ifthere is any level of Allack 
larval superiority a species that evolves the Attack larval competition strategy will be 
unable to evolve the Avoid strategy, even if conditions change. However, in a patchy 
population structure this is not the case, it becomes possible to evolve from A lIack to 
Avoid even if there is some level of Attack larval superiority. This may explain how 
many species of Callosobruchus beetles, including C. maculatus, appear to have been 
able to escape their ancestral Attack strategy as bean size increased. 
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Thus organisms living in a patchy environment should be more likely to evolve 
scramble competition strategies than similar species living in undivided populations. 
However, it is probably true that few organisms live in an environment that is as patchy 
as that of Callosobruchus beetles. So although population structure may have had an 
important effect on the evolution of competitive strategies in this genus, its importance 
to the evolution of competitive strategies more generally is likely to be limited. 
8.3. Extension to competition in open systems 
This thesis, and other studies cited in table 8.1 have investigated competition in 
closed systems, in which individuals have the option of how to compete over the 
resource, but not of leaving the resource patch in search of another. The advantages of 
studying competition in closed systems are obvious; the limited behavioural options 
open to individuals make it potentially easier to understand the factors that affect 
individuals behaving in different ways. How applicable are the conclusions to the open 
systems typical of many competitive interactions? 
A high cost of sharing the resource, probably increases the chance that a 
species will evolve a contest competition strategy in all competitive systems. If a 
territory contains enough food to support one individual, but not two, the individuals 
should fight over the territory rather than sharing it. Davies and Houston's (1981) 
work on territoriality in pied wagtails shows how the amount of food within a territory 
affects how individuals compete over it. A territorial individual normally excludes all 
other individuals from a stretch of river, but if the amount of food within the territory 
increases, the territorial individual may allow another individual to share the resource. 
If the amount of food increases further, as it does in the spring when a rapid supply of 
insects emerge, territorial individuals give up territories completely. Thus this species 
seems to have evolved a plastic response allowing individuals to change their 
competitive strategy in response to changing levels of resource. 
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The cost of fighting will almost certainly have an effect in open as well as 
closed systems. It has long been appreciated that high costs of defending a territory 
will make it less likely that a species will evolve territorial behaviour. The pied wagtail 
study discussed above (Davies & Houston 1981) also showed this effect; as prey 
density in a territory increased, the cost of defending the resource also increased as 
more individuals attempted to use the territory. Davies and Houston (1981) suggested 
that the reduction in the costs of sharing the resource coupled with the increased cost 
of defending the resource could explain why, as prey density increased, territorial 
individuals would allow a second individual to use the territory as well. 
The effect of asymmetries in allowing the evolution of conditional strategies 
will also apply to open systems as well as to closed systems. The models of asymmetric 
competition produced by Maynard Smith and Parker (1976) and also by Hammerstein 
(1981) both show how asymmetries allow conditional competition strategies to evolve. 
However, the effect of asymmetries on increasing the amount of aggressive contests 
that occur in closed systems will not be the same in open systems. In a closed system if 
one individual wants to fight for the resource it is very difficult for the other to avoid 
the contest, whilst in an open system a competitor that does not want to fight can 
simply leave the resource. Models of asymmetric competition in open systems 
(Maynard Smith & Parker 1976, Hammerstein 1981) suggest that asymmetries will 
actually decrease the amount of active aggression, as the asymmetries can be used to 
settle contests without fighting. 
Historical constraints will occur in any competitive system in which there are 
alternative ESS's. There is no obvious reason to suppose that they will be more likely 
to occur in closed systems than in open systems. Similarly, the effects of genetic 
relatedness caused by a patchy population structure would appear to be just as likely to 
apply in open systems as in closed systems. Scramble competition strategies will still be 
more likely to evolve in subdivided popUlations than in undivided populations. 
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Thus although the work in this study was carried out specifically with 
Callosobruchus beetles in mind, the results have implications to the evolution of 
competition strategies in general. 
8.4. Problems with inferring evolutionary origins from contemporary data 
This study illustrates some of the problems associated with making inferences 
about the evolutionary origins of behavioural strategies from contemporary 
experiments. The importance of historical constraints in limiting the ability of a species 
to adapt to new conditions mean that it may often be difficult to explain strategies 
observed today in terms of current selective pressures. For example, it would be very 
difficult to explain the different strategies of C. allalis and C. maculatus when 
competing over black-eyed beans in terms of current differences in the cost of 
exploitation competition on this host. C. analis appears to be using a maladaptive 
strategy. It is only by making assumptions about the evolutionary history of the 
species, and assuming that C. analis originally evolved on a smaller host and then 
became stuck at the Attack ESS, that it becomes possible to understand the 
contemporary situation. Although there are fairly good reasons for thinking that this 
assumption may be valid, it can never be tested as the original hosts of the two species 
are unknown. Thus, when investigating the effects of selective pressures in the past the 
researcher must be satisfied with producing plausible explanations that fit with 
contemporary observations and consequently provide further testable predictions, 
rather than producing a definite answer. 
A second problem that will often arise is that the values of such factors as the 
cost of exploitation competition measured now may not be a good indicator of their 
value at the time when the strategies originally evolved. In chapter 3 it was argued that 
although there seem to be inherent differences in the effect of host size on the larvae of 
C. analis and C. maculatlls now, this does not mean that this was the case when the 
two species evolved their competition strategy. It is possible that the reason C. 
104 
maculatus is less affected by reductions in host size than C. ana/is is an effect of the 
different competition strategies that the two species use rather than the cause. C. 
maculatus may have evolved a more plastic response to host size, simply because its 
Avoid competition strategy means larvae will often be sharing beans with variable 
numbers of other larvae. 
8.5. Possible extensions to this work and the limits of the system 
. Whilst this study provides an insight into some of the factors that may affect 
the evolution of competition strategies, there are still areas in which further work could 
yield much useful information. The Smith and Lessells (1985) model suggests that 
Avoid behaviour should only be found in species that live on large hosts, whilst A lIack 
behaviour should be found in species living on small hosts and also, due to historical 
constraints, species living on large hosts. Although there is some information 
suggesting that this expected relationship between larval competition strategy and size 
of host does exist across different species of bruchids, this evidence is largely 
anecdotal. The same is true of parasitoid insects (Godfray 1987b). It was hoped to 
carry out a more rigorous analysis of the available data to investigate this relationship 
using the statistical techniques that are now available to correct for the confounding 
effects of phylogenetic relationship (Harvey & Pagel 1991) as part of this study. 
However, the lack of an accurate phylogeny for bruchids (C.H.C. Lyal pers. com.) 
along with difficulty obtaining high enough quality data from the literature, meant such 
an analysis could not be carried out. As better quality data becomes available such a 
comparative study could provide a strong test for the effect of host size on larval 
competition strategies. Such a study could also provide information on the relationship 
between population structure and competitive strategy as well. 
To answer the question of why a species behaves in one way rather than 
another it is necessary to measure the costs and benefits associated with each of the 
possible behaviours. There are many difficulties in measuring the fitness consequences 
105 
of a behaviour that a species does not normally use. In chapter 3 the cost of 
exploitation competition was estimated for C. analis by forcing two larvae to share the 
same bean one after another. The reduction in fitness of the second larva through the 
bean was used to estimate the cost that larvae would pay if they shared a bean 
simultaneously. However, the fitness consequences of sharing a bean sequentially may 
be very different to the consequences of sharing simultaneously. For example, mung 
beans that have had a single larva pass through them, show a marked change in colour 
soon after the adult emerges (pers. obs.), suggesting that the damage caused by the 
first larva causes changes to the chemistry of the bean. Thus the quality of the resource 
available to the second larva may be very different to the quality available to the first, 
leading to an over- or under-estimate of the cost of exploitation competition. 
However, comparisons of the cost of exploitation competition in C. macula/liS, 
measured both directly and using the sequential development method, suggest that the 
sequential development method does provide a fairly good estimate of the cost of 
sharing beans simultaneously. 
There are other possible ways in which these costs and benefits could be 
measured. Godfray (1987a) discusses how certain insecticides can stop the larvae of 
some species of solitary parasitoid larvae developing the fighting mouthparts. They are 
then unable to fight within the host, and several adults can emerge from a single host. 
If such a chemical could be used for the same purpose in C. ana/is it would then be 
possible to measure the fitness consequences of C. ana/is larvae developing 
simultaneously within a bean. Alternatively, current advances in the field of molecular 
genetics may one day allow the development of genetically altered C. ana/is larvae, 
that do not fight within hosts and these could also be used to measure the fitness of 
larvae that share beans. However, techniques such as these also have problems; a 
chemical that stops larvae developing fighting jaws will almost certainly affect other 
aspects of development, and even genetic manipulations may alter traits not directly 
linked to the competition behaviour. 
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This outlines a common problem found in most studies that attempt to 
manipulate the way in which an organisms behaves, and assess the fitness 
consequences. It is impossible to be certain that the manipulation only affects that trait 
of interest, and thus that the fitness measured is a true indication of the fitness that 
would be measured if the organism actually used the behavioural strategy normally. 
However, as long as manipulations are carefully chosen, and if possible calibrated by 
carrying them out on another species where the fitness can be measured using the 
manipulation and also directly, these type of techniques provide a powerful tool in 
investigations of the adaptive nature of behaviours. 
8.6. Conclusions 
The way in which an individual competes over resources will have a major 
effect on its fitness, and ultimately on the population dynamics and stability of the 
species. Despite the limitations discussed above. Callosobruchlls beetles provide a 
good model system for studying the evolution of competition strategies. The work 
described in this thesis shows that the competition strategy a species uses may depend 
on a few simple factors. However. the results also show that the previous evolutionary 
history of a species may be critical in determining whether the species can evolve the 
behavioural strategy that maximises individual fitness under current ecological 
conditions; differences observed between species now may depend on differences in 
the past rather than differences in current conditions. 
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SHORT COMMUNICATION 
Does larval competition affect fecundity 
independently of its effect on adult weight? 
N. COL E G R A V E Department of Animal and Plant Sciences, University of Sheffield 
Key words. Callosobruchus maculatus, bruchid, larval competition, 
oviposition. 
Introduction 
One of the most successful areas of life history theory has 
been the modelling of insect oviposition behaviour (Parker 
& Courtney, 1984; Charnov & Skinner, 1985; Godfray, 
1987; Wilson & Lessells, 1993). The first models estimated 
the optimal clutch size by measuring the effect of larval 
competition on the survival of larvae from different sized 
clutches (Mitchell, 1975). However, it was soon realized 
that, as well as reducing the survival of larvae to maturity, 
larval competition also affects the fecundity of surviving 
adults. More recent optimal clutch size models have been 
based on measurements of the survival of larvae and 
the fecundity of adults from clutches of different sizes 
(Smith & Lessells, 1985; Charnov & Skinner, 1985). Be-
cause of the difficulty in measuring fecundity in relation to 
larval competition it has generally been done in two steps; 
first the effect of competition on adult weight, then the 
effect of adult weight on fecundity (Waage & Ng, 1984; 
Wilson, 1993; see also Charnov & Skinner, 1985, using 
results from Klomp & Teerink, 1967). This two-step 
method makes the implicit assumption that the only effect 
of larval competition is via its effect on emergent adult 
weight (solid lines, Fig. la) and that there is no indepen-
dent effect o( competition on fecundity (dashed lines, 
Fig. la). .' , , 
This paper tests the assumption that competition has no 
effect on fecundity independent of its effect on adult 
weight in the bruchid beetle Callosobruchus maculalus. By 
comparing the regression of fecundity on adult emergence 
weight in larvae, ~aised alone or in competition with 
another larva in a' bean, it is possible to test whether 
competition does (Fig. Ib) or does not (Fig. lc) have an 
independent effect on fecundity. C.maculatus does not 
feed as an adult and exhibits a strong correlation between 
fecundity and adult emergence weight (Smith & Lessells, 
1985; Credland et al.; 1986; Messina, 1991). Previous 
models of optimal oviposition behaviour have made the 
Correspondence: N. Colcgrave, Dcpanmcnl of Animal and 
Plant Sciences, University of Sheffield, P.O. Box 601, Sheffield 
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assumption that there is no effect of larval competition 
independent of its effect on adult emergence weight. It Is 
essential that this assumption is tested if these modc\s are 
to be based on solid foundations. 
Methods 
Two hundred adult C.maculalus (less than 24 h old) were 
allowed to oviposit on 51lO mung beans (Vigna radiula) 
for 1 h. Mung beans were used as they are small enough 
for competition to have a detectllble effect at densities 
of two larvae per bean (Mitchell, 1975). Because femllles 
would be expected to lay fewer eggs on poor qUlllity 
beans, 170 beans carrying at least two eggs were selected 
(Thanthianga & Mitchell, 1990). Seventy of these heans 
had their egg load reduced to one egg and UX) to two eggs 
by removal of excess eggs. A greater number of beanll WIIS 
used for the two-egg treatment as the chance of ooth eggs 
hatching was lower than the chance of the single eggs 
hatching in the one-egg treatment. The bellns were then 
placed in individual cells in a partitioned retri dish. and 
incubated at 3O"C. 70% humidity. After 10 days the beans 
were examined and any with unhatched eggs were dis-
carded. After a further 10 days the beans were monitored 
daily and any adults removed on their day of emergence. 
Females were anaesthetized with COz. weighed and paired 
with a male drawn randomly from a stock cuhure. The pulr 
were then placed in a container with at least l~O blllck. 
eyed beans (V.ungI4iL'ulata), ensuring an ClICC!II of ovi. 
position sites (Mes. . ina. 1991). The females were allowed 
to oviposit until they died and the number 0' eggs luld by 
each female counted. A total of thirty pairs was IItt up 
from the one-egg treatment and thirty-two pairs fmOl the 
two-egg treatment. 
Results 
Adult females raised in competition with another larva 
were lighter than those raised alone (weights or tcnudes 
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fig. 1. The ahcnullivc etr~'tI 0( buvaI cumpetition on tcnuaIc fccundiuy. (a) l..amd CIOIIIperition could affect fc:maJc rccunJity via an effect on 
remule emergelll:C wc:illht (Iilliid arRJW1i) and abo directly, inLIcpcndcnC 0( its effect oa km.Jk wcighI (dmbcd arrow). (b) U there is an 
ind.·pendent effed ot t.n-Id oumpetitiun on fecundity, then the rcpaMoa au- 01 tccundity oa anc.gcocc wcighl for the no CIOII1J'C'IiIioa 
tn:atment (Iilllid Iinc) and the all11petilion trcatmcnl (dibhc:d line) would hIM dilfc:mllilope or dcvIlioo. (e) U there is no indcpmdrnI effect 
or mrvlll QlI11petililln on fec:undity then the n:gn:aioa lincl for the two lmlllnmu IbouId hIM the IiIIIIC IIope and elevation. 
railied In c:ompetilion - 6.59 = 0.20 mg (!ltandard crror). 
N - 32: railied alone - 7.16 = 0.17 mg. N - 30; Mann-
Whitney U - 320, P - 0.024). Thul even .tlarval densities 
of two larvlle ('Cr ile.n, com('Ctilion reduCCI .dull emcra-
encc weight. 
The weighls or adull ftmllk. ranged rrom 3.70108.68 mg 
• crou the Iwo treatment •. When the dilla from lhe two 
treatments wero combined, fcc:undity wu correlated with 
emcrgen(.'C weight (Fig. 2; ,.0.47, N. 62. P < 0.001). 
Anal)'1lil or covariance w •• UliCd to determine whether 
Ihe slU('C1 .nd the elevtnionl of the regrcuion or fecundilY 
on weight differed between trelltmc:nts. In an anlllytis 
utiing competition II • factor .nd weight .1 • covariate. 
the Interaction between competilion .nd weighl did not 
explain a aigniOcant amount of the variance in fecundity 
(F,.,. - 0.88, P - 0.35) ahowinl thaI there .. II no dif· 
ference between Ihe alopel of lhe rcgrel5ion lines. The 
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fig. 2. The n:llltitlll"hip between adult emergence weight and life-
lime fC<.'UllClity. Stllid IqUIlIt'I n:pmcnl rcmwCI raiJed without c0m-
petition. open IqUil/ft n:pn:cnl fc:nudca raiM:d In compelition with 
a IICCXlnd larva. 
competition did DOC clplain a significant amount or the 
remaining variance (FI-'" - 0.31, P - O.SS) mowing tha' 
there was no between treatmenl difference in the elevations 
or ahe regreuioa lines. Thus competition -"rean to h.ve 
no cft'ed on fc:cundiry independent of its effect on adull 
tmcrgence .-eight • 
DllCuallon 
The results or this experiment show, that in C.ntlJnd4nu 
at Ic:ut. there is no crfect of larval competition on adult 
fc:amdiry independent of its cft'ed on adult weight_ This 
means thai the work done by previous aUlhon based on 
Ibis assumption is we (e.g. CrcdJand t'l1II •• 1986; WiOOn, 
1993). 
The mull is Ilightly surprising. It is easy to ICC! thai 
competilion will reduce adult weight due to reduced Reo 
source intake. and that this win reduce adult fecundity. 
However. it is quite conceivable that competition could 
reduce recundiry in other ways ""hicb do nol reduce _dull 
weight. A Iimiled supply of !lOme miaonutmnl wilhin the 
bean which is essenlial for egg production bul DOC growth. 
could rault in competing beetles emerging from the bean 
al fuD size bul with a reduced capacity to produce eggs. 
AhemanYCly. a phenotypic response 10 the presence or 
another larva within lhe bean could cause the larva 10 
develop fUler to .void competition. bul at the elpense or 
some reproductive pocential. 
The mult is btely to aha .pply to other bruchid beetles 
of the genus ClIlJosobn«hus, such as C.chiN'IUU and 
C.p/uJwoIi .hidl have a very similar ea>Iogy to C.IMC'IAlt.uus • 
although ",bethcr the rauJt wiI1 apply to C.anlllu. v.hida 
Ihows a more active form or larval competition. is by no 
means «rtain. Evcn less obvious is whether this result wiD 
apply 10 species outside this genus (e.g. parasiloid wa."s) 
whose larvae compete in similar ways but for completcly 
different types of resource. Further experiments. similar 10 
those: reported bere. are needed 10 judge the generaliry 01 
the findings reported in this paper. 
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Competition by organisms for scarce resources is a major 
driving force of evolution, thus organisms are expected to 
compete efficiently over resources. Much competition 
takes place in 'open' systems, where individuals have the 
choice of either competing over the resource or of leaving 
the resource patch and going elsewhere. Competitions of 
this type have been extensively modelled (Maynard-
Smith and Parker 1976). However, some competition 
occurs in a 'closed' system in which competitors have the 
choice of how to compete over the resource but not of 
leaving the resource patch and going elsewhere (e.g. 
parasitoid wasps; Godfray 1987, Leaf miners; Faeth 
J 990, sawflies; Craig et a!. 1990). For instance, in many 
,;pecies, young organisms have limited mobility, and are 
thUS unable to avoid competition with con specifics by 
moving to another area to feed. Intraspecific competition 
(or food is also likely to be intense between juveniles: 
young organisms have a high requirement for food as 
they are growing, and the amount of food they get when 
young may have a very large effect on their lifetime 
fitness. In beetles of the genus Cullosobruchus, for exam-
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pIe, adult females lay eggs on the surfaces of various 
leguminous beans (Southgate 1979). On hatching the 
larvae burrow into the bean where they feed until pu-
pation. As several eggs may be laid on a single bean and 
larvae cannot move between beans, larval competition 
may be intense. 
When faced with intense intraspecific competition in a 
closed system an organism has two possible strategies 
open to it, to accept the presence of conspecifics and 
compete passively (scramble competition sensu Nichol-
son 1954), or to actively try to exclude conspecifics (con-
test competition sensu Nicholson 1954) and even kill 
them. Both strategies can be found throughout the animal 
kingdom. For instance, although the nestlings of many 
birds exhibit scramble competition, the nestlings of some 
species, particularly of large raptors fight over food and 
may commit siblicide (Meyburg 1974, Mock 1984). Sim-
ilarly, in parasitoid insects there is a dichotomy between 
gregarious parasitoids which show scramble competition, 
with several larvae sharing a host, and solitary parasitoids 
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W 
Fill. I. TIle Smith .nd USIoCIJ" mudd: 11lC ,,·axis reprelICnls W. 
the pnthuhililY Ihul an III/m't lurn beut" an IIvoiJ lurva in a 
Ii~hl. 11,c y·.~ili repreloCnh E. Ihe rehllive ClI"l 10 an AvoiJ larva 
ul hhurinll I be.n Wllh anllther AI'tlili lurn. The lonel repn:'iCnl 
differelll I~SS~, N.8. Allhnu.:h Ihe ori~inul Smith and u!>''iClJs 
"'Ildel (lilly clln\idl.'red vuluI.'5 uf W 01 0.5 or grealer. fur com-
plclI,'nehh Ihi~ ligure indutles .11 pllssihlc: values of W fn"" 0 10 
I. IInwewr. vlltues of W tl.'Mi lhlln 0.5 mClln thill AI/tid larvae 
arc WUN lil/hten Ihun A''tliJ IIINae; a 5iluulilln which il un-
likdy III occur in nillure. 
within the hUht ulllilallllre dead except for one (God fray 
19K7). In C"lIo.mlml(·I"'.f beelles different !ipedes within 
the genull exhihit different competitive litl'lllegies (Smilh 
and lcs~lI!i 19115): larvae of C. III"fultilltJ coexist within 
a bean and compelI.' passively by expluiting the resource. 
with IICverul adults emerging fmm Ihe same bean. In 
Conlru!;t lurvue of C. tlfltllis "how an extreme fonn of 
irllerferencc compelilion, with larvae fighting within a 
beun ulllil all arc dead except one. What kinds of IIClec-
tive forces can delennine whether a "pecies evolves a 
conl!!sl or IICrumhle litrutegy? 
III all effurt 10 invesligale Ihis problem previuus au-
thul'5 have produced bUlh phenutypic and genetic models. 
The question of liiblidde in birds has probably received 
the mllst allenlilln (O'Connur 1978, Dickens and Clark 
19K7, Gudfray and Harper I9'X»; however, GuMray 
(19K7) hus IIlso mudelled Ihe evolution of the solitary and 
gregariuus lilralegie!l in parll.'iitllid insects. Allhough the 
modds differ in detail their conclusions are similar: con-
lelil competition is must likely to evolve when the bene-
fit!! to the individual of excluding or killing a conspecific 
competilllr outweighs the costs and risks associaled with 
the inlerference. If the compelitur is a relative (a.o; is 
usulilly Ihe case fur chicks in a nest) the reduction in 
inclusive fitness due tll luss of a relalive must also be 
tllken inlo account. For these conditiuns to be met re-
quirefl that the filnesfi of the remaining individuuls is large 
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compared to what it would have been had it shared the 
resources wilh the dead individual. a silualion which is 
most likely to occur when food is very scarce. Howev~. 
genetic modds suggest that once a conlest stralegy has 
evolved it is very difficult for scrambling individuals to 
invade, even if conditions change and scrambling indio 
viduals would actually be finer (a hysteresis effect; Gud-
fray 1987). Both the bird and the para.'iitoid models aiM) 
point to the possibility of parent-offspring conflict (Mac-
nair and Pader 1979) over whether young should aJnpt a 
contest or scramble strategy. 
The evolution of larval competition strategies in Celllt" 
sobrud'UJ beetles has been modelled by Smilh and les-
sells (1985) who produced a game theory model. Illt~ 
extended to a genetic model by Smith (1990). which 
looked at the effeet that differing costs of sharing a bean 
would have on the competition strategies adopted ~y 
larvae. The results of the model suggested that if the CO!o.I 
of sharing a bean is high then a cOnlest strategy is evolu-
tionarily slable. whilst if the cost of sharing a bean is low 
then a scramble strategy will evolve. However. this 
model assumed that competilion was symmetric; that if 
IWO larvae shared a bean each would utilise half of the 
resource. In nature, competilion is rarely totally sym-
metric (Begon 1984, see also Lawton and H~'iC1J 1981 
for interspecific competition). with one compelilor often 
doing much bener than another. Wilbur and Collins 
(1973) have described how competition can generate. 
skewed size distribution in amphibian larvae. due to some 
larvae competing more strongly than others and so get-
ting more of the resource; the same phenomenon has been 
shown to occur in young pygmy sunfish (Ruben-
stein 1981). Both of these srudies also suggest that the 
degree of asymmetry increa.<;eS with the intensilY of com-
petition. Although previous authors have modelled d· 
feelS of ao;ymmetries on the evolution of competition. 
these models have generally been for open systems. This 
paper takes the Smith and LesseJls model as a starting 
point and describes a game theory model addressing the 
question: What effect does asymmetric competition ha\'e 
on the evolulion of competition strategies in a closed 
system? 
The Smilh and IAssells model 
The Smith and lcs.o;ells model assumes that larvae can 
adopt one of two stralegies. An "Allack" larva seeks out 
other larvae within the bean and fights until either aU 
other larvae are dead or it dies itself; this strategy the~ 
fore represents an extreme conlest strategy. An "A\..,;.r 
larva avoids other larvae within a bean and competes hy 
using the resource; this represents a scramble stralegy. 
The fitness payoffs of larvae adopting different strategies 
are defirlCd relative to that of an A,'oid larva which is the 
sole occupant of a bean (= I). If an Amid larva shares. 
bean with another Al'Oid larva both suffer a reduction in 
fitrICss due 10 limiled resources. This reduction in filness 
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Table I. Payoff matrix for the asymmetric game. F is the probability of a superior larva beating an inferior larva in a fight. E. and Ez 
.n: the relative costs due to passive competition of the superior and inferior larva respectively. q is the probability of an Avoid larva 
WlCces.\fully evading an Attack larva. Payoffs represent the payoff to larva A in competition with larva B. 
Larva A Larva B 
Allack Avoid Tyrant Marryr 
Allade O.S 1+q-qE.-qEz l+q-qE.-Fq l+Fq-qEz 
2 2 2 
l+q-qE.-qEz 2-E.-Ez 2-F+Fq-E.-qEz 1 +F-Fq+q-qE.-Ez 
2 -2- 2 2 
Tyrant l+Fq-qEz 1 +F-Fq+q-qE.-Ez l+q-qE.-qEz l+F-Ez 
2 2 2 -2-
Jlart)'r l+q-Fq-qE. 2-F+Fq-E.-qEz 2-F-E. ~E.-qE2 
2 2 
relative to the fitness of the larva alone in a bean is called 
E and can vary in value from 0 to I. If two Attack larvae 
occur within a bean then they fight until one is dead. A 
tarva survives with a probability of 0.5 and if it does so 
ha.'i sole access to the resource and a fitness of one 
(assuming there is no cost of having fought to the larva 
that wins the fight), so the expected payoff to an Allack 
larva in this situation is 0.5 (i.e. fitness of I multiplied by 
lurvival probability of 0.5). If an Allac:k and Avoid larva 
occur in the same bean they will fight and the Allac:k larva 
will kill the Avoid larva with a probability of W (0.5 S W 
~ I). otherwise the Avoid larva kills the AIIClck larva. The 
results of the game under different conditions are 8um-
marised in Fig. I. If W > 0.5 then A'ItIck is always a 
possible Evolutionary stable strategy (ESS; Maynard-
smith 1982). IF (I-E» W then Avoid is an ESS and if 
both conditions are true then attack and avoid are alterna-
tive ESSs. Smith and Lessells also extended the model to 
8 rnultilarval game. However, the results of this are qual-
itatively the same as for the two larval game. 
The asymmetric game 
The model I describe is for a two-larval game, that is, 
each bean contains two larvae. I use the same basic 
itrategies. Attack (attempt to find and kill other larvae 
within a bean) and Avoid (avoid other larvae within the 
bean and compete passively over the resource), as used in 
ahe Smith and Lessells model, but the use of asymmetries 
in the model also allows for the incorporation of comli-
tional strategies based on detected asymmetries. 
I assume two possible asymmetries. The first is an 
Ill'ymmetry of fighting ability, with one larva (the I'SUpe_ 
rior larva") being a beller fighter and thus more likely to 
win an aggressive encounter (with the "Inferior larva"). 
The second is an asymmetry in passive competitivness, 
that is, if two Avoid larvae share a bean, one is likely to be 
8 better passive competitor than the other and so suffer 
lesS from the competition than the other. There could be 
OIlWS 71:3 (1994) 
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many reasons for these asymmetries. In the case of Cal/,,-
sobruchus beetles the most plausable cause is different 
arrival time of larvae within the bean. A larva which 
arrives first in a bean may have a growth head start and so 
be larger when the two larvae meet, thus which is the 
superior larva depends on which arrived first in the bean. 
The two asymmetries (fighting ability and passive 
competitive ability) are independant. The labels superior 
and inferior refer only to the asymmetry in fighting abil-
ity. Thus the superior larva (fighting ability) may be a 
better or worse passive competitor than the inferior larva. 
Finally I assume that both asymmetries are produced 
by chance effects (such as order of arrival in the bean) not 
by any inherent difference in the competitive ability of 
the strategies. In contrast to the Smith and Lessells 
model, where Attack larvae are always equal or better 
fighters to Avoid larvae, in this model Attack larvae are 
not inherently better fighters than Avoid larvae. This 
means that all larvae. independent of the strategy that 
they use, have a 50% chance of being a superior larn. If 
the asymmetries are caused by order of arrival in the 
bean, then the strategy that a larva will use does not affect 
its probability of being the first larva in the bean. Whilst 
this may not represent the most biologically realistic 
situation, it does allow for the effect of asymmetries 
caused by chance effects to be looked at without the 
confounding effect of determined asymmetries between 
strategies. 
I consider 4 strategies. two of which are simple strate-
gies. two of which are conditional stnllegies. The two 
simple strategies are Attack and Avoitl. The conditional 
strategies are "Attack if you are the superior larva and 
Avoid if inferior", which I call Tyrant, and "Avoid if you 
are the superior larva and Attack if inferior", which I call 
Martyr. The strategies are assumed to be determined 
genetically, however the conditional stnllegies allow for 
flexible behaviour dependent on the conditions in which 
the individual finds itself, thus two larvae could have the 
same genetic strategy (e.g. they may both be Martyr), but 
show different behaviour (attack or avoid), dependent on 
501 
, 
conditiuns (e.g. dl!pending on whether they are the first or 
second larva to arrive in the bean). 
Payoff!! are dl!linl!d relative to the payoff to a larva 
developing alone within a bean (= I). If two larvae meet 
and light for possessiun of the bean I assign a probability 
(F) Ihatthe superior larva wins. This will occur whenever 
buth larvae "how Alltlt'Jc behaviour. and also whenever 
une larva adopts AflClck behaviour. the other Amici beha-
viour lind the A,'oicllllrva dlles nut successfully avoid the 
Atlm'Jc larva. The varianle F can take values from O.S to I 
dl!pemling on the IIdvllntuge of the superior larva in a 
light. If two lurvae coexist within a belln then each will 
pay a cost incurred by sharing the resource. I have used 
EI to represent the cost to the superior larva and ~ to 
represent the cost to the inferiur larva. These values are 
calculated as reductiuns to a maximum fitness of I, and 
can thus take values of 0-1. Finally, I have used q to 
represent the probability that an Avoid larva successfully 
avoids an AIICI(,Jc larva within a bean. The payoff malrix 
fur this game is "huwn in Table I, payoffs being calcu-
lated assuming thut a larva has a pronability of O.S of 
being the superior I"rva. For example if an Avoid larva 
finds itself in a bean with another Avoid larva, then with 
probabilily of O.S it will be the superior larva and so 
!iuffer the E. cost of passive competition (ami so gain a 
payoff of (I-EI)/2). otherwise it will be the inferior larva 
(and 110 guin a payoff of (I-E~)I2). So the mean payoff to 
the lurva will be (2-EI-E~)I2. 
nl'Sults 
Fig. 2 shows diagrammatically the results of the game 
under various conditions. The axes of each graph repre-
sent the relutive cost of passive competition to either the 
superiur (y-axis) or the inferior (x-axis) lurvae. Zones can 
then be delimited onto these figures indicating the ESSs 
under different condilions. Fig. 2a represents a situation 
where the asymmetries are undetected, whilst 2b and 2c 
represent silualions where asymmetry is detected by the 
lurvue. 
A.f),"""l'/ries 1101 d('te"ted 
If lurvae are unllble to deleet asymmetries (i.e they cannot 
tell whether they are the superior or inferior larva) then 
the predicted ESSs are the sume as those produced by the 
Smith and Lessells model, depending only on the average 
costs to the two larvae of sharing the bean. In the Smith 
and Lessells model, if two lurvae sharing a bean have 
individuill filllcsses of greuler than O.S of the fitness of a 
larva alone in a bean (E < O.S), and Atta('k larvae are not 
beller lighters thun Avoid lurvae (W • O.S) then Avoid is 
the lituhlc litrulegy. In the undetected asymmetry model 
presented here Avoid is the stuble stf'dtegy if the mean 
filness of two lurvae liharing a bean is greater than O.S of 
the litness of a larva alone within a bean. It does not 
mailer whether the passive competition is symmetric, 
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with larvae having equal E values, or whether competi-
tion is highly a'iymmetric. for instance. with one larva 
with an E value of 0.1. the other with an E value of 0.9. 
The degree of asymmetry in fighting ability also has no 
erfect on which stralegy is stable when the asymmetry is 
undetected. Thus in this situation, asymmetry in compet-
itive ability does not affect the evolutionary outcome if 
the larvae are unable to detect the asymmetry. 
Asymmetry in passi"~ competiti"~ ability 
If the a .. ymmetry is detectable by the larvae then condi-
tional strategies become a possibility and the ESSs are no 
longer the same as those predicted by the Smith and 
Lessells model. If there is no asymmetry in fighting 
ability (F = O.S) then the ESS depends simply on the 
relative fitnesses (EI and E!) of the two larvae when 
sharing a bean. For consislency I still use the labels 
superior and inferior to describe the larvae even though in 
this situation there is no difference in fighting ability. the 
superior larva is then defined as lhe larva which suffers 
the EI cost of pas.'iive competition in the model. If both 
suffer lillIe from competition (EI and E2 < O.S) then ",'(lid 
is stable. If both suffer badly from competition (EI and El 
> O.S) then Arrad is the ESS. However if there is a high 
degree of asymmetry in pa'>Sive competitive ability (EI < 
O.S and Ez > OS or EI > O.S and El < O.S) then the . 
conditional strategies become stable. Which of the stmle. 
gies. Tyrallt or Martyr, is stable depends on the direclilm 
of the a'iymmetry; if the superior larva is the beller 
pa.'i.'iive competitor (EI < El ) then Mart)'r is stable. while 
if the inferior larva is the bener passive compelitor then 
Trrallt is stable. However, because in this situalion there 
i~ no asymmetry in fighting ability the labels of superior 
and inferior are just arbitrary lables (they do not imply 
anything about passive competitive ability), the two con-
ditional strategies are bener viewed as a single strategy of 
"Attack if you suffer the higher cost of passive competi-
tion. avoid if you suffer the lower cost of pa. .. sive compe-
tition". This makes sense because a larva that is going to 
suffer a great reduction in fitness due to pa. .. sive competi-
tion does bener by fighting for access to the whole bean 
and ri!oling dying in the process. 
Asymm~try in fighting ability 
At the other extreme, if there is no asymmetry in pD.'i.'ii\'C 
competitive ability of superior and inferior larvae (EI • 
E1) but there is asymmetry in fighting ability, then McJlf)'r 
is no longer a possible ESS. If the cost to the larvae of 
sharing a bean is low (EI and ~ are low) then Amid is 
stable, if it is high (EI and El are high) then Anack is the 
ESS. At intermediate values of EI and El T)'rant is the 
stable strategy. The exact range of conditions over which 
Tyrant is the ESS depends on the asymmetry in fighting 
ability. For example if a superior larva beats an inferior 
larva in a fight with a probability of 0.6 (F = 0.6) then 
Tyrant will be stable when the individual fitnesses of two 
larvae competing passively within a bean are between 0.4 
and 0.6 of the fitness of a larva alone in a bean (0.4 < EI• 
OII(OS 71:) (19M, 




















Fig. 2. The asymmetric game: The x-axis represents E .. the relative cost due to passive competition to the superior larva. whilst the 
,_!l"is represents Ez• the cost to the inferior larva. a) represents the situation where asymmetries are undetected by the larvae whilst b) 
iuKJ c) represent two situations where the larvae are able to detect the asymmetries. F is the probability that a superior larva beats an 
inrerior larva in a fight. The zones represent different ESSs. 
Ez < 0.6). If the degree of asymmetry in fighting ability is 
higher so that a superior larva beats an inferior larvae 
with a probability of 0.8 then the conditional strategy is 
stable for values of E. and E2 of between 0.2 and 0.8. So 
increasing the degree of asymmetry in fighting ability 
increases the range of conditions over which Tyrant is the 
ESS. 
Asymmetries in both fighting and passive competitive 
ability 
If (here are asymmetries in both fighting and competitive 
ability then which strategy is the ESS depends on the 
exact values of the asymmetries. In general as asym-
metries in passive competitive ability increase, the condi-
tional strategies become more likely as the ESS, and as 
the asymmetry in fighting ability increases. the range of 
conditions over which Tyrant is stable increases at the 
expense of the other three strategies. The formal ESS 
conditions for each of the strategies are shown in Table 2. 
The probability of an Avoid strategist avoiding an At-
Table 2. ESS Conditions for the asymmetric game. F is the 
probability of a superior larva beating an inferior larva in a fight. 
£, and ~ are the relative costs due to passive competition of the 
wperior and inferior larva, respectively. 
Asymmetries undetected 
Strategy ESS conditions 
Allat"k E, < I-E2 
Avoid E, > l-~ 
Asymmetries detected 
Strategy ESS conditions 
Allat"k E, > I-F & ~> F 
Avoid E, < I-F & Ez< F 
Martyr EI < I-F & E2> F 
Tyrant E1>I-F&E2<F 
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tack strategist (q) has no effect on which strategy is the 
ESS as long as this probability is not 0 or I. However, 
computer simulation suggests that the value of q does 
affect the speed at which a mutant strategy can invade a 
population (unpub!'). 
Discussion 
If asymmetries are present in fighting ability or compet-
itive ability, but cannot be detected by the larvae then 
they have no effect on the evolutionary outcome of this 
game. However. if the asymmetries are detectable by the 
larvae then conditional strategies become possible and 
the stable strategy depends on the level ofthe asymmetry. 
However it is unlikely that there would be an asymmetry 
in passive competitive ability without there being some 
asymmetry in fighting ability and if both factors are 
included then the situation becomes more complex. Fur-
thermore, it is likely that there would be a relationship 
between the degree of asymmetry in competitive ability 
and fighting ability. If this is the case then the possible 
strategies depend on the relationship between these two 
asymmetries. If the asymmetry in fighting ability is grea-
ter than the asymmetry in competitive ability then Tyrant 
becomes more likely as the ESS. If the asymmetry in 
competitive ability is greater than the asymmetry in fight-
ing ability then the Martyr becomes more likely as the 
stable strategy. 
If the chance of an Avoid larva evading an Allack larva 
is small (q is small) then both of the conditional strategies 
will produce what look like Allack outcomes, and so 
detectable asymmetries may increase the observed fre-
quency of Allack-like stnltegies in nature. This differs 
from the predictions of previous models of asymmetric 
competition (Maynard-Smith and Parker 1976). In gen-
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erul. Ihese mudd" predict thut dClcetuhle asymmelries 
will reduce Ihe IieverilY of conleslS. This discrepancy 
Ilri!oCs 811 Ihesc mudel" rerrescnl open syslem!! where one 
C(lnleslllni cun Ic:llve the resuuree ruthcr Ihun fight: if one 
COllle"tullt leuve!! the light CIlIIIIU! esculule. My mudd 
Il""umc" thut as lUllS II!! (Inc larva allempls 10 fight Ihen 
Ihe Iwo IlIrvue will meet wilh • nun-lero pn,bahililY and 
lin eseulnled COlllest occurs: in effect neilher larva ciln 
leuve the resource pllteh. The resull!! agree with the pre-
dicliun of Mllynllrd·Smilh alld rur~er (\976) thllt esca-
lateL! COlllest" are e"pe"'leL! when the pUY-(lff for winning 
is Iurge cOlllrured 10 the IUSN due to injury: the mudd 
predicts lighling When the benelit 10 one of the larvae of 
winning a fight ill greuler thun the ri"k of dying in a fight. 
Thill uls() agrees with the predictiuns of Enquist and 
Leimllr (19')0) thllt flllni lighl" are e"pected when the 
vulue of Ihe fUlure to an illdividulIl if it dues not lighl is 
limull cmnrured to the villue of Ihe resource over which it 
is fighlillg: a lurv. which will suffer a greut redUClion in 
filne"', due to lihllring a resource Ca low fUlure wilhout 
lillhlillg) will !le npecled to fight over Ihe resource. 
11le mudd IISSUllleN Ihlll IlIrvlle huvc only (WO oplions. 
tu ullempl h, ~i1Ithe mher compelilor or to accept a share 
(If Ihe resuurce dl."lennilled by Iheir pllssive compelilive 
IIhililY. Illlwever. It clln eu"ily be e"lended to include the 
P',,"sihiliIY of duminunce. with the lIiuperiur Illrva forcing 
Ihe inferittr IlIrvll to IIccepl a reduced shure of Ihe re-
liuurce. If Et iN viewed Ill. the cu"lto the superiur larva of 
being dUlllinlllll. 1I11L! E, IlIi Ihe co,,, to Ihe inferillr htrva of 
being denied .cces" 10 the reMlun:e. Ihen Fig. 2 can be 
u!oCd 10 predicllhe ESS under differenl cllndilillns. In Ihis 
hituilliun the ut'oM filrale!:y cun be viewed as Ihe ,1",,,-
Itlmlfh"b,/o",iI",,,, filrulegy. and any condilions under 
which avuid iii fillthle cun be viewed as condilions under 
which a lIyslem (If dmninunce would be shthle. indeed 
frum (tu",ide Ihe beun Ihese two filrulegies would be 
impussihle 10 dislinguilth. In generul. the ESS dl.'pends on 
the WII)' the refoiuurce iii purtiliuned bel ween Ihe Iwo lar-
vue: it doefl nul muller if Ihili iii delennincd by pK\ive 
cUlllpelitive ahilily (II' litlme lIyslent of duminunce. 
Whih.t the c()ndusiunll of Ihis mudel do nue disagree 
wilh Ihul>(' of Ihe Smilh lind Lesliells mudel (..tll/l(·l "mlle-
gieli are filill mllre Ii~ety when the Coslli of "huring I ICed 
are high) it dllel allnw fnr Ihe c"islence of condiliunal 
lilrulegiell. ThI.'I'C ill sume evidence Ihlll the Soulh Indian 
lilrllin of C. IIIm'u/,/IIU "hllwI a conditlonulslrulegy ~ery 
liimilur 10 Ihe 7)'"'''' litrulesy described here (Thanthiunga 
lind Milehdt 19K7). with one lurva devcluping nnnnally 
while Ihe ulher hulds buck ItM devc1llpmenl. Thunlhianga 
lind Mih:hdt (19K7) liuggeslthulthe lurvae may be u'iing 
Ihe villruliunli. causcd by lurval feeding. 10 a.\SCS the 
prescnce und lIile (If IInlllher lurva in Ihe !lelln. If lhe two 
IlIrvlle meel then a cnnlesl OCCUI'!l and the limuller larva 
dies. although active killing by the lurger larva hlL" nnt 
been dem(lnslrnleL!. ExperimenlM are required to deler-
mine whelher Ihe Alltld: filrulegies of uther speciell flueh 
liS C. (JIlt/lis lire true AlltIt'k lilralegiel or In fUL1 (undi-
liunullilralegies. 
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The model presenled here was framed wilh Coli,). 
sobru"hus hcctles in mind where lhe asymmetry is li~cly 
10 be caused by arrival time al the bean. A larva ~ hieh 
arri\'es first will have a growlh head slart and so be bigger 
Ihan lhe second larva. probably making il a superiur 
fighler. This gro~1h head Slart also maLes il a slnmgC1' 
pa.'isive competilor (Bellows 1982). However. the model 
~'iII equally apply 10 larval compelition in other species. 
and even 10 other Iypci of compelilion where Ihe l.'Ompet-
ilon are unable 10 mo\'C 10 another area. In olher lipedes 
lhe a .. ymmetry in fighling abilily could be cuused by any 
numlleroffaL'Iors and an indi\'idual wilh a higher fighling 
IIbilily may IN.II a1~'ays ha\'e a higher pa.'isive compelith'e 
abilily. In fact a lr.kJc-off between inveslmenl in fighling 
equipmenl and feeding equipmenl could mean lhiIl lhe 
superior fighler is an inferior plL\Sive compelitor. 
However. although the results of the modd will apply 
to many other compelitive situations. the model dl~ nue 
lake inlo accounl inclusive filncss becau!oC in Cul/mll""'-
el/lts beetles the larvae ~'ithin a bean are I'llrely ~Ialed. 
The nkJdcl ~'ould need 10 be extended 10 apply 10 sil~ 
ualions \\ here compelilors are relaled (e.g. siblidJc in 
bird .. ). 
Whil"" pre\'ious models of asymmelric competiliun 
suggesled lhal delected a."ymmetries should reduce the 
amounl of fighling over resou~ the results of lhe 
model pw;cnled bere suggest thul in closed syslems de· 
leeted a. . ymmctries may actually im-rea-.e lbe Ii~elihl.ld 
of fighling as a compelilion Iitr.1lcgy. This adds asymm-
elry in competilion 10 a list of faclors (induding tho~ of 
population genetics such as hysleresis) thaI ma~e Allile-l· 
I)PC behaviour a more likely obl.erved oulL'Ome Ihan lhe 
simplest models of larval compel ilion suggest. 
AdN""t'J~nrtt'lf1J - 1 ~ould li1.e 10 lhank K. i.b'loClIs fur hrlr 
and enroun~ .. all lU~es of the wriling of thill J'3I'C'f. I 
would altO hLe to thimk T. Tuflun. B. Sheldon. J. La~ltlft, O. 
UIIUiIr. J. Tuomi and M. Srencer. all of .. hum hI\'c oflcml 
helpf'ul CUI1lJlImU on tarl~ wnions of this manu",,-npt. nlll. 
wtn ~_ done .. btl ... in f\X'('ipt of an NERC J'lbI~flIIlIWle 
allo uIL 
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The cost of exploitation competition in Callosobruchus 
beetles 
N.COLEGRAVE 
Department 0/ Animal and Plant Sciences. PO Box 601. University o/Sheffield. Sheffield SIO 2UQ. UK 
Summary 
1. The relative cost of intraspecific exploitation competition is determined for the 
larvae of two species of bruchid beetle, with different larval competition strategies, by 
allowing two larvae to share host beans one after the other. 
2. On the larger host (Vigna unguiculata. black-eyed bean, also known as cowpea) 
there is no difference between the cost of exploitation competition for Callosobruchus 
analis and C. maculatus. 
3. On the smaller host (V, radiata, mung bean) C. analis seems to suffer a higher cost 
of exploitation competition than C. maculatus. 
4. The experimental results are interpreted using a game theory model of larval 
competition. 
5. The results suggest that a differing cost of exploitation competition is not the selec-
tive force maintaining the different larval competition strategies of laboratory popula-
tions of the two species now, although it may have been responsible for the origin of 
the different strategies in the past. 
Key-words: Bruchid, Callosobruchus analis. Callosobruchus maculatus. larval competition. scramble 
competition 
Functional Ecology (1995) 9,191-196 
Introduction 
The way in which an organism competes over a 
scarce resource has a major effect on its lifetime 
fitness. Thus organisms are expected to evolve to 
compete over resources efficiently. Intraspecific com-
petition is often intense between young organisms 
because their limited mobility means that they are 
unable to move to another area to find food and are 
dependent on resources provided by their parents 
(either directly by parental feeding or indirectly via 
the female producing the young in a suitable patch of 
resource). For example beetles of the genus Callosa-
. bruchus lay their eggs on the surfaces of various 
legumes (Southgate 1979). The larvae burrow into the 
bean where they feed until pupation. As several larvae 
may be found within a bean and an individual larva 
. completes its development within a single bean, larval 
competition can be intense. However different species 
show different larval competition strategies (Smith & 
Lessells 1985). Several Callosobruchus macultltus 
Fab. larvae will coexist within a single black-eyed 
bean (Vigna unguiculata (t.) Walp, also known as 
cowpea) and compete passively in a scramble-type 
process (sensu Nicholson 1954). As a result several·· 
adults can emerge from a single bean. However in the 
same host C. analis Fab. larvae compete actively by 
apparently seeking each other out within the bean and 
fighting until all are dead except one (Umeya, Kato & 
Kocha 1975). As a rule, only one C. analis adult will 
emerge from a single black-eyed bean no matter how 
many larvae entered in the first place. What types of 
selective forces cause two species, similar in so many 
ways, to compete in such different ways over identi-
cal resources? 
In an attempt to answer this question, Smith & 
Lessells (1985) produced a game theory model oflar-
val competition using two disparate larval strategies. 
The first was called the Avoid strategy and was ana-
logous to the strategy used by C. maculatus. with 
larvae competing passively by depleting the resource. 
The second strategy, the Attack strategy, was ana-
logous to that used by C. analis larvae, with larvae 
fighting within a bean until all are dead except one. 
The model assumed that larvae would show a reduc-
tion in fitness due to sharing beans that was repre-
sented by the variable E. This cost of exploitation 
competition was defined as the reduction in fitness of 
a larva which shares a bean compared to its fitness if it 
had developed without exploitation competition. The 
fitness of a larva developing without exploitation 
competition was defined as I. The model also allowed 
for the possibility that an Attack larva may, by 
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.1a. I. TM Smilh & 1.t,~II, ntolkl. £ illihe (0.\ of cumpr. 
lilll"" WI. IhI: Inlak Imll MJjll'rtllr1I)'. LIfk'1i ~ the 
r;..~s unJtor IilrreR'nl (tlf\dlliunll. 
lirrciuli/in, In .sg~",ivc bduavlour. be • ,upcriur 
fishIer lu an Avuid 1iU'V'. tishlinl lupcriorily or 
Allik'k WI' ~rrc~nlcd by the varillhle W. defined ... 
lhe prubuhiljlY u( .n AII...:k Jun., beul,n, an Avoid 
1iU'Vlln I filll\(. II Yo I' rurther .\!\un~ ltwI one "'ull 
would .IIA'II),' enk'f,C lucc('\\(ully (mfn • be"" IU{h 
Ihllilln Avuid 1iU'V' would belli an An .... liU'Va "jib a 
pruhllhilily "f 1- W. TIle mudel did put c.aM: ink) 
ICcuu"l h~'lullivc fit"" .. nu~ by ~Ijllcdnn. of 
1iU'V~ Yo'ithln belin, bccllU\c CullclSclb""',.,,. b«tl<"' 
lelld lu dilllr,bul(' lhei, tn' OVtr Ihc Ivaili.hlc be4ll' 
(Me",ln. A Mill.'hell I'JK'J). Ii() lhid LaniIC .-'dun 
be,"" In' nat"tly ~lulnJ. 'I'M Pkldel pt'cdi41Cd thn:c 
,e""ntl (lUIL'tIIUeli unde .. di((~nl cundilillnl (H,_ I). 
If dk'~ Iii An.'k 1iU'V1I1 '"renllri1Y (W>G" then 
An .... 'I .lwl)',.n ewluliuniIfY "uhlc "raltn tESS; 
Mll),nllnj·Smilh I"'K~). If the co-c uf c~rlott.:alk ... 
,"uOllk'lilitln i.llIw 1£ < (1- "11 Ilk'n Avoid i. an US. 
If t-tlh c(lndiliunl In' met then lhc IWO "ntICI~ ate 
alternAtive r:.Ss, (Mll),nllf\S,SlIlilh 19112); p.apulalion, 
(If tnli~ly AI ... " or Ayuid indivlJwal. In' ~Ic 
,s"in'l inYI,iun b)' mUlunhi ullin. die other ""clY 
anil a ",i .. cd P'-ruIUlil'" ~lU1 ",,,vc 10 tilher of die 
[SS.. dtrendin, on thc illiliul frl."tlum:k'4 or Ihc 
"tntle"ie.. In dk'\C cin:um"lIlnCCI indivk.lwtl. n«d 
nttl tuavc lho ~mc fil"".' II lhc allCmldivc US~ 
inJccd Ihc ""Mkl pn:dkt. !hul Indiviilwtlift In Muid 
P'!'UIUliu,1Ii will (lrlCn be filler than 1lk)\C ~ All«k 
PlflUluliutt., Iluwcvcr. (lfk."C. Ihc p.".'"llUIUft _ boa 
moved IU (l11C (,r Ihe ahernuuve r:.ss .. ttr« .. vel), 
h«UIlk'i Irurrcd Ih"~ ~.u"" ntutun" arc unable: 10 
InvlUSc Yohcn nt~. tvtn ar indlvidwaJ. would be finer 
lllhe ttlh", r:.Ss. 
'I'M Smith A u".t111i mlMkI l~ ~ li~pIc ,~ 
Ihcc)f)' "M.,Jd /lnd liuffel" rnlfn,lhc hnullUKlftift .~"-: •• 
/lIed wilh lhlli lyJ'C ur ""ldel. IIldud~n. ~1k'UUft an 
Ihc !llntltllY loCI. In Ihi. CII~ IU 'YoO I"uplc .. ,laItlla. 
Ilow('v" .. mudelli which allow fur n,.,,," ~OO1pln ~ 
dilllln'" !llntleSi". (Cu\cJntYC 19')~) 'I\'O the, ~ 
qualilltlivc pn:dkliunl. I,ma AII .. k I)'p.: behll\1UUf u. 
mun: !Jlcly 10 t"ohe "hen Ihc CO\( or t~ploi14tioa 
comrctiuoo is high. Although Smith & It-\~II, 
(1985) ~-clvpcd lhcir model for inlmWly fcc:din, 
fI«d Jnd.alon. Ihc model b ck.uiy ~l"\lnl 10 l1W1y 
'p.'Cin "how: Laruc arc confined 10 di~c pi*1(hn 
of rnoun.--c. In particular. im«I pua,.iloid. t.how I 
p.;analkl d~hotomy oIla(c hi\lOrin. L~-n ... ·,uli· 
wy' Md ',R'IMiou,,' (Godfray 1987). 
A hi,her CO\I of clploil4llon compcti.;,," in C. 
tJlfdli. I.Iwn in C. 1fWt ... J.uttS could Ihll' clplAin their 
dltrcn:nc LvuJ C'OrI1pctitiOft WlIlcgi«. PreIIiuu"')'. 
audkn h.a\C "",""",full)' mc&wmJ Ihc C'O!oI of 
e\pIoIl4tlun CCJmpetilioa in C. 1fWt-"lalttS (CRdlAlkl. 
Okk & \\'ri~ 1986; Giga & Smith 1991; "'CloW\a 
1991) by mc&wring Ihc ~Lati\1: fitnn.l of wue 
r.lilloCC.l "ilb and ",!bout elploil4tWn COntrctiliun. 
U""'t"er lhll a.nnot be done for C. tJlfdlis &i Ihc 
I.oanAC lill t' ...... other kl"in, • wngle l4n" ~ de\-ck" 
"ilbout c~pluil4lion COC'IlJ'ctition. Sc\'Cf1bcbl, it 1, 
pot.~blc 10 rc:c 1"'0 C. tJlfdlis l.vue 10 ~ I be .... 
lalucnti.Jlly. by allow. in, one 10 dc\-elop alone _ ilhin 
• be ..... theft. once il 1\&. ~ aUov.-in, .. 
r.cxond LIn. to doclop in Ihc IlU'OC be ..... The m.Iuc'. 
bon in fi~l of abc t«ond bna compiU'Cd 10 Ihc fiN 
C' .... be utCd ., a mc~ 0I1hc CO\( ir abc "0 l4n III! 
h.W tJI.amJ the be. wmuh.ancoo"'y. If abc wne hi 
dalac _ itb C. ~III bn«, Ibm Ihc miU(1Wn 01 
fitnn.' of t«ond bn-ae through a be.an can be rom· 
pamJ rur abc "'0 ~ic1i. If Ihc CO\( of flploi14titlQ 
c:ocnrcti1ion in C. IUtlJlil il 1U,ht:r than in C. 1fWt ... I.I· 
,.. Ibm the n:ductioa in filnet.l 01 Ihc t«OOd C. 
IIItdIu LIn .. "ill be "lp«ttd 10 tic hiSher Ibaa for Ihc 
I«Clftd C ....... latlll ~.. FinAlly Ihc ~ucnli'" 
dc\-'tk1pmml mc1hod c .... be c..tihr'ollCd (or A\'UiJ 
compctuiun by comp.vin, abc ~Lui\'t filnet.i of abc 
1I«Ond C ~Il. bin .. "ilb Ihc filnet.' of C. 1fWt"o 
tJcullS LanAC r.1id in limuILInc'oIli rompctilillQ (i,t. 
~Ithe be. _1m one other Lvva'. 
Tbil PIPtt ~ • .mn of clpcrimrnrti 
doipnJ 10 am'" abc quc.t.lion: c .... daffCft'n('('f, in 
Ihc aN 01 t~""" C'OInpctilioa in C tuWlis and 
C ~1l1 "'pWn thnr dlfr~ lan'aI comrcti. 
tiuD flUilIICJ"n.' ScqumIUal cnmrcti1ion "~rfflmcn" 
.. ftC c.wricd OUI OIl boch tr.p«in 01 bMlc 10 J"U\ ide 
~ a-..AWIfn 01 the CO\I of ClrlotUdkln rom. 
pctllkla. and WmullAftcouti comrctitioa tlrfflmrnt' 
_etC clllnCd OUI OIl C _lII"lttl 10 cilibrate abc 
~ t'lpcrimmt .. All tlpmmcnl' "'en: ('...mat 
.... OIl bud.-qaS be4IM CfNI.ltSE.llH H9m,) 
and ahG OIl tomaDcr muD, be"", (6H 10-63 m,). lu 
JIfO' a.k "'0 t.iIa 01 bot.t, "'jib differin, c\('C\'1cd 
~d. 01 tlplojl.lllion competition. 
5E Ql 't.s'T1A1. D£\'t:l.Onu~,. 
One hundred adull C. """'is (-ilhin Il-h 0( Cltl('1'-




24 h. The beetles were then removed and the beans 
examined. Any beans that did not carry eggs were 
returned to the beetles for a further 6 h of oviposition. 
This was repeated until all beans carried at least one 
egg. All eggs were laid within a period of 36 h. The 
beans then had their egg load modified to one by 
removal of excess eggs with a scalpel and were placed 
in individual cells of a partitioned Petri dish in condi-
tions suitable for larval development (30°C, 70% rh). 
This procedure removes any systematic difference in 
bean quality caused by females laying fewer eggs on 
poorer-quality hosts. After 7 days the beans were re-
examined and any carrying unhatched eggs were 
removed from the experiment. After a further 21 days 
the beans were monitored daily and any emergent 
adults removed. The length of the left elytron of each 
adult was measured. Once adults had ceased emerg-
ing, all beans from which beetles had emerged were 
collected for the next stage of the experiment. Any 
beans from which no beetle had emerged were kept 
for a further 7 days to ensure no further emergence 
and then discarded. One hundred C. analis adults 
(less than 12h old) were then allowed to oviposit on 
the remaining beans for 24h, after which the beetles 
were removed and the beans examined. Any beans 
not carrying eggs were returned to the beetles for a 
further 6 h of oviposition and this was repeated until 
all beans carried at least one egg. As C. analis adults 
showed reduced oviposition on used mung beans, not 
all beans carried eggs within 36 h. Beans that did 
carry eggs after 36 h were therefore used as a sub-
group. The remaining beans were given to a new set 
of adults (less than 12 h old) for a further period of 
oviposition until they also all carried at least one egg. 
Thus two subgroups were set up, the beans within 
each subgroup carrying eggs laid within 36 h of each 
other. All beans in both subgroups were then modi-
fied to have an egg load of one and the larvae were 
allowed to develop exactly as in the previous parts of 
the experiment. Once again all emergent adults were 
measured. 
The C. macula Ius sequential experiment was car-
ried out using exactly the same method, but owing to 
the shorter development time of C. macularus larvae 
the beans were monitored for emergence daily 21 
days (rather than 28) after the eggs were laid. As C. 
maculCllus adults showed less aversion to laying on 
used beans, all second eggs were laid within 36 hand 
It was not necessary to set up subgroups. 
SIMUL TANEOUS DEVELOPMENT 
One hundred adult C. macula/us (less than 12 hold) 
were allowed to oviposit on 200 host beans for 24 h. 
The beetles were removed and the beans examined. 
Any beans that did not carry eggs were returned to the 
beetles for a further 6 h of oviposition. This Was 
repeated until all beans carried at least two eggs. All 
eggs were laid within 36 h. Each bean then had its egg 
load reduced to two by removal of excess eggs with a 
scalpel. The beans were then placed in individual 
cells of a partitioned Petri dish and placed in condi-
tions suitable for larval development. After 7 days the 
beans were re-examined and any carrying unhatched 
eggs were discarded. After a further 14 days the beans 
were monitored daily and any emergent adults 
removed on the day of their emergence. All adults 
were measured. 
ANALYSIS 
Both the survival of larvae and the size of emergent 
adults were used as measures of fitness in the statisti-
cal analysis. Size was used as a measure of fitness as 
lifetime fecundity is strongly correlated with size in 
both species (Credland el al. 1986; Colegrave 1993 
for C. macula/us and N. Cole grave unpublished data 
for C. analis). As males and females of C. analis are 
impossible to distinguish reliably without dissection, 
and do not differ in size when raised with or without 
competition (Fl.4o=0·79, P=0·38), size data for the 
two sexes were pooled for C. analis in the statistical 
analysis. However as C. macula/us shows sexual 
dimorphism with males smaller than females. and the 
effect of size on a male's fitness is unknown, only the 
data on C. maculalus female size were used. 
Results 
LAROE HOST - BLACK·EYED BEANS 
In both C. analis and C. macula/"s the second larvae 
to pass through the beans showed a reduction in the 
size of emergent adults compared to first larvae 
(Table la; larval sequence, F,.m-23'(), P<O·OOOI) 
suggesting that they suffered a reduction in fitness 
owing to reduced resources. However second C. 
ana lis larvae did not show a greater reduction in size 
than second C. macula/"s larvae (species by larval 
sequence interaction, F,.m-()'18, P.O·68). There 
was no difference between the species in survival to 
emergence when comparing first larvae to second lar-
vae, as shown by the non-significant three-way inter-
action in a three-way log-linear model (Table 2a, 
a-I·17, df-I, P-().28; Sokal &t Rohlf 1981). Thus 
it appears that in block-eyed beans the cost of 
exploitation competition is similar in C. analis and C. 
ma,'"latu.J. Furthennorc second C maculatu.J larvae 
did not differ in either survival to emergence 
<X2 • 2·83, df-I, P>()'05), or emergent female sile 
(/.0·96, df-161, P-().3-') when compared to C. 
mac"latus larvae Illised in simultaneous competition 
wilh another larva (Tables Ib and 2b), suggellting thllt 
the estimllte of the cost of exploitation competition 
obtained by the sequential development method II a 
good estimate of the true cost of simultllocous larnl 
competition in C. macular".J on bluck-eyed beans. 
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T.ble I. Mc.'An clylnm Icnlllh ur aduh. rrum (111he I('tJUCft· 
lial elrcrimc.onl .,.here IlINlt' .t\lUC .Ik~ one Iflef!he ocher 
.nd (h) the lilmuhllnct,." c'rcrimem .,.here IlinlC roIwc • 
bun lllhe IiIImc lime 
Fil"lllidul.. S«und adult, 
nlean t SE clylnm mean t SE cl)1f'Oft 
ten,lh (mm) irn,lh tntm) 
81114'11 -eyed he,",i 
C. ult411;, 2,OH 001 
C. tfl4U'IIIU1I1I 2,44 t O.oI 
Munl beanl 
C. "Mlis 2,04 t 0·0, 





MClll\ t Sf clYlron 1en,Ih (mm, 
idulh flliliCd in 
(h) .imu!c_,.,. rontJlClilion 
C. tfI4I('ul.llul 
BIiM:koCyed beana 2·)9 tOOl 
Mun, hean, 2·~9 t O.o~ 
SMAI.L "nST - MUNG IU!ANS 
Adull C. unulls fnll1' die two luhS"IlI1" did no( dirrer 
In ehhcr liurvivul 10 cmcr,cnce exz.I.Q7. dr-I. 
P>O'()~) or adull.I/,c (r.()'16. df-"I. P.()'87).so Lhc 
two luhSI'\IlII" were ruu1cd for Lhc rollowin. anal),,,," 
Once .,uln secund lurvue f",", beans pmJu..-ed IItVLIkr 
aduh. chlU1 finll lurvllC mahle la: !Antal 1Cq~. 
FI,lI2-319·4. P<O'~XlI), luuelilin. thAI Lhcy foUf· 
fered frolll reduced rt!iOUn:~. lIowevCI' in chil (ate 
che redu"li"n In ,ilC (lr ICCOrUIlurvllC In C IrkKflWl1IS 
WI. lisnincanlly ,realer Ihan !he reduction In Ii~e or 
lCCond IUNae In C. ont"" (sreelel by IlUVallCquc~ 
Inlerl":linn, F1•m -SO,4,I'<O,(XXlI) luggCltinalhid 
lhe C()ti, of tJlrlnirulion compelition. In lcnns of ill 
crfccl on aduh Ille, may be ,realer In C. 1rUK,l/allU. 
CUllfllt,hrut'hlls ""tlli • • hawed • 8~41" n:du..'tion in 
IUNlvIlIlo emergencc of lieCond lurvae !han C. 1'IItJ(0". 
Idlu.r(Table 2a: 0-9·29, df-I, P.O'(Xl2) IUggN. 
in. chul in Icrml of lurvival C. nu"O/AIIJIII.r lurreted I 
lower colli of c"r1ulculinn c()fUpelilion In muns bean." 
Second C. ,"1It·III.II111 lurvllC IUNlvcd h well h Ihmc 
nl~d In ilmultllMoUI competition rr .. ble ~b; 
x2.).()6, dr-I, P>O·05). llowcvCl'Lhc "'ulll lhid 
emer8ed from the ,«ond lurvllC wm: ImaJJer thAn 
Ih(l\C from larvae nl~d in limullllncoul COntpctilion 
<Tahle Ib: ,_11-68: dr-Ill, I'cO·()(XJI); wy 
accmed 10 lurrcr •• reliler reduction in filnnl .. hen In 
lCquenllul (omrclilion. 
I>lscus. .. lon 
The refiuhs of the ICquenlilll dcvcl0l"ucnt ""peri-
menll Iuggelit thlll when Uliing block-cycd beans as I 
hOliI Ihe COIi( of nploilarion (omrctjljon fur the IWO 
lredcl II very limilar. The fael tbul both !he ~ucn­
Iill! and simullancous e"penmcnls .ive (omr-nahle 
",limal" or Lhc rebli\"e CMt or c"ploilalion competi-
lion In C. IrkKfIlalltf on black-cyed beans iUggNs 
thAr (he nluet obtAined in the acqUCtlliaJ cllperimcnl 
fot C. 111I4J/il ~ probably • reliAhle indicalOf' of Lhc 
valuet tIw .. 'OU1d be otuined if lan'le did iJwe 
beans simultancol"ly "'ithoul competing .ggrn-
li,·e1y. H()Yo~er i( mung beans an: uloCd as Lhc ho!.I 
the lilU&lion bcc-omcI ~ complu. In ttTl1ll or iur-
vi val 10 emergence C. IfttJC1Ilalll.l Io«mI to lurrer less 
OYo'in,lO elploil4lion competition than C. 11M/is. but 
in It'nM or the aUt or suni,,;ng "'ults the iilWilion is 
~\'cncd. .. jth C. IfkIC1Ilalltf ~'ing I grealer reduc-
tion in W~ 0( adults than C. QIId/is. AI!iO .. hile Lhc 
~ima," 0( the C'O§t 0( ellploilation competition in 
ICnm or sun;\'allO aduhhood Igree fOf' Lhc C. ""K'" 
wII" ~UCtlIW and simullanC'OUs dc\'c10rruenl 
Cllpcrimcnrs. the ~.tIer ~uction in lilC of ICCOnd 
adulu from the tequcntial npcrimcnl suggest !bul on 
muna be.-.-m Lhc ICQUCIIIUI method may givc an 0"('1" 
~imale 0( the CMt of clploil4lion competition. 
My ~ltti a1!iO prD\ide NlmalCl or Lhc value of 
the CO\( 0( clploi .. ioa compnilion parameter u~ 
by Smith A In'ICU, (1985). The CO\( o( tllploilalion 
compctilion panmc1tT (E) ~tcd Lhc ~uction 
in filnn' or. brv. a-inglO c,ploil4lion compctitilll\ 
compamt 10 • fitnnl 01' I it !he lan'l had been alone 
in the bnn. AI IifctirrIC fecundity is directJy JI"C'rlll" 
tivnAllO fenWc size in both "J'CCics (N. Colcgra\'f. 
unpuNi\hcd d.Ju) !he mcasurn or filnCfo' uioCd in Ibi, 
t"rm~ can be.- combined by multiplying Lhc me,," 
we of emerrcnl adult' by Ihcir ~lllge sun·ival. 
l( the fit"",-' nlut 0( bn'llC railoCd in compctition 
(eilhcr t.equcnlwly or simuluncou~y) b !hen di\'idcd 
by the filllC'it valut 0( brvx rlliloCd "ithoul c"p'llilll-
lion compnilion.lhea • \'aJue 0( Lhc relalive filn«s or 
the compctin, L1n'ae is otuincd. This value can thNt 
Tat* 1. ~ ~;,-.I oflw\cat rrom ,.,the toequC'ft. 
.... "~ .. Iatft ~at "'-c • bota one aftff anuther 
and Clt, .- ................ ~"pttimrtll, .. htft wuc Wft • 
tit ... rtwUIIIC .... 
fa) F."..a.uc S«ond !.nit 
BlAcl-crcd bc-AIK 
C#llflllu I6SCl2, 8~~ (J,~, 
c. ..... ..,.., .. 917 (~2, 917(2·:, 
PoIUII,IIt ... 
e #llfllltl 7 .... 7(H' .en c"," 
e ..... ..,.".. 711 (H, 65-)"'3, 
'I Mll\lul (t SEt 01"'1) '-'It' 
(b, \twin, I be .. umuluancou,Jy 
C._..t.ar .. 
BLa: .. .qcd bc-.- as Ill., 




Table 3. Estimates of the cost of competition and parameter 
(E) from both the sequential and simultaneous experiments 
Development on 
Black-eyed beans Mung beans 
C. maculatus 
Simultaneous 0·06 0·24 
Sequential 0·01 0·28 
C. ana lis 
Sequential ' 0·08 0·49 
be subtracted from 1 to give an estimate of the cost of 
exploitation competition parameter (E). 
Estimates of this parameter (E) obtained from the 
sequential experiments are shown in Table 3, along 
with the estimates obtained for C. maculatus compet-
ing simultaneously. The model predicts that if there is 
no Attack larval superiority (W=0·5) and E>0·5 then 
Attack will be the only stable strategy; if E <0·5 
Avoid becomes a possible ESS. The values for both 
species competing on black-eyed beans are not only 
very similar (C. maculatus E=O·01 •. C. analis 
E=0·08). but are also well within the range where 
Avoid is expected as a possible evolutionary out-
come. When using mung bean as a host the cost of 
exploitation competition in C. analis (E=0·49) does 
appear to be higher than in C. maculatus (E=0·28). 
and is also very close to the 0·5 value above which 
Attack is the only stable evolutionary outcome. In a 
situation where Attack larvae are actually better 
fighters than Avoid larvae (W>0·5) the Smith & 
Lessells model requires that the cost of exploitation 
competition is reduced further if A void is to be an 
ESS [as E < (1- W»). In this case a small Attack larval 
superiority could put C. analis within the conditions 
in which Attack is the only ESS on mung beans. It 
would require a very large increase in Attack larval 
superiority to stop Avoid being an ESS for C. analis 
on black-eyed beans and C. maculatus on both hosts. 
Thus it appears that on black-eyed beans differing 
costs of exploitation competition cannot be invoked 
to explain the disparate larval competition strategies 
of the two species. It seems that C. analis larvae 
would actually show an increase in individual fitness 
if they showed the Avoid behaviour used by C. macu-
latus. However on the smaller host, mung beans. the 
two species may indeed use the appropriate behaviour 
that maximizes individual fitness given their differing 
cost of exploitation competition on this host. It may 
be that C. analis originally evolved in a host similar to 
mung bean and has only recently moved to using 
black-eyed beans as an altcmutive host. If Attack 
larvae are superior fighters to Avoid larvae then once 
C. analis had evolved the Attack strategy it would be 
very difficult for mutant Avoid larvae to invade the 
population even if the cost of exploitation competi-
tion reduced, because they would almost always be 
sharing beans with Attack larvae that would often kill 
them. The population would be stuck at the Attack 
ESS. This is similar to the situation that is thought to 
occur in parasitoid insects, where the larvae of some 
species fight over a host even though there is enough 
resource in a single host to support the development 
of several larvae (God fray 1987). 
The notion that the costs of exploitation competition 
are higher in smaller beans, promoting the evolution 
of Attack-type strategies on these hosts, is in agreement 
with the observation that the wild bruchid species in 
Japan (Kiritani 1957 cited in Toquenaga & Fujii 
1991). which feed on small wild beans rather than on 
larger stored products. usually show an Attack larval 
competition strategy. Thanthianga & Mitchell (1987) 
have also shown that a strain of C. maculatus, which 
was isolated from mung beans in south India. shows 
an Attack type of larval competition. even when 
allowed to develop in larger beans in the laboratory. 
It might be expected that larvae of an A void 
species, which may have to share a bean with one or 
several other larvae, will encounter much more vari-
ation in resource availability than larvae of an Attack 
species. which essentially obtain all or none of the 
resource. Thus Avoid species might evolve a greater 
degree of plasticity in adult emergence size compared 
to Attack species. with each individual modifying its 
emergence size to suit the resources available. The 
variance of the first and second larvae through the 
beans can be pooled to give an idea of the degree of 
variation in adult size when larvae shift different 
hosts. On the black-eyed beans there was no dif-
ference between the variances of C. antllis and C. 
maculatus (variance C. analis = 0·10 1. variance C. 
maculatus=O·I09; FIl4•248 = 1·08 P>0·05). However 
on mung bean. the smaller host, C. maculatus showed 
a greater variance than C. analis (variance C. ana-
lis = 0·081. variance C. macularus = 0·181; F 1115.177 = 
2·235. P<O·Ol) suggesting that C. macultlfus larvae 
may be able to tailor their size at emergence to suit the 
level of resource to a greater degree than C. analis 
larvae. The fact that second C. maculatus larvae show 
a greater reduction in size than second C. ana lis 
larvae while second C. analis show a much higher 
reduction in survival when developing on mung beans 
is also consistent with this idea. It may be that when 
resources are limited C. maculatus larvae can respond 
plastically and produce smaller adults while C. antllis 
larvae are unable to respond and so, if resources are 
significantly reduced. die. 
The fact that selection pressures may change 
between the evolutionary origin of a character and the 
present day creates problems with making inferences 
about the evolutionary origins of a behavioural strat-
egy from contemporary experiments. There may have 
been alterations in the physiology of the species since 
the larval competition str.ttcgy evolved. For example, 
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N. ell/I'gra," 
a "(,«ieli Ihlll evolves an Avoid·lyre slnucgy may 
thcn aiM) evolve a ,reulcr dcgree of plll\lidly in its 
R'''(''tn~ 10 reliuun:e aVlliluhililY. Thi5 could ~c t~ 
cumnlly mCII"ured CO,,1 of expluilulion compelilion a 
("Iur Indicalur of ~hllt II ~as al I~ lime "'~n ~ 
'ItIIIC,>, evulvcd. NevcnhclclS lhe u~ of thcon:lical 
n\lIl.M~, alun, with lhe clperi,"cnluIIClJ.lina of ~i, 
J'R'dicliuOIi, Is an exlremcly (",wcrfullo..,lln demon-
'ItIIlin, ~hich evoluliltnllry Kcnanu5 are coo",i"lcnl 
wilh ()h~rvllliun Illdu)'. 
Thull It tocems thai dirrcring c~t of Clploilalion 
compelition for Ihe Iwo ~('«Ics Is nol ~ R'lbOn fur 
Ihe dirrcrenllllrval compeliliun liltlllcgics ~~n devel-
opin,ln bhu:k-eyed heuns (the hl""l on Yo·hkh ~ cui-
luR'S u~d In thi. exrerimcnt hllvc been cultured rur II 
Icu~1 the III~I 18 yC/IIII; C. M. Lcs~lIs. pcnonal rom-
munlculiun). I lowe vcr the higher COSI of Clploillliion 
comflClilion ,hown by C. anallJ on mung beans sug-
gesl" Ihullf thcy originltlly evolved on a ho!.tllimilill 
to mun,lhl, could explltin Ihe origin or IMir Anack 
lilrulcs)'. The forces Ihul muinluin this '\tulelY now 
arc lilill oren lu quesliltn. 
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Sperm precedence in zebra finches does not require 
special mechanisms of sperm. competition 
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SUMMARY 
Competition between the spermatozoa of different males to fertilize the eggs of a single female acts as a 
selection pressure on the behaviour of males and females. However, quantitative predictions about 
behaviour can only be made if the paternity consequences of different patterns of copulation are known. 
Ikrause exhaustive empirical measurement of these consequences may be impractical, interest has centred 
on determining the mechanisms by which sperm competition occurs, knowledge of which may allow 
consequences to be calculated. One method of elucidating mechanisms of sperm competition is to use 
mathematical models to determine which mechanisms are necessary or sufficient to account for empirical 
observations. We use this approach for zebra finches Taeniopygia gul/ala and show that empirically 
measured rates of disappearance of sperm from the reproductive tract, and differences in the number of 
sperm in the first and subsequent ejaculates of each male, are sufficient to account for observed levels of 
sperm precedence. Special mechanisms of sperm competition, such as displacement or stratification of 
sperm, are therefore unnecessary to explain sperm precedence in this species. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The recognition that sperm competition - competition 
bt-tween the spermatozoa from different males to 
fertilize the eggs of a single female (Parker 1970) - may 
bt- frequent even in apparently monogamous species 
has led to considerable advances in the understanding 
of male and female behaviour during the female's 
fertile period (Birkhead & Moller 1992). However, a 
lack of detailed knowledge of the paternity conse-
eluences of different patterns of insemination by pair 
and extra-pair males, particularly in birds, has 
hindered the making of precise quantitative predictions 
about optimal behaviour. This deficit has led to 
increased interest in mechanisms of sperm competition: 
knowledge of auch mechanisms may provide an 
alternative to empirical measurements in determining 
the fitn('Sl consequences of different copulation strate-
gies (Lessdls & Birkhead 1990). 
In birds, one of the most intriguing observations in 
terma of the mechanism of sperm competition is the 
apparently disproportionate success of extra-pair copu-
lations (EPCI). For example, in several wild bird 
populations the proportion of extra-pair young is 
considerably higher than the observed proportion of 
£PCI (see, for example, Westneat II al. 1990; Dixon,t 01. 
199-l; Mulder II al. 1994). Although such a dillcrrpancy 
might be accounted for by the discreetness, and hence 
Jow observability, of EPCS in the wild, stud irs of caged 
birds, where all copulations can be observed, reveal a 
similar inconsistency between the proportion of IPCI 
and rxtra-pair young (the single IPC experiment in 
Birkhead It 01. 19880). Such observations encourage 
lhe provocative luggntionl that either the mechanism 
p, •• R. &t. LMttl. B (1995) 259.223-228 
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of sperm competition entails an advantage to the last 
male to copulate, over and above any advantage from 
minimizing the loss of sperm through constant dis-
appearance between insemination and fertilization 
(Lessells & Birkhead 1990), or females are in some way 
able to influence the outcome of sperm competition 
and select sperm providing a favourable genetic 
endowment to their oft.;pring (Birkhead II 01. 19930). 
However, before pursuing these possibilities, the 
alternative explanation that the success of EPCI is due 
to differences in the number of sperm inseminated, and 
the relative timing ofEPCI in conjunction with constant 
sperm loss rates, should be evaluated. In particular, 
Birkhead & Fletcher (1992, 1995; T. R. Birkhead & 
F. Fletcher, unpublished results) have recrntty demon-
strated that the number of sperm transft'rrrd in 
copulations by zebra finches Tamiopygia gu/lala is 
considerably larger when the male is 'rnted' than 
when he has inseminated a female within the previous 
calendar day. IfIPCI normally occur aftt'r the male has 
ceased copulating with his own mate (Birkhead II 01. 
1988h; Morton,' 01. 1990; Birkht'ad & Moller 1992). 
larger t'jaculate size may account for the dispro-
portionate success of IPCI. 
The aim of this paper is. thert'fore, to investigate 
whrther levels of sperm precedt'nce in the zebra finch 
measured in captivity can be accounted for by the 
number of sperm inseminated in conjunction with a 
constant disilppearance rate of sperm bt'tween in-
aemination and fertilization. To do this, we use 
mathematical models together with empirical mt'asure-
ments of: (i) the number and timing of copulations; (ii) 
the proportion of copulations that result in insemi-
nation; (iii) the number of sperm inseminated; and 
C 1995 TIll! Royal Sod~IY 
Ii,,) Ihr r.tle- Ct( IUKI (If Jlre-\'itJu~ly illW'rnillalNJ liJlrnn 
li'um Illr rrprtKlufli\'1' Ir"n, In m .. ke- prrc:lkliunl of 
Ir\,rI. Ill" ~prrm prrn·t!rlU'l'. WC" lllrn Inl Ihnt" 
prrdinillllK lIy ('uIIIJlilriIlK Ihe-m wilh Ir\'rl. uf prl'-
c'rdrlll'r ill napli\'il)' IIIra_urrd by Ui .... hl'ild ,t "I. 
(I ~II\1l41, (rl'llll"ly~rd !Jy T. R. Uir ""r .. d. ullpubliahNJ 
rr~IIIIli): (i) il .. ill!tlt' u'e pe-rfurtlle-cI aflrr lilt' l.ul of 
~r\'rr.11 rupul.lIiulI. by lilt' pilir male (rniliu's ~3.7 ~~ 
(9:' ";, ("t1ll/iLlrlll"" limil.: "1.G,-4i6.1 ~Ii) of Iht' Ilulro-
Ihllly li'nili"uhlr rRRI {alluwillK Ii.r Iht' limillK (If 
wl'lIl.lIillll, frnilil.illiull alltl u"ipc)t;iliulI) (' fPC nprri. 
IIIrlll'); (ii) \\hrll Inalr. art' awilfhrd durilll( lht' 
Ii-millr'. fi-nilt' ,H'riIKI, thr lie-wild Illalr frnili," n.3 o~ 
(li\.2 8:1.2 "II) "f Ihr ,xnrntiilll)' frnilil.ahlr "KR' 
('lIl;lIr •• willhinK "x,H'rime-nt '). ,\ fil lH'lwrrn lhr 
I'rrdinrd alld "I)tOrn'Nt Ir\'rli of ('xtrll.pilir palrrnilY 
(1'1''') (lr Ie-mllc!·nullt' prC'f"rdrllf"l' W01l1d impl)' that no 
~prdill ml'rh:ll\i~m ill rt'C'JllirNt 10 r"plain tlal' k\'rl of 
NIH'nn prrc'l'drnc'r oh!it'n·C'Ct in lhr lI!e-lml finrh. 
2, METlIOI>S 
Wr IIIlIclrllrc:1 Iht' (rm"It", "'ltI'llllllni\'l' IrArt ill a ii1l1C1t' 
'1'IIII11'ltrll1lrlll' r ..... l..n ... lh " IIi,Lhl'ad I9'MJ). S"l'rm an' 
111'11l .. ilrt! 111111 Ihi. ("lI"",ltrlllll'lIl al i ..... ",llIariun. alld IlIrn 
cli'~"III' .. r ill it Cumlltlll raIl'. Any rr","I"iIlK I/won arl" 
r\'I'IIHMlly u_1 fI" (rraililitllulI, \\'r _UflIrd Ihlll Ihl" 
pIC,halliliry IIr «'lUh IUltlr (rrliJi~illlC .n rl"e drpc'lItl, ullly em 
Ihl' prupUlltun lIf'llI'nll In Iltt' rrpftllillni\'l" marl lllitl ia hi, 
.1 Ihr lillll' lIffl'rrili,ltllulI, Thi. fllIlllrl ia Ihr iimplnl p' .... ilJll" 
lillr.., I1\lItlrl, I.t'. II I'IIIIMIlIiC'l it .iluillillll in "hkh Ilwm, rrum 
dillio""1II I'j .. "uliurli 1'l(llI'rirnt'l' I"t' pmr filiI." ur It ... rrmn lhr 
f'l'pf'tllluni\'r Inan, IIl1d IIrt' 11111 ("""lIrrd or diwd\'l1l1ll1llrd 
IIY Ihr unlrr ill "lairll Iht'y arr i"Irutlurrd Ifllo III .. marl 
Til bll' I. T/rl """ .. ,,, of (o/,ulaliolff "lfJ lfu",An of Jpn". 
i"u",innltJ bv paittJ ",al, :rb" finlhrs 
(Tilt' 1UIIIIIII'r and lin,i"" u( (,,(lI'III"liulli iii Ihlll ul ..... n·rd in 
\'illrc:1 Iriltl. tlr Irll pilirrc:t 011111'1 (UirLllnd rl .1. 1988. 
(rt'allill)'..-d by T. R. UilLhrltd, uIIJluhli.hrc:1 ,nultl}). 11'l" 
1111111111" u( "''''lIIll1l1liulIl Willi nlimltlrd hy a .. umilll( IhAI 
67 % lIr eClJlUlillill'" Inm,frr 1i,lI'r", (UirLhritd ,1 til. 1989), 
Tht' 1111111111'1' uf ~llI'rnl illli('lIIilllurcl WlU nlilllilird hy ... umiIlK 
Ihal 7.SU Ie 10' (± 4.0:t~)( 10' ut.) Ilwrm Arr 11lM'lIIilllurd 
ill Ihr fi~1 11111'1',,"1'1.11 ('llJlIII"lillll by a mall', alld 1.6!19 x 10' 
(± 1.3:I!J)( lUI) In 11I1~I"rlll ,ulTra.(ul "'1'"1"liul" by lI,r 
1Oll1llt' IIIltlt' (If - 30 ilia I ... i IIi, Lhrllcl " rtrldlrr 19'J~; T, R. 
iii, Lhnd, ~:. J. "rllall " .... HI'I!'''t'r. ulIl'"hli.hrd rnllhli).) 
lIulllhrr "l'lprm, 
1I111111tt'r til' 1I111111wr (If lllatmill.urd 
day Ct11'U1i1li1l1l1l "'Ii('m ill a litlllt )( 10-
-~ 2.:UH I.~H 8.73~J" 
-of 1.8:lIi 1.:2:10 2,(t!1O 
-3 I.~IH I.OG 1 1.803 
-2 2.U8 I.MO 2.787 
-I 2.0Ha 1.3!~j 2.377 
0 1.476 O.!)fI!J 1.6UO 
1 O.lUH 0.539 0.9U 
2 0.612 0.410 0.697 
3 0.21)" 0.177 0.300 
.. O.Hill 0.113 0.191 
5 0.192 0.129 0.219 
• 8.739 - 7.8 U + 0.5"" )( 1.(j~I!1. 
p,.,. R . • w. I_i. " (P~I~) 
,r.ul."', O~I 'Iu.Idrc:l nmr') or Ihrough ph~~ult"Rlc.1 
di..-nmin ......... by dar rrtn4I". SIJC'ff.t& 0( lprml P tilillaffl'C'lrc:I 
b)' Ihr liminl ur inM'11,ilU ....... bUI onl)' brcAUIit'. "'llh A 
com ... nl It_ ".'l". mon~ tilWrnt (rom l"Arlin rjaculllln ",ill 
h .. ,1:' diwppl:'lIrrc:1 by dar limt' o((ntiliu.ion. MOf'(' COI11p1rll 
lior.., n"ldeh .'l" .,.-il ... " i k-U, Ii Bi,Ltar"d 19"10) bul 
li"l. m1IJinul narJLtUrnnmli 0( dar pA,-.m"l"n illcludrc:l 
in .uch mudcl. "n' LacLing, .. nd wnmd in lill",ar n"drt. 
'''In'l"otic Innti of tprnn prtTtdm«' an' dumirnurc:l by Ihl' 
It .. ,,,.r (,om only onr compAnmt'nl. and lhal ... "Il" ",ill 
Ix "lu.aJ 10 dar obIIt'nni "Il" 0( diwpprUAl1Cl' in All 
cumpAnmmli in 1M fo)'tiIm1 It..r.ldl, Ii Bi,Lh"Ad I~IO). 
Wilhin 1M I'r"",",o"~ 0( diP modd, Ibl' pitHrrn of 
InwrnilUlioa by 1"'0 lor nltlft) nlilln nn br \'anrc:l in Irrn1l 
of buth dar liming and Ru- 0( rjKUIAln and till" probabilil)' 
ur rmililA ....... 0( rMh r'lt1r in 1M clulch by l"<lch ur Ihl' n",1n 
prrdiclrc:l. Inil~lI)' "'l" rnodellrc:lIM pAlrrnilY urdulchn of 
"ll '1t~ flU in dtJmnt;Ulrc:l ... ·oc .. tineltn) ",hen Iltt' pAir 
m"lr nlild" dar nomw pAlirm 0( .. boul I.. copul".i, .... 
hrl,*t'I't1 d.a)'6 -,S {rt'bli\l" 10 1M I .. ~>ing o(lht' linl «1l.Jtland 
+ ~ (t« I"ble I), .. nd .. difft"ft'Q1 mial ... mad ... a wn!;lr U'c 
1 .. 1'*1T1l d .. )'6 - oS and + 3. Wl" darn moditird Iltt' pitl1rrn vi 
inM'111in"I;'''' h)' (,Mb o(tllt'",o IIlilln 10 pnodirllhr l');prClrd 
pAlrrnily 0( chiel. in rMh cI BirUar<ld " .1.'. l'xprrinlMllli 
(I 988.l. 
Thr ti,... inamUlUliuo by "0)' IIlilk '" IU .""Umrc:!IO lrauti", 
.. buua 8 million tiprnn. .... bwqurnl copuLalionl by till' unit' 
m"l ... 10 ""Inti", .. boul onr and A b.tlf million sprnn (t« I .. ble-
I). Wlam " IIlilW "' .... npt'Clrd 10 1Ilil1.r h lhan on ... ",hoIr 
in ... milUl...... 00 hi.. Ii,... d.ay of copulaliun. tI,l' Larvr 
rjileul ... r W(' "'~ .. tltUlIM'd 10 APpl)' 101M muAining (nln,un 
ur " 'ti,... inwmill.lllioq' nud" 00 IUbwqurnl d .. ~'I. 11M' 
Dumt.., ur 'P"'" imnninAlrc:I b)' l'lICb IIlillr on l'Ach d .. )· "' .. , 
caL:ul.altd by IUmming 1M .. mounl of Jprml IrAntinTNI in 
(',uh inwmilU'iuo It« tal*' .,. 
(X copuLuiom by ,roc .. tinchrl, 67~o mult in illwmilUl. 
liun vl dll' (rtn4k \Bi,LiK'Ad " til. 1989). Thi. "".In 
t'lId'4Uic ntl.alioa in 1M A""lUnl of'lwrm irunninAlrd. 
"hkh .. nprc1rc:1 10 ahltT 1M pnodic.rd "U''f'Agr palrrn.l),. 
Wc," ill\n,iR.alrc:l till' mARniludl" oflhp rffl'C1 by CJll'1)illl oul 
prclimilUl)' umuLuiom ft" ulI!;k II'C mode" in ",hkh; fil 
inv-rnilUll;'''' by Lorh IIlilIn "'IU drlnmini.lir tt" ...... ,h 
clIJ,uLalion rnuhrc:l in 0.67 uf an inwminlllion); til) io. 
IIn1limuiuo by thr pAir IIlillr "'Ai drln111ini'lic. And b)' Ihl" 
nln'.pAi~ 1Ililk- Ilcxha .. ic fi.C". rllCh copul.uion rnuhtd in 
inlnnilUll;'", "'llh a prob.thilil)' vlO,67; d,ll "'IU drlnfllinc-d 
in lltt' wmuLa,;' .... uWlIg a random-num,,", 1",""lorl; and 
(iii! inV'fhilUliom by Lorh IIlilln "''ft'l" Iloch.'lie. Tltnc-
"",uLn;'" u.c-t'd lllill .IIC'ft"IU Iloch.tolicil)' in h'M'11I" 
rnaliun by tlK' """".pAir IIlilk hAd • La'll" l'fft"Ct. IIOCh" .. idl)· 
in inM'11ull.llliua by Iht' pAil IIlillr grnrr.ally ahl'O"d IItt-
prrdiclrc:l poIlmUlr h)' an. Ib .. n I ~;.. SimilAr "mulAliOCH 
"wn.t'd chAl utl.alioa in l'j.IcuLaIl" W(' of linol and lubtrqUt'nl 
rjMUl,un by rilher 1Ililk- (ej.:acul.1ll" ,.u(' ehoM-n ("'"' 
nar.an -1A .. nlt.a .. And mt'.an + Ld. ",j.h "lUAI puh.abili'n 
1Ift'14bl" I , ... mt'<lM And I.d." AI.., h.ad A In\lAl I'fft"C1 on 1M 
prrdiclrc:l poI.rnUIY. W(' Ihrrdi'Jfl" uwd nuxtrk in "hifh 
irlarmilUliuo by 1M pili, IIlilk "'., delnmini'lir •• nd by 1M 
"1f".pAil m.ak 1l1X1lil .. ic. ThH AU"",rc:I us '0 CAlcul"'r An 
C'UCI nprclrc:l mr"n , .... (- 0.67)( ...... ",ltt-n Ihl" n.,. ... p4ir 
millt' dun illM'111in.lll" Iht' rnllille). ,.uhrr Ih<ln nlil1\illing 1M 
C'lJX'Clrc:I mriln rrom muhipk ruM of Ibt' Nmul.uion. Thr 
C'!Tret 0( "ocit.uticil), in inwmilUlioo in "muIA,ion. 0( 1M 
mal"""",i'chinl( nprrimrnl .ilI R,hrr ~ \'lIri.MI'. bul 
brrllll'lC.' Ihl" ... fft"Ct "'IU I"'"..t'l' iftIAU (aboul 1-2 ~~) and 
occurnd in Lorh ditn:tiom. And An CJ\Tf'ill1 prrc:fic.ion could 
only Ill' nud" by IUmmin, K'pII ..... ,l" prrc:ficlic:ml (ur ".ach en'" 
(11ft' 1x1tM). "'l" uwd delnmini .. ir modd'io nlilLt' prnfictionl 
ft,.. Ihl" m.aI"""",1lchinl nprrimml. 
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In birds, fertilization of an egg occurs about 30 min after 
it is ovulated, and about 1 day before it is laid (Howarth 
1914). In zebra finches, eggs are laid early in the morning, 
and copulations are concentrated in the same period of the 
day (Birkhead tl 01. 1989). Because sperm take time to reach 
the infundibulum (the site of fertilization at the top of the 
,.eproductive tract), we have made the simplifying assump-
tion that all the copulations by the pair or first male on any 
day occur immediately after fertilization of the egg ovulated 
on that day. To be consistent with Birkhead tl at.'s (1988a) 
protocol, we have assumed that EPCS, and copulations made 
by the second male on the day of mate switching, are made 
of h later. Thus the earliest egg that a copulation (pair or 
C'xua-pair) on day 0 (the day that the first egg is laid) can 
frrtilize U that ovulated on day 1 and laid on day 2, i.e. the 
third egg. 
While the sperm is in the reproductive tract we assume 
,hat it suffers an instantaneous loss rate of 0.026 ± 0.007 (s.e.) 
hoi, u estimated from the decline in the number of sperm 
adhering to the vitelline layer of sequentially oviposited eggs 
(Birkhead tl 01. 1993b). The extent to which this loss rate 
~fJectJ use in fertilization, death or inactivation in the 
~productive tract, or evacuation from the reproductive tract 
is unknown, but u immaterial to the predictions of the model. 
The finite lurvival rate of sperm on day d, 
D.-exp(-I'r), (1) 
where, u the hourly instantaneous 108s rate and I is the 
pumJxor of hours on day d that the sperm was present in the 
,.eproductive tract. Thus for the sperm of an extra-pair male, 
or of the second male on the day of switching, D, for the day 
of insemination u 59.5% (exp (-20)(0.026». In all other 
c;pcI D. u 53.6% (exp (-24)( 0.026». If N, sperm are 
inK'millated on day i, the number of them surviving to be 
able to take part in fertilization on day J, 
I-I 
S,.I - N,' n (D .. ). (2) 
. -,
ThuI, the total number of sperm from a given male, available 
10 take part in fertilization on day J, 
'-I 
S ... , - ~ (S,.,). 
_. 
(3) 
The probability of a given male fertilizing an egg ovulated on 
day Iii thl'n his value of S"".1 divided by the sum of the values 
of S .... 1 Ihr all mail'S who have copulated with the female. 
3. RESULTS 
We used the model to predict levels of sperm 
precedence. Figure I shows the expected probability of 
Erp for each egg when a single EPC is made between 
days - 5 and + 3. The probability of EPP varies 
through the laying sequence of eggs. Sperm cannot 
fertilize eggs laid less than 2 days after insemination 
(see above), so that eggs laid early in the laying 
IIC.'quence may have no EPP. After the last insemination 
by any male the number of each male's sperm will 
continue to decrease, but the proportions will not, so 
that the probability OfEPP would then remain constant. 
Thus when, as in this case, the pair male continues to 
copulate after the EPC, the predicted EPP drops from an 
initial peak. In general, the later the EPC, the higher the 
level of EPr in those eggs that could be fertilized, but 
the lower the number of eggs that could be fertilized (st'e 
figure I). This is because the amount of the pair male's 
.perm in the reproductive tract reflects the balance 
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Figure 1. Predicted levels ofEPp when pair males make about 
14 copulations between days -5 and +5 (see table I), and 
there is a single successrul EPC between days - 5 and + 3. The 
EPC was assumed to occur 4 h after fertilization of the egg 
ovulated on that day. All other copulations were assumed to 
take place immediately after fertilization of the egg ovulatl'd 
on that day. While in the reproductive tract, sperm are 
assumed to disappear at an illstantaneous rate of 0.026 h-l. 
The probability of patl'rnity w..... detl'rminl'd by the 
proportion of sperm in the reproductive tract at the time of 
fertiliza tion. 
between gains through insemination and losses through 
constant disappearance. In ubra finches, this balance 
results in a decline in the amount of pair male's sperm 
in the reproductive tract over the period when the 
clutch is being fertilized (although this is not necessarily 
true for other rates ofinsemination and disappearance). 
Thus the later the EPC, the higher the proportion of 
sperm in the tract that it represents • 
Birkhead II al.'s (1988a) single EPC experiment 
rt'presents the case where the EPC occurs on day 0, and 
the pair male achieves the normal pattt'rn of copula-
tions until day -I (see table 1), and 0.2 copulations on 
day 0 in the I h that he has access to the female (further 
analysis of video trials (Birkhead ,1 al. 1988a: T. R. 
Birkhead, unpublished results)). As a result, the extra-
pair male can only ft'rtilize eggs laid on or after day 2, 
but is then predicted to achieve a constant 49.2 % 
paternity of eggs. This is well within the ob.~en·ed 95 % 
confidence limits of41.6-66.1 % (mean 53.7%). 
In Birkhead " al.'s (1988a; T. R. Birkhead, un-
published results) mate-switching experiment. mate 
switching in each trial occurred after a variable number 
of days of copulation by the first male (mean - 3.6; 
range - 2-5), and a variable numlx-r of days lx-fore 
the female lx-gan egg laying (2.0; (4). We tht'rt'fore 
predicted the pattern of copulation by t'ach male from 
that obst'rved in the S('parate \·ideo trials of mate 
switching. In tht'S(' video trials. tht' numlx-r of 
copulations by the first male did not vary with day 
numlx-r relative tither to laying (linear or quadratic 
terms) or mate switching, nor did it difTt'r bt-tween the 
day of mate switching and other days. We therefore 
assumed that first males in the patt'rnity trials made 
the observt'd mean rate of 1.268 copulations per day. 
The numlx-r of copulations by second males in the 
video trials varied only relative to the day of laying 
(number of copulations (K'r day - 0.814-0.266 (day 
II II III I)('r) ; fl ... - !UlK, P - 0,017), \\'t' u!it'd litis 
rrl."i"" tu "tilm"t' tltt' numhrf uf cupulations ",atlt' 
r;adl d.IY by fI("t'ulld ",,,1M in radl uf tlar patt'rnity 
trials. Urn'u~t' tlf Ihr \'ariiuiull in Iht' limiflK uf nllilt' 
Ii\\'itrhil\~ wt' prntirlrd palt'rnily IIC'paralrly fur t'iuh 
p.llrrnil), trial, .IIlI III 111 IIII'd U\'l'r 1111 I ria III 10 oblain an 
u\'rrall prl'diniull (If p"ll'mity by Ill ... 1IC'('olld nUllr of 
77.9 11". Tlti_ iii ,,~ain wl'lI witlain Ih ... ul)!o('rvrd 95°~ 
C"Cllllidl'lUr limits (If 65.2IB.2 ~~ (mC'"n n,] ~o). 
-t. l>ISC:USSI()~ 
(hlr IIItKtd h ... runllidrrahlC' .U("("('Ii. in prC'tlklilll( 
1t'\'rlM uf ~I)('rm prn'nlrnq.-: lht' prrdiniunl fur bUlh of 
Uiddlt'lld " nl. 'I (19U8a) rxprrimC'lmlil' wrll withi" 1IIf,' 
95 ~ u ("(UlfidC'IIc'l' linail. fur till' ohKC'r\,C't1 \'ahIN. Wt' art' 
IhuK "blC' leI c:undudt' Ih"l .pC'dal mC'dlaniliml of llle'rm 
('ulllpC'litiun lIfC' IInl nC'('('Ii,ary 10 (')(pli,in mC'illiurro 
III)('rlll prn'C'dC'fI("(- In ;tC'lm. lim·lal'll. Thi, cunduliiun is 
11111 unrclC'd lIy IIny dil1rrrll"C' ill p"roUtlC'll'n IiU"" as 
C'j.It'III'IIt' iiiI.«' tH'lwC'C'n ruplh'(' 1I11t1 wild hir,": lhili is 
t)('ntllKe- ullr llIaill "im Wll. '111110 prnlinlC'\'rI. uf Ipt'rm 
prt't'C'dt'IIt't' ill Iltl' wild, hUI 10 UK(' ('umpariliO'u of 
uh!OC"r\'l'd alld prnli"'n! II'\'rI. uf .pl'nn prrc:rdrllt't' in 
.... pli\'i'y In Il'lil iclrlts 1I""ul liar mrdlilflilim of alle'rm 
"III1II)('I;liulI, 1I.,wC'\,C'r, WI' hll\'t' .mulr Iir\'t'rilt aim. 
plilyinK a~"ul1lpli() ... alld mlillt- pmll,",i"", fur Dilly a 
lIi"l(lr \'IIII1t' fur llaC' I .... , fitll' uf _prrm and fur dll' 
rrlillh'" numltC'n (If II)('rm inwominalnl al linl and 
lIultKe-fluC'''1 illKe-l1limuiulIN. WI!' Ihl'rrti'rl!' carrinl mil 
funlarr IUltlly,il II) d"Irrmillr huw II«'n,ith'l!' our prrdic. 
lill"l wrrt' 10 Ihl'.'" lluumpliUl'I. 
l-'ir-I. til" t'lilimltll.' elf ill,lltlll""C'OIlI lu ... ralt' b". a 
IMltr .1 ... "I.lr<l rrror. Tht' prntirlnl IIC'fUlltI m"l .. 
l'I'r,·C'cll""'1.' "hrll liar mudI'I Will rrrlln u~i"R vAluN ollr 
1I1111.d.,rd rrror t)('luw ur alx)\'1!' Ihl' ml'llfl w ... "'3.~· 
~:l,3u~ Ii,r dl" .. pc ""I)('ri 1111'11 1 a,," 71.+-82.7°;' fi,r Ihr 
m"I""tiWild.h'K nl)('rimrlll. Murru\,rr. Ihl!' mrlhud 
ulirtllo nl;III"11.' till' di~apl)(,lIrI\IIfl!' uf -Ile'rm (cuunlinK 
1i1)('1'''' IIdlarrill" 10 liar \'itrllinC' I,,)'('r) pr('\'t'1I11 allY 
Mlim"Ir uf diliilpprllfIU"'t' nit' brillK m"dr fi,r ltat' 
pl'riud tH'furt" til" fl'rtiliuuiu" Uflh" finl«'JUf, l.ou raiN 
milthl IH' l1Iurh taiKhrr (II"'t' t'~~. havl' 1H'l(un 10 br 
Ie-nili .. nt, fl,r ill~li""'C' if IUII.·frC't' Iiloral(t' iI ph)',io-
lultirally illnllnpatiblr with UNt' (If lil)('rm fi.r frrtilil". 
liull. Wt' tllrrrli,rt' rrlle'IIIC't1 liar cukul"titllu "hh a 
UfO I, .... ralt" u"liI llat' lilllr (If fC'nililali"" uf IIlr finl 
r~K. Ttli. rC'liuhnl ill luwC'r prt'<linnl 1IC'f0nd malt" 
I'rr'l"l'd I' lin- "f 31.~~;' fur Ihl' ,pc nl)('ril1lt'nl and 
~:z ... u u Ii,r Iltr nllut' •• wildlilllC 1!')(I)('ril11C'IU, bUI did nol 
IIl1l'r Iltr (1"lIlilali\'r Jlllllrrn uf " .. Ihrou~h Iht' 1.a)'inK 
Iir(llu',u'r uf rR1(1I. A hi~hrr 1,*11 rialf> unlil Ihl' 
Irl'lililluiun of Ihl' finl tRIf would lliwl' Iltl' O"I'CM~itl!' 
rl\rc'l u" , ..... hUI i. nul In likrly hittltlKit·ltlly. 
SI'('(JIItI. Iht' .Iltntlilrd trrun fi., Ihl' nllllltH'r of IJle'rm 
ill"C'minlllrd III firlll ."d lutlllNJUl'nl ropul.aliu,u art' 
"I"" I"rgt'. fiC'fllllNt' ill. Ihl.' rillio of -I"'rlll from dilTl'rrnl 
III a In I hill iii Ulirtt in ttll' mudC'1 10 dC'lC'rmint' lht' 
rXIH'C'II'ct f.I''', it i. ollly Ih«.' rillil) uf tilt' numlM'n of 
~pC'rm Itl finl! lind IlIb"C'(I"r"l C'upulalioOi "hit'h is 
imporlilnl. Tit" 'Iallel.nd trror uflhl. ralio it approd-
lllillC'ly IAI (Armililj(" & UC'rry 1987), and" hrn " .... 
rrran IhC' nltK"'1 minK valun Ollt' .I.ndard rrror brlow 
Tablr 2. 711 '.ltd .f tllUJ/'J'I'lIl/SMi of J/Jn'" IIltl,jllt"/fI" 
Ji:I .,.. t,,/itlll In~/ •• f JKIfIIIIi _I, ,pn... 1',"ttI,rui ftW 
BirUtdJ rl al:. (I')&fl~' (a' U'C ,.pni"'nI' (b) "'"'''' 
nritdllitt l1/Jnillfnll 
(0) ..PC npni"w-nl 
rAlio 0( .,.-on in I 
hi: r.ubw:qucnl tj.acuLaIl'S • ,6 
i6, fI\41lfM_ill:hinl nprtimml 
rillio ol .. .-nn in I 
I .. : .ubw:qucnl ejacuLal,", ".6 
'lprnn di ... p.,rUAn«' 
r.llr/h-I 
o o,(t!6 
8.4 0• Z6,6~. 
:~,(J.30 • .·J.2~0 
41.6 fi9," 
.6.3 77.9 
Of "bo\" lilt' mr..... Ihr pR'diclcd f('Cond malt' 
pn:crorncr " .... U.S-52. I 0';' ror tht' r.rc t'xJX'rimrnt 
anc.l 76.1-78.9° .. rur tlK' m.Jlt"-nIo'ilching rxprrimrnl. 
11, ... Rmrrtll concluYon from IhNt' "1l~li\iIY IInal),," 
iI Ihal incn-il.wd lICcurACY in Iht' panm('lrr nlimAI"" 
ur in lht' nprrinM'fuollI)' drlrrminrd \'alu«"I of fit'C'Ond 
mAlt' prrcnJrnct> "vuld iQ('ft"llW Iht' p«l"ff of lilt' 
mudd 10 ditCrimirult' bruu't'n difTrrrnl hnlOtbt"lll"1l 
conn-minK thr mn .... nimu of sprnn compt'liliun. 
Our mudd .. ItO llNlmrt ....... llll inttminillrd sJM"ml 
.. film Ihr tin,k comp;anmnll in dlt' modd. "hir'h 
mighl nol br 1M Cil.WO it: fOr rumplt'. fnnalC'S rxprl 
'JM'ml from Illt' rrprodtKlh't' trolcl. 11tH "'ould hA\'t' no 
"'fret on lht' prrdictiom of (ht' modd if Iht' umt' 
JlfoJlortiun of .. II rj.acuLaln lin' t':lpt'lIrd by rrmaln 
(breau\(' only rrl.uI\(, sptTlll numbrn art' importAnl). 
"Ul "auld altrr ltar npt'Clrd Ir\'('1 of pl't'C't'd('nct' if 
frm.alC'S nprllnt • difTrrnll proponiun of rjacut"IN 
(rom difTrrnll mOlln." or- on difTrn-n1 d.n"l rt'1'llin' 10 
l.a)'ing. w ... h",t' no infum"'llon on du·"; fXW"ibililin. 
In adllil;"", Iht' unglr comp ... nmrnl of tilt' mudd 
impliN III.n darrt' is t"IM'nliolUy only Oflt' • roult" by 
"hilh irl\('mi~lcd sprrtn c;an ft'.Jch Iht' infundibulum. 
Bc-cA"'" i. is ~ic.lU)' impl.-.uwblc dlilllpt'mlliiOril!;t' 
lubult'S (.n) do not (unction in spnm slnrARr. Ihill 
llmuunu 10 ll""omeng dul tprrm (Annol pad dirn-tiy 
up lht' rrprutltKli\· ... IrAC1. b)'P"wng tilt' un. 111 ... 
AbililY 0( 'Ilt'fm 10 nploil IIny "rmilil .. 1lioll ",indow' 
(Gbrng d J. 1981) by 1nO\1ng dirn-lly up Ibl!' 
rrprodtKli\ t' tr.'1C1 ,,'OU1d incrt"il.wo Iht' prnticlrd In'''' of 
1 .... 1 m.akspnm prt'Cnlmct' (l..nwoUs & BirlhrAd I~ao). 
f1n.ally. tiM' ConlroUnt orcunulolllCC'I undrr "hkh 
lht' numbrr of 'JXTm irunnen.-urd ,,'rrt' mrAtiUm! in 
upli\il)' ptrdudt' difTrrmcn in n",l" qualilY con· 
lriholin" 10 ditrrrmcn in cj.acul.alt' lizt' brl"l"t'n pair 
and ".an-poUr m.aln. In 11K" "lkl. frmaIN molY chuclIo(' 
Kfxxt qUAlifY nuln "lib "hom 10 pnfonn ll"Cl 
(K ... mpmarn" J. 1m; llolJrr 1994). ThNt' miliN 
nliay .ltO hnf." Laflrr cj.acut.un {Sht'ldon 1994). Ibul 
t'uRRrr,JliIlC 1M dl~proponiotult' IUCCC"ll of.POL 
I n our nlOl.lrl. botb co.ut.1nl d"upprlU'AIlCt' of .prml 
.00 ditrrfrnli .. l rjolCULaIt' ti,t' m.J)' COflulbutt' 10 lilt' 
di'proponion.alt' IUC'c""of'POL To judl:t' Ihnr rt'1.lIi\~ 
impon.allCt' "'~ .lto prrdictnl l PP "h('n no Iprm' 
dit.1plM'.:arrd. or" hrn .U rjolcuLaIC'S ronloUnrd Iht' UI1lt' 
numbrr of sprrm (M"C' , .. bit' 2). 1llNt' c .. lculinion. 
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day OfEPe 
tlgure 2. The optimum time for a single EPC. The expected 
number of extra-pair off.~pring was determined by summing 
,he expected EPP for each chick in the brood (see figure 1), 
and rea(~hes a maximum when the single EPC takes place on 
day -1. 
.uggest that, in the case of single EPC, both constant 
disappearance of sperm and differences in ejaculate 
size have approximately equal effects, and both are 
nceded to achieve high levels OfEPP. In the case of mate 
.witching, disappearance of sperm has an important 
effect relative to that of ejaculate size differences. 
Our conclusion that observed levels of sperm 
precedence in zebra finches do not require any special 
mechanism of sperm competition contrasts with that of 
(.nsells & Birkhead (1990) for the domestic chicken 
Gollus domtsli(us. A series of mathematical models 
.imilar to that used here suggested that observed levels 
of sperm precedence measured by Compton et al. 
(1978) could only be explained by a nonlinear model 
embodying some advantage to the last male, for 
iOJltance sperm displacement or stratification. Recent 
f .. ikd attempts to replicate the empirically measured 
,-alue of second-male precedence (T. R. Birkhead & 
G.J. Wishart, unpublished results) used in these 
models suggest that unreliability in this value may 
.. ccount for the discrepancy between the conclusions 
for domestic chickens and zebra finches. 
An important motive for studying mechanisms of 
.perm competition is as a first step in a functional 
understanding of the copulation b(~haviour of males 
.. nd females. Figure I suggests that an individual able 
10 achieve a single EPC faces a trade-ofT, governed by 
Ihe timing of that EPC, between the number of young 
,hal the EPC can potentially father in the brood and the 
likelihood of paternity of each. By summing the 
('''pected EPP over all off.~pring in the brood (see figure 
2), it is pos.'Iible to predict the optimal timing of an EPC. 
The model suggests that maximum EPP in the whole 
brood is achieved when the EPe occurs on day -I, 
although there is little reduction in EPP if it occurs on 
day 0 or -2. Mate guarding and extra-pair courtship 
in the wild and in aviaries do not show a close fit with 
,his prediction of maximum mate guarding and extra-
pair courtship on day -I. In the wild, mate guarding 
(in the form of following) remains at a constant high 
lc\'el throughout the femalc's fertile pt'riod and extra-
pair courtship peaks on days 0 and 1 of the female cycle 
(Bir~head tt al. 1988b). In aviaries, mate guarding (in 
/'rill. R. SN. /Artd. B (I99~) 
the form of frequent copulations) does peak on day 
-I, but extra-pair mounting peaks earlier, on day -3 
of the female's cycle (Birkhead et al. 1989). The poor fit 
is not surprising given that the optimal timing of an 
EPC is an evolutionary game between the pair male, the 
extra-pair male and the female, in which males may 
have less than perfect information about the timing of 
laying. However, our example illustrates the kinds of 
functional predictions that can be made given a 
knowledge of the mechanism of sperm competition. 
In conclusion, the simple model presented in this 
paper makes predictions which are in agreement with 
the observed levels of precedence in zebra finches in 
captivity. It suggests, therefore, that the outcome of 
sperm competition in this species may simply be a 
consequence of the number of sperm inseminated and 
the constant disappearance of sperm from the re-
productive tract, rather than any specialized mech-
anism. It therefore serves to caution against invoking 
mechanisms that entail an advantage to the last male 
to mate (other than constant disappearance of sperm) 
or the active physiological intervention of the female in 
determining the outcome of sperm competition. How-
ever, the predictions of our model are sensitive to the 
parameter estimates, so further empirical work making 
more accurate estimates will increase the power to 
discriminate between hypotheses: both theoretical 
models and empirical studies arc needed to make 
progress in understanding mechanisms of sperm com-
petition. 
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